The DOI matches its Crossref record; 15 of the 15 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
How Civil Wars End: A Rational Choice Approach
Abstract
What conditions determine whether a civil war ends in a negotiated settlement or a military victory? The authors address this question by developing an expected utility model of the choice between seeking an immediate settlement or continuing to fight in anticipation of eventual victory. The model implies that the likelihood of a settlement varies with estimates of the probability of winning, the time required to win, the rate at which the costs of conflict accrue, and the payoffs for victory versus settlement. Logistic regression results suggest that a settlement becomes less likely the larger the government's army and more likely the longer the civil war lasts. Payoff and cost variables had no effect on the likelihood of a settlement.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
(1970) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 3,500
Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts
Fukuyama, F., & Gurr, T. R. (1994) · Foreign Affairs · doi:10.2307/20046672 · Cited by 900
The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945–1993
Licklider, R. (1995) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2082982 · Cited by 736
World Military and Social Expenditures, 1974
Sivard, R. L., & Institute for World Order (1982) · DigitalGeorgetown (Georgetown University Library) · doi:10.6077/0zc1-tr77 · Cited by 554
Ethnic Conflict in World Politics
Harff, B., & Gurr, T. R. (2018) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9780429495250 · Cited by 325
World military and social expenditures
Newcomer, K. E. (1982) · Women's Studies International Forum · doi:10.1016/0277-5395(82)90049-8 · Cited by 309
How a War Ends: A Rational Model Approach
Wittman, D. (1979) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/002200277902300408 · Cited by 261
Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process
Campbell, J. C., & Pillar, P. R. (1983) · Foreign Affairs · doi:10.2307/20041830 · Cited by 214
Iklé, F. C. (1971) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 197
Correlates of War Project: International and Civil War Data, 1816-1992: Archival Version
Singer, J. D., & Small, M. (1994) · ICPSR Data Holdings · doi:10.3886/icpsr09905 · Cited by 169
Cited by
International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis
Doyle, M. W., & Sambanis, N. (2000) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2586208 · Cited by 1,234
The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement
Walter, B. F. (1997) · International Organization · doi:10.1162/002081897550384 · Cited by 1,083
Inequality, Grievances, and Civil War
Cederman, L.-E., Gleditsch, K. S., & Buhaug, H. (2013) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139084161 · Cited by 978
Measuring state capacity: Theoretical and empirical implications for the study of civil conflict
Hendrix, C. S. (2010) · Journal of Peace Research · doi:10.1177/0022343310361838 · Cited by 795
What Is Civil War?: Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational Definition
Sambanis, N. (2004) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002704269355 · Cited by 779
Metadata
- Authors
- Mason, T. D., & Fett, P. J.
- Venue
- Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 1996-12
- Volume
- 40
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 546-568
- ISSN
- 0022-0027 (ISSN-L)
- 1552-8766
- OpenAlex
- W2317953442
- Cited by
- 327
- References
- 15
- FWCI
- 14.74
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: How Civil Wars End: A Rational Choice Approach. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1177/0022002796040004002
- The paper
- Mason, T. D., & Fett, P. J. (1996). How Civil Wars End: A Rational Choice Approach. Journal of Conflict Resolution. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002796040004002
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.