The application of animal signaling theory to human phenomena: some thoughts and clarifications
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Animal signaling theory has recently become popular among anthropologists as a way to study human communication. One aspect of animal signaling theory, often known as costly signaling or handicap theory, has been used particularly often. This article makes four points regarding these developments: (1) signaling theory is broader than existing studies may make it seem; (2) costly signaling theory has roots in the social as well as the biological sciences; (3) not all honest signals are costly and not all costs borne by signalers serve to ensure honesty; and (4) hard-to-fake signals are favored when the interests of broad categories of signalers and receivers conflict but the interests of individual signalers and receivers converge.
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Citations
Cites
Mate selection—A selection for a handicap
Zahavi, A. (1975) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/0022-5193(75)90111-3 · Cited by 5,251
Biological signals as handicaps
Grafen, A. (1990) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/s0022-5193(05)80088-8 · Cited by 2,462
Signaling, solidarity, and the sacred: The evolution of religious behavior
Sosis, R., & Alcorta, C. (2003) · Evolutionary Anthropology: Issues, News, and Reviews · doi:10.1002/evan.10120 · Cited by 699
Cooperation and Commune Longevity: A Test of the Costly Signaling Theory of Religion
Sosis, R., & Bressler, E. R. (2003) · Cross-Cultural Research · doi:10.1177/1069397103037002003 · Cited by 569
Sosis, R., & Ruffle, B. J. (2003) · Current Anthropology · doi:10.1086/379260 · Cited by 389
The hunting handicap: costly signaling in human foraging strategies
Bliege Bird, R., Smith, E., & Bird, D. (2001) · Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology · doi:10.1007/s002650100338 · Cited by 372
The evolution of magnanimity: When is it better to give than to receive?
Boone, J. L. (1998) · Human Nature · doi:10.1007/s12110-998-1009-y · Cited by 172
Cited by
Rethinking the Theoretical Foundation of Sociobiology
Wilson, D. S., & Wilson, E. O. (2007) · The Quarterly Review of Biology · doi:10.1086/522809 · Cited by 1,206
Towards a unified science of cultural evolution
Mesoudi, A., Whiten, A., & Laland, K. N. (2006) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x06009083 · Cited by 864
What is bullying? A theoretical redefinition
Volk, A. A., Dane, A. V., & Marini, Z. A. (2014) · Developmental Review · doi:10.1016/j.dr.2014.09.001 · Cited by 519
Social benefits of luxury brands as costly signals of wealth and status
Nelissen, R. M. A., & Meijers, M. H. C. (2011) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2010.12.002 · Cited by 471
Personnel selection as a signaling game.
Bangerter, A., Roulin, N., & König, C. J. (2012) · Journal of Applied Psychology · doi:10.1037/a0026078 · Cited by 309
Metadata
- Authors
- Cronk, L.
- Venue
- Social Science Information
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2005-12
- Volume
- 44
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 603-620
- ISSN
- 0539-0184 (ISSN-L)
- 1461-7412
- OpenAlex
- W2124898613
- Cited by
- 109
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 2.50
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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