The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Knowledge of What Might have Been: Affective and Attributional Consequences of Near Outcomes
Abstract
This study examined certain affective and attributional consequences of outcomes and "near outcomes"in the lives of target individuals. A total of 121 subjects read versions of scenarios that systematically differed in the valence of a major life outcome and whether the outcome actually or only nearly happened (the "near outcome"). Results generally indicated that near outcomes as well as actual out-comes had significant impact on the perceived affective consequences of the situation, and that near outcomes also affected trait inferences and predictions regarding the target person. Differences between the perceived affective consequences of positive near outcomes and negative near outcomes were generally a function of differences in the valence of the near outcomes rather than of differences in objective circumstances. Other results also reflected a derogation of the "near winner." The personalities of individuals who narrowly missed experiencing a positive event were rated more negatively; they also were judged as less likely to be successful and less likely to feel positively about their lives in the future. These results are discussed in terms of the suggestions of Kahneman and Tversky (1982) that individuals who learn of a near outcome may simulate its actual occurrence, and that the "simulation heuristic "may shape both inferences and affective states.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
From acts to dispositions the attribution process in person perception
Jones, E. E., & Davis, K. E. (1965) · Advances in Experimental Social Psychology · doi:10.1016/s0065-2601(08)60107-0 · Cited by 3,424
Observer's reaction to the "innocent victim": Compassion or rejection?
Lerner, M. J., & Simmons, C. H. (1966) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/h0023562 · Cited by 921
Cited by
Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment
Bottom, W. P., Gilovich, T., Griffin, D., & Kahneman, D. (2004) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/20159081 · Cited by 3,536
Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.
Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.004 · Cited by 3,476
Norm theory: Comparing reality to its alternatives.
Kahneman, D., & Miller, D. T. (1986) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.93.2.136 · Cited by 3,024
Slovic, P., Finucane, M., Peters, E., & MacGregor, D. G. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.025 · Cited by 2,349
“Clinical versus Actuarial Judgment.”
Dawes, R. M., Faust, D., & Meehl, P. E. (1989) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.2648573 · Cited by 2,298
Metadata
- Authors
- Johnson, J. T.
- Venue
- Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 1986-03
- Volume
- 12
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 51-62
- ISSN
- 0146-1672 (ISSN-L)
- 1552-7433
- OpenAlex
- W1965380301
- Cited by
- 177
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 3.41
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.