The DOI matches its Crossref record; 61 of the 61 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Political Economy of Institutions and Corruption in American States
Open accessAbstract
Theoretically, this article draws on political agency theory to formulate hypotheses. Empirically, it shows that political institutions have a role in explaining the prevalence of political corruption in American states. In the states, a set of democracies where the rule of law is relatively well established and the confounding effects of differing electoral systems and regimes are absent, institutional variables relating to the openness of the political system inhibit corruption. That is, other things equal, the extent to which aspiring politicians can enter and gain financial backing, and to which voters can focus their votes on policies and thereby hold incumbent politicians accountable for policy outcomes and find substitutes for them if dissatisfied with those outcomes, reduce corruption as a general problem of agency. These institutional effects are estimated in the presence of controls for variables representing other approaches.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action
Ostrom, E. (1990) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511807763 · Cited by 20,653
The Logic of Collective Action.
Golembiewski, R. T., & Olson, M. (1966) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.2307/2091298 · Cited by 11,364
Mauro, P. (1995) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2946696 · Cited by 8,820
The Theory of Economic Regulation
Stigler, G. J. (1971) · The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science · doi:10.2307/3003160 · Cited by 8,098
Why do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output Per Worker than Others?
Hall, R. E., & Jones, C. I. (1999) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355399555954 · Cited by 7,879
La Porta, R. (1999) · Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/jleo/15.1.222 · Cited by 5,699
The Theory of Economic Regulation
Stigler, G. J. (2021) · The Political Economy · doi:10.4324/9781315495811-8 · Cited by 5,483
Djankov, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2002) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355302753399436 · Cited by 3,956 · cited 1×
“'D ; *&" ) " #" & " D = ') " +) ) D 6 "+ + $ & # $ ) D ?”
The causes of corruption: a cross-national study
Treisman, D. (2000) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/s0047-2727(99)00092-4 · Cited by 3,889
Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development
Olson, M. (1993) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2938736 · Cited by 3,794
Cited by
What Is Quality of Government? A Theory of Impartial Government Institutions
ROTHSTEIN, B., & TEORELL, J. (2008) · Governance · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0491.2008.00391.x · Cited by 1,446
Glaeser, E. L., & Saks, R. E. (2006) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2005.08.007 · Cited by 788
The multiple facets of social capital
Bjørnskov, C. (2006) · European Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2005.05.006 · Cited by 508
PROPOSAL FOR A NEW MEASURE OF CORRUPTION, ILLUSTRATED WITH ITALIAN DATA
Golden, M. A., & Picci, L. (2005) · Economics and Politics · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0343.2005.00146.x · Cited by 470
Constitutions and Economic Policy
Persson, T., & Tabellini, G. (2004) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/089533004773563449 · Cited by 306
Metadata
- Authors
- Alt, J. E., & Lassen, D. D.
- Venue
- Journal of Theoretical Politics
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2003-07
- Volume
- 15
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 341-365
- ISSN
- 0951-6298 (ISSN-L)
- 1460-3667
- OpenAlex
- W1577114345
- Cited by
- 292
- References
- 61
- FWCI
- 21.84
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The Political Economy of Institutions and Corruption in American States. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1177/0951692803015003006
- The paper
- Alt, J. E., & Lassen, D. D. (2003). The Political Economy of Institutions and Corruption in American States. Journal of Theoretical Politics. https://doi.org/10.1177/0951692803015003006
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
