The DOI matches its Crossref record; 79 of the 79 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Repression, political threats, and survival under autocracy
Open accessAbstract
Along with the mobilization of political support, repression is one of the two basic instruments dictators use to stay in power. Yet, there is no systematic investigation analyzing whether repression actually helps dictators retain power. This article fills this gap by addressing the simultaneous relationship between survival and repression. The results reveal that repression certainly increases the likelihood of dictators’ survival. Furthermore, this article also analyzes different types of authoritarian leader exit and repression. The article distinguishes between, on the one hand, nonviolent and regular exits and, on the other hand, violent and irregular exits as well as between political terror and restrictions on civil liberties. It argues that terror is effective against threats from organized groups, while restrictions on civil liberties essentially serve to prevent collective action. The empirical evidence confirms that political terror only reduces the likelihood of nonviolent and regular exits. Instead, restrictions on civil liberties are effective in deterring both sorts of threats.
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Citations
Cites
The Logic of Political Survival
Bueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R. M., & Morrow, J. D. (2003) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4292.001.0001 · Cited by 4,217
Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset
GLEDITSCH, N. P., WALLENSTEEN, P., ERIKSSON, M., SOLLENBERG, M., & STRAND, H. (2002) · Journal of Peace Research · doi:10.1177/0022343302039005007 · Cited by 3,846 · cited 2×
“Trade data are from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, while civil war data are from Gleditsch et al. (2002).”
Method(1970) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 3,500
The Politics of Authoritarian Rule
Svolik, M. W. (2012) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139176040 · Cited by 2,611
Elections Without Democracy: Thinking About Hybrid Regimes
Diamond, L. (2002) · Journal of Democracy · doi:10.1353/jod.2002.0025 · Cited by 2,425
What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years?
Geddes, B. (1999) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.2.1.115 · Cited by 2,025 · cited 1×
“First, there are a series of dummy variables distinguishing the type of authoritarian regime: military, party based, and personalist, with monarchies as the excluded category (Geddes, 1999; Geddes et al., 2012).”
BackgroundPolitical Institutions under Dictatorship
Gandhi, J. (2008) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511510090 · Cited by 1,910
Ethnic and Cultural Diversity by Country*
Fearon, J. D. (2003) · Journal of Economic Growth · doi:10.1023/a:1024419522867 · Cited by 1,829
Back to the Future: Modeling Time Dependence in Binary Data
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State Repression and Political Order
Davenport, C. (2007) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.10.101405.143216 · Cited by 1,564 · cited 6×
“Concretely, repression ‘deals with applications of state power that violate First Amendment-type rights, due process in the enforcement and adjudication of law, and personal integrity or security’ (Davenport, 2007a: 2).”
BackgroundInfluential
Cited by
Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A New Data Set
Geddes, B., Wright, J., & Frantz, E. (2014) · Perspectives on Politics · doi:10.1017/s1537592714000851 · Cited by 1,537
Frantz, E., & Kendall-Taylor, A. (2014) · Journal of Peace Research · doi:10.1177/0022343313519808 · Cited by 266
The Ideological Shadow of Authoritarianism
Dinas, E., & Northmore-Ball, K. (2020) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414019852699 · Cited by 138
The Dictator's Digital Toolkit: Explaining Variation in Internet Filtering in Authoritarian Regimes
Hellmeier, S. (2016) · Politics & Policy · doi:10.1111/polp.12189 · Cited by 69
Transnational repression: data advances, comparisons, and challenges
Dukalskis, A., Furstenberg, S., Gorokhovskaia, Y., Heathershaw, J., Lemon, E., & Schenkkan, N. (2022) · Political Research Exchange · doi:10.1080/2474736x.2022.2104651 · Cited by 54
Metadata
- Authors
- Escribà-Folch, A.
- Venue
- International Political Science Review
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2013-07-05
- Volume
- 34
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 543-560
- ISSN
- 0192-5121 (ISSN-L)
- 1460-373X
- OpenAlex
- W3124017819
- Cited by
- 283
- References
- 79
- FWCI
- 27.82
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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