The DOI matches its Crossref record; 18 of the 18 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
How to Cope with Noise in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma
Open accessAbstract
Noise in the form of random errors in implementing a choice is a common problem in real-world interactions. Recent research has identified three approaches to coping with noise: adding generosity to a reciprocating strategy; adding contrition to a reciprocating strategy; and using an entirely different strategy, Pavlov, based on the idea of switching choice whenever the previous payoff was low. Tournament studies, ecological simulation, and theoretical analysis demonstrate (1) a generous version of tit-for-tat is a highly effective strategy when the players it meets have not adapted to noise; (2) if the other players have adapted to noise, a contrite version of tit-for-tat is even more effective at quickly restoring mutual cooperation without the risk of exploitation; and (3) Pavlov is not robust.
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Cites
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A strategy of win-stay, lose-shift that outperforms tit-for-tat in the Prisoner's Dilemma game
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Tit for tat in heterogeneous populations
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Self-citationEvolutionary phenomena in simple dynamics
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Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated GamesPreprint
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Mistakes allow evolutionary stability in the repeated prisoner's dilemma game
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The Optimal Level of Generosity in a Selfish, Uncertain Environment
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Cited by
The Complexity of Cooperation: Agent-Based Models of Competition and Collaboration
Fukuyama, F., Axelrod, R., & Jervis, R. (1998) · Foreign Affairs · doi:10.2307/20048800 · Cited by 2,189
Self-citationDispositional Forgiveness of Self, Others, and Situations
Thompson, L. Y., Snyder, C. R., Hoffman, L., Michael, S. T., Rasmussen, H. N., Billings, L. S., Heinze, L., Neufeld, J. E., Shorey, H. S., Roberts, J. C., et al. (2005) · Journal of Personality · doi:10.1111/j.1467-6494.2005.00311.x · Cited by 1,074
The Rupture and Repair of Cooperation in Borderline Personality Disorder
King-Casas, B., Sharp, C., Lomax-Bream, L., Lohrenz, T., Fonagy, P., & Montague, P. R. (2008) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1156902 · Cited by 605
Beyond revenge: the evolution of the forgiveness instinct
(2008) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.46-1772 · Cited by 489
Cognitive systems for revenge and forgiveness
McCullough, M. E., Kurzban, R., & Tabak, B. A. (2013) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x11002160 · Cited by 481
Metadata
- Authors
- Wu, J., & Axelrod, R.
- Venue
- Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 1995-03
- Volume
- 39
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 183-189
- ISSN
- 0022-0027 (ISSN-L)
- 1552-8766
- OpenAlex
- W2130698617
- Cited by
- 293
- References
- 18
- FWCI
- 26.41
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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