The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Volunteer's Dilemma
Abstract
A conflict game simulating social traps in which a collective good can be provided by a volunteer is discussed and some solution concepts are analyzed. There is a greater incentive for “free riding” than for the production of the collective good at the cost of the volunteer. However, if everybody defects, all players will lose. Such a result is frequently produced by “diffusion of responsibility” as described by Darley and Latané (1968). In contrast to other social traps, a dominant strategy does not exist. Also, the mixed-equilibrium strategy yields very low payoffs. The expected gain is not greater than the payoff achieved by the nonequilibrium maximum strategy. Superrationality might be a way out of the trap. However, this concept lacks the desirable equilibrium property. Only in the free communication version of the game can a definitive answer to the question of a rational strategy be given.
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Citations
Cites
The Logic of Collective Action.
Golembiewski, R. T., & Olson, M. (1966) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.2307/2091298 · Cited by 11,364
(1976) · Cited by 10,423
Bystander intervention in emergencies: Diffusion of responsibility.
Darley, J. M., & Latane, B. (1968) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/h0025589 · Cited by 3,083
Collective action as an agreeable n-prisoners' dilemma
Hardin, R. (1971) · Behavioral Science · doi:10.1002/bs.3830160507 · Cited by 370
Cited by
Whitener, E. M., Brodt, S. E., Korsgaard, M. A., & Werner, J. M. (1998) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.1998.926624 · Cited by 4,971
A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments
Dechenaux, E., Kovenock, D., & Sheremeta, R. M. (2015) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-014-9421-0 · Cited by 706
Gender Differences in Accepting and Receiving Requests for Tasks with Low Promotability
Babcock, L., Recalde, M. P., Vesterlund, L., & Weingart, L. (2017) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20141734 · Cited by 507
Cunningham, C., Ederer, F., & Ma, S. (2021) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/712506 · Cited by 452
Sociological Rational Choice Theory
Hechter, M., & Kanazawa, S. (1997) · Annual Review of Sociology · doi:10.1146/annurev.soc.23.1.191 · Cited by 450
Metadata
- Authors
- Diekmann, A.
- Venue
- Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 1985-12
- Volume
- 29
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 605-610
- ISSN
- 0022-0027 (ISSN-L)
- 1552-8766
- OpenAlex
- W2012653702
- Cited by
- 480
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 4.50
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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