The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Incentive and Tax Effects of Executive Compensation Plans
Abstract
The ability of two (non-mutually exclusive) potential explanations for executive compensation plans is examined. One is that the plans reduce the combined tax liability of the corporation and its managers. The other is that the plans encourage the managers to maximize the value of the firm. It is found that the tax effect can explain some of the popularity of compensation plans, some of the variation in their use across firms, and the timing of changes in the provisions of the plans. However, there are variations in the cross-sectional use of the plans which cannot be explained by taxes, which can be explained by incentive effects.
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Cites
Why Is There Mandatory Retirement?
Lazear, E. P. (1979) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260835 · Cited by 2,038
Cited by
Conservatism in Accounting Part I: Explanations and Implications
Watts, R. L. (2003) · Accounting Horizons · doi:10.2308/acch.2003.17.3.207 · Cited by 2,763
Self-citationThe relevance of the value-relevance literature for financial accounting standard setting
Holthausen, R. W., & Watts, R. L. (2001) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/s0165-4101(01)00029-5 · Cited by 1,742
Self-citationThe use of equity grants to manage optimal equity incentive levels
Core, J., & Guay, W. (1999) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/s0165-4101(99)00019-1 · Cited by 1,456
Gaver, J. J., & Gaver, K. M. (1993) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/0165-4101(93)90007-3 · Cited by 1,257
Managerial competition, information costs, and corporate governance
DeAngelo, L. E. (1988) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/0165-4101(88)90021-3 · Cited by 586
Metadata
- Authors
- Smith, C. W., & Watts, R. L.
- Venue
- Australian Journal of Management
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 1982-12
- Volume
- 7
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 139-157
- ISSN
- 0312-8962 (ISSN-L)
- 1327-2020
- OpenAlex
- W1977211709
- Cited by
- 371
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 45.18
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
