Tit for tat in heterogeneous populations
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For direct reciprocity, game theoretical analysis and individual-based simulations have shown that a population of defectors can be invaded by a small cluster of retaliators or even by a single retaliator.
“For direct reciprocity, game theoretical analysis and individual-based simulations have shown that a population of defectors can be invaded by a small cluster of retaliators 31 or even by a single retaliator 32 .”
From Evolution of indirect reciprocity (2005) · cites this paper as [32]
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Self-citation
- Authors
- Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K.
- Affiliations
- University of Oxford (GB)
- University of Vienna (AT)
- Venue
- Nature
- Published
- 1992-01
- Volume
- 355
- Issue
- 6357
- Pages
- 250-253
- ISSN
- 0028-0836 (ISSN-L)
- 1476-4687
- OpenAlex
- W1976528791
- Cited by
- 1,029
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 31 · 2025: 44 · 2024: 50 · 2023: 38 · 2022: 38 · 2021: 50 · 2020: 34 · 2019: 47 · 2018: 44 · 2017: 29 · 2016: 39 · 2015: 44 · 2014: 38 · 2013: 48 · 2012: 58
- FWCI
- 59.90
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Nature (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
- Keywords
- tit-for-tat, iterated prisoner's dilemma, evolution of cooperation, heterogeneous populations, reciprocity, randomness, evolutionarily stable strategy, Axelrod tournaments
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Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
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