Ranking Games
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 21 of the 21 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Background: Research rankings based on bibliometrics today dominate governance in academia and determine careers in universities. Method: Analytical approach to capture the incentives by users of rankings and by suppliers of rankings, both on an individual and an aggregate level. Result: Rankings may produce unintended negative side effects. In particular, rankings substitute the “taste for science” by a “taste for publication.” We show that the usefulness of rankings rests on several important assumptions challenged by recent research. Conclusion: We suggest as alternatives careful socialization and selection of scholars, supplemented by periodic self-evaluations and awards. The aim is to encourage controversial discourses in order to contribute meaningful to the advancement of science.
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Cites
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Cited by
Citations, Citation Indicators, and Research Quality: An Overview of Basic Concepts and Theories
Aksnes, D. W., Langfeldt, L., & Wouters, P. (2019) · Sage Open · doi:10.1177/2158244019829575 · Cited by 1,257
The Hong Kong Principles for assessing researchers: Fostering research integrity
Moher, D., Bouter, L., Kleinert, S., Glasziou, P., Sham, M. H., Barbour, V., Coriat, A.-M., Foeger, N., & Dirnagl, U. (2020) · PLOS Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.3000737 · Cited by 540
Quan (2017) · doi:10.1108/ajim-01-2017-0014 · Cited by 306
Swedberg, R. (2020) · The Production of Knowledge · doi:10.1017/9781108762519.002 · Cited by 293
How the publish-or-perish principle divides a science: the case of economists
van Dalen, H. P. (2021) · Scientometrics · doi:10.1007/s11192-020-03786-x · Cited by 128
Metadata
- Authors
- Osterloh, M., & Frey, B. S.
- Venue
- Evaluation Review
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2014-08-04
- Volume
- 39
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 102-129
- ISSN
- 0145-4692 (ISSN-L)
- 0193-841X
- 1552-3926
- OpenAlex
- W4211240286
- Cited by
- 123
- References
- 21
- FWCI
- 4.16
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.