The Relationship between Coercion and Protest: An Empirical Evaluation in Three Coercive States
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 33 of the 33 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The relationship between coercion and protest, arguably the core of any theory of rebellion, remains unresolved. Competing hypotheses have emerged from formal models and empirical research. This article uses two forms of the predator-prey model to test these competing hypotheses. Time-series data from three coercive states (the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, and the Palestinian Intifada) are used to estimate parameters for both models. Results show stable, damped relationships in all three cases. The “inverted U” hypothesis receives less support than its “backlash” alternative, that is, that dissidents react strongly to extremely harsh coercion. Moreover, the study indicates that protesters adapt to coercion by changing tactics.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Francisco, R. A.
- Venue
- Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 1995-06
- Volume
- 39
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 263-282
- ISSN
- 0022-0027 (ISSN-L)
- 1552-8766
- OpenAlex
- W1985373000
- Cited by
- 304
- References
- 33
- FWCI
- 6.60
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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