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Cited by 217

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Explaining the Stability of Negotiated Settlements to Intrastate Wars

Hartzell, Caroline A. · 1999 · Journal of Conflict Resolution

Abstract

Although the majority of civil wars end when one warring party achieves a victory over the other, negotiated agreements are growing more common as a means of ending intrastate conflict. To explain why some negotiated settlements prove stable and others do not, scholars have examined the impact of factors such as superpower conflict, group identities, and third-party guarantors. This article argues that those negotiated settlements that are the most extensively institutionalized—that is, that provide institutional guarantees for the security threats antagonists face as they move toward a situation of centralized state power—are the ones most likely to prove stable. An analysis of all settlements negotiated to end intrastate conflicts during the period between 1945 and 1997 supports this proposition.

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Metadata

Authors
Hartzell, C. A.
Venue
Journal of Conflict Resolution
Published
1999-02
Volume
43
Issue
1
Pages
3-22
ISSN
  • 0022-0027 (ISSN-L)
  • 1552-8766
OpenAlex
W2166372769
Cited by
217
References
4
FWCI
21.36
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Explaining the Stability of Negotiated Settlements to Intrastate Wars. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1177/0022002799043001001
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Hartzell, C. A. (1999). Explaining the Stability of Negotiated Settlements to Intrastate Wars. Journal of Conflict Resolution. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002799043001001

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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.