The DOI matches its Crossref record; 32 of the 32 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational Choice Approach
Abstract
This article examines recent developments in a literature referred to as `the new institutionalism'. After reviewing some of the consequences for the study of institutions of the behavioral revolution and the elaboration of Arrovian theories of social choice, the author develops the theory of structure-induced equilibrium and explores the two sides of the institutional coin - an examination of the consequences of institutional structure and an explanation of the development of institutional structure.
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Self-citation
Cited by
HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS
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Metadata
- Authors
- Shepsle, K. A.
- Venue
- Journal of Theoretical Politics
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 1989-04
- Volume
- 1
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 131-147
- ISSN
- 0951-6298 (ISSN-L)
- 1460-3667
- OpenAlex
- W2026904251
- Cited by
- 727
- References
- 32
- FWCI
- 15.80
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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