The DOI matches its Crossref record; 68 of the 69 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A dictator’s toolkit
Abstract
A dictator’s motivation for using repression is fairly clear, but why some repress more than others or favor particular types of repressive strategies is less obvious. Using statistical analysis, this article demonstrates that a dictator’s reliance on co-optation fundamentally alters how repression is used. Specifically, it finds that co-optation through the use of political parties and a legislature creates incentives that lead dictators to decrease empowerment rights restrictions, like censorship, while increasing physical integrity rights violations, like torture and political imprisonment. This occurs because, by creating parties and a legislature, a dictator draws his potential opposition out of the general public and into state institutions, making it easier to identify who these opponents are, to monitor their activities, and to gauge the extent of their popular support. This reduces the need to impose broad types of repressive measures, like empowerment rights restrictions, that breed discontent within the overall population. At the same time, co-optation creates the risk that rivals, once co-opted, will use their positions within the system to build their own bases of support from which to seek the dictator’s overthrow, generating incentives for dictators to increase physical integrity violations to limit the threat posed by these individuals.
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“In the tests that follow, we evaluate the effect of cooptation on future (as opposed to contemporaneous) levels of repression because research has indicated that changes in institutions of governance often take a few years to impact policy outcomes (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003).”
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Metadata
- Authors
- Frantz, E., & Kendall-Taylor, A.
- Affiliations
- Bridgewater State University (US)
- Government of the United States of America (US)
- Corresponding author
- Kendall-Taylor, Andrea
- ORCID
- Frantz, Erica
- Venue
- Journal of Peace Research
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2014-03-20
- Volume
- 51
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 332-346
- ISSN
- 0022-3433 (ISSN-L)
- 1460-3578
- OpenAlex
- W2070733498
- Cited by
- 266
- References
- 69
- Citations by year
- 2026: 19 · 2025: 68 · 2024: 15 · 2023: 12 · 2022: 17 · 2021: 39 · 2020: 28 · 2019: 11 · 2018: 24 · 2017: 11 · 2016: 14 · 2015: 7 · 2014: 1
- FWCI
- 35.83
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- Locations
- Journal of Peace Research (publishedVersion)
- Journal of international women's studies (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Political Conflict and Governance
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History › Memory, violence, and history
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › International Relations and Foreign Policy
- Keywords
- dictatorship, repression, co-optation, political parties, legislatures, censorship, torture, political imprisonment, physical integrity rights
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