Clinical Assessment of the Probability of Coronary Artery Disease: Judgmental Bias from Personal Knowledge
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Abstract
Probability estimates of angiographic coronary artery disease made by experienced, board- certified staff cardiologists were compared with those of cardiologists in training (fellows). In addition, estimates made before coronary angiography were compared with those made several months later based on written clinical summaries of 15 items of objective clinical and test data. Cardiologists were asked to estimate the probabilities of coronary artery disease, multivessel disease, and triple-vessel or left main disease. The study population consisted of 510 consecutive patients without valvular disease referred for the first time for coronary angiography to three hospitals. Both staff and fellows consistently overestimated the pre-angiographic probability of coronary artery disease. The probabilities estimated from patient summaries were always significantly lower than the pre-angiographic assessments. Only staff cardiologists reliably assessed the probabilities of coronary artery disease during the second assessment (p < 0.05). Thus, estimates of disease probability based on clinical judgment vary according to the source of information, and these estimates are more accurate when physicians have objective data on hand and do not know the identities of the patients. Key words: judgment; disease probability; disease estimate; coronary artery disease; clinical assessment; value-induced bias. (Med Decis Making 1992;12:197-203)
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Cited by
Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment
Bottom, W. P., Gilovich, T., Griffin, D., & Kahneman, D. (2004) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/20159081 · Cited by 3,536
Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.
Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.004 · Cited by 3,476
Slovic, P., Finucane, M., Peters, E., & MacGregor, D. G. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.025 · Cited by 2,349
Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment
(2002) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098 · Cited by 2,192
The weighing of evidence and the determinants of confidence
Griffin, D., & Tversky, A. (1992) · Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1016/0010-0285(92)90013-r · Cited by 1,841
Metadata
- Authors
- Bobbio, M., Detrano, R., Shandling, A. H., Ellestad, M. H., Clark, J., Brezden, O., Abecia, A., & Martinez-Caro, D.
- Venue
- Medical Decision Making
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 1992-08
- Volume
- 12
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 197-203
- ISSN
- 0272-989X (ISSN-L)
- 1552-681X
- OpenAlex
- W2130101569
- Cited by
- 72
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 5.43
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Bobbio, M., Detrano, R., Shandling, A. H., Ellestad, M. H., Clark, J., Brezden, O., Abecia, A., & Martinez-Caro, D. (1992). Clinical Assessment of the Probability of Coronary Artery Disease: Judgmental Bias from Personal Knowledge. Medical Decision Making. https://doi.org/10.1177/0272989x9201200305
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