The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Probability Judgment in Medicine: Discounting Unspecified Possibilities
Abstract
Research in cognitive psychology has indicated that alternative descriptions of the same event can give rise to different probability judgments. This observation has led to the de velopment of a descriptive account, called support theory, which assumes that the judged probability of an explicit description of an event (that lists specific possibilities) generally exceeds the judged probability of an implicit description of the same event (that does not mention specific possibilities). To investigate this assumption in medical judgment, the au thors presented physicians with brief clinical scenarios describing individual patients and elicited diagnostic and prognostic probability judgments. The results showed that the phy sicians tended to discount unspecified possibilities, as predicted by support theory. The authors suggest that an awareness of the discrepancy between intuitive judgments and the laws of chance may provide opportunities for improving medical decision making. Key words: probability judgment; support theory; unpacking principle; cognition. (Med Decis Making 1995;15:227-230)
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Citations
Cites
Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases
(1982) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511809477 · Cited by 8,240
Support theory: a nonextensional representation of subjective probability
Tversky, A., & Koehler, D. J. (1994) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.101.4.547 · Cited by 1,167
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Cited by
Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment
Bottom, W. P., Gilovich, T., Griffin, D., & Kahneman, D. (2004) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/20159081 · Cited by 3,536
Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.
Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.004 · Cited by 3,476
Slovic, P., Finucane, M., Peters, E., & MacGregor, D. G. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.025 · Cited by 2,349
Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment
(2002) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098 · Cited by 2,192
Support theory: a nonextensional representation of subjective probability
Tversky, A., & Koehler, D. J. (1994) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.101.4.547 · Cited by 1,167
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Metadata
- Authors
- Redelmeier, D. A., Koehler, D. J., Liberman, V., & Tversky, A.
- Venue
- Medical Decision Making
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 1995-08
- Volume
- 15
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 227-230
- ISSN
- 0272-989X (ISSN-L)
- 1552-681X
- OpenAlex
- W2004740854
- Cited by
- 205
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 3.70
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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