The DOI matches its Crossref record.
Expecting Continued Play in Prisoner's Dilemma Games: A Test of Several Models
Abstract
Several models of prisoner's dilemma interactions were tested in a series of twelve games whose termination point was determined probabilistically. A new model was introduced to discriminate among equilibrium and nonequilibrium situations on the basis of a player's expected benefits or losses for cooperating. The experiment included twelve payoff matrices, three probabilities for continuing, two opponent strategies, and the player's sex as independent variables. Results showed that both the game payoffs and the probability that the game would continue interacted to affect the rates of cooperation observed, and that the equilibrium model predicted this outcome most accurately. While the predictions of each of the models were supported, the equilibrium models appeared to be superior to the others. The discussion highlights the importance of considering the likelihood of a game terminating as a major determinant of the cooperation that can be expected in mixed—motive interactions.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cited by
Rand, D. G., & Nowak, M. A. (2013) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2013.06.003 · Cited by 1,308
Heide, J. B., & Miner, A. S. (1992) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.2307/256374 · Cited by 1,217
The Further Evolution of Cooperation
Axelrod, R., & Dion, D. (1988) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.242.4884.1385 · Cited by 840
The psychology of social dilemmas: A review
Van Lange, P. A. M., Joireman, J., Parks, C. D., & Van Dijk, E. (2013) · Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes · doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2012.11.003 · Cited by 763
Trust, conflict, and cooperation: A meta-analysis.
Balliet, D., & Van Lange, P. A. M. (2013) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/a0030939 · Cited by 659
Metadata
- Authors
- Murnighan, J. K., & Roth, A. E.
- Venue
- Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 1983-06
- Volume
- 27
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 279-300
- ISSN
- 0022-0027 (ISSN-L)
- 1552-8766
- OpenAlex
- W1982121017
- Cited by
- 224
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 9.97
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Expecting Continued Play in Prisoner's Dilemma Games: A Test of Several Models. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1177/0022002783027002004
- The paper
- Murnighan, J. K., & Roth, A. E. (1983). Expecting Continued Play in Prisoner's Dilemma Games: A Test of Several Models. Journal of Conflict Resolution. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002783027002004
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.