The DOI matches its Crossref record; 38 of the 38 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Protest, Deterrence, and Escalation: The Strategic Calculus of Government Repression
Abstract
The theoretical literature on government repression has mostly taken a choice theoretic perspective, wherein either the protest group optimally chooses a protest tactic in response to government behavior or the government optimally chooses a repression strategy. This approach is insufficient for capturing the strategic nature of protest and repression. The theoretical shortcomings of this approach are reflected in contradictory empirical findings on the effects of repression on dissent. The article develops an extensive strategic game between the government and an opposition group that allows one to identify the conditions for successful deterrence or protest. Introducing incomplete information and a third-party threat additionally produces equilibria with repression and escalating violence. The model produces novel testable hypotheses that shed new light on the effect of repression on dissent, the likelihood of violence, and the possibility of a coup. Implications for the domestic democratic peace and “murder in the middle” hypothesis are drawn.
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Cites
Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War
FEARON, J. D., & LAITIN, D. D. (2003) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055403000534 · Cited by 7,366
The Logic of Political Survival
Bueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R. M., & Morrow, J. D. (2003) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4292.001.0001 · Cited by 4,217
Journal of Economic Literature
(2017) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel · Cited by 4,052
The Logic of Violence in Civil War
Kalyvas, S. N. (2006) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511818462 · Cited by 3,314
Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
Cho, I.-K., & Kreps, D. M. (1987) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885060 · Cited by 3,201
(2013) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.103.7.i · Cited by 2,733
The Logic of Violence in Civil War
(2006) · The Logic of Violence in Civil War · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511818462.001 · Cited by 2,402
Inside rebellion: the politics of insurgent violence
(2007) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.44-5891 · Cited by 1,708
Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816–1992
Hegre, H. (2001) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055401000119 · Cited by 1,619
State Repression and Political Order
Davenport, C. (2007) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.10.101405.143216 · Cited by 1,564
Cited by
The Oxford Handbook of Social Movements
(2015) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199678402.001.0001 · Cited by 839
An Empirical Evaluation of Explanations for State Repression
HILL, D. W., & JONES, Z. M. (2014) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055414000306 · Cited by 450
RITTER, E. H., & CONRAD, C. R. (2016) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055415000623 · Cited by 314
Repression, political threats, and survival under autocracy
Escribà-Folch, A. (2013) · International Political Science Review · doi:10.1177/0192512113488259 · Cited by 283
How Sudden Censorship Can Increase Access to Information
HOBBS, W. R., & ROBERTS, M. E. (2018) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055418000084 · Cited by 241
Metadata
- Authors
- Pierskalla, J. H.
- Venue
- Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2009-12-10
- Volume
- 54
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 117-145
- ISSN
- 0022-0027 (ISSN-L)
- 1552-8766
- OpenAlex
- W2069807251
- Cited by
- 322
- References
- 38
- FWCI
- 15.20
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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