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Cited by 224

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Expecting Continued Play in Prisoner's Dilemma Games: A Test of Several Models

Murnighan, J. Keith, Roth, Alvin E.·1983·Journal of Conflict Resolution

Abstract

Several models of prisoner's dilemma interactions were tested in a series of twelve games whose termination point was determined probabilistically. A new model was introduced to discriminate among equilibrium and nonequilibrium situations on the basis of a player's expected benefits or losses for cooperating. The experiment included twelve payoff matrices, three probabilities for continuing, two opponent strategies, and the player's sex as independent variables. Results showed that both the game payoffs and the probability that the game would continue interacted to affect the rates of cooperation observed, and that the equilibrium model predicted this outcome most accurately. While the predictions of each of the models were supported, the equilibrium models appeared to be superior to the others. The discussion highlights the importance of considering the likelihood of a game terminating as a major determinant of the cooperation that can be expected in mixed—motive interactions.

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Metadata

Authors
Murnighan, J. K., & Roth, A. E.
Venue
Journal of Conflict Resolution
Published
1983-06
Volume
27
Issue
2
Pages
279-300
ISSN
  • 0022-0027 (ISSN-L)
  • 1552-8766
OpenAlex
W1982121017
Cited by
224
References
0
FWCI
9.97
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Expecting Continued Play in Prisoner's Dilemma Games: A Test of Several Models. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1177/0022002783027002004
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Murnighan, J. K., & Roth, A. E. (1983). Expecting Continued Play in Prisoner's Dilemma Games: A Test of Several Models. Journal of Conflict Resolution. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002783027002004

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.