The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A Theory of Full International Cooperation
Abstract
This paper develops a coherent theory of international cooperation relying on the twin assumptions of individual and collective rationality. Using a linear version of the N-player prisoner's dilemma game, I provide a formal proof of Olson's conjecture that only a `small' number of countries can sustain full cooperation by means of a self-enforcing agreement. Moreover, I find that this number is not fixed but depends on the nature of the cooperation problem; for some problems, three countries will be `too many', while for others even 200 countries will be a `small' number. In addition, I find that the international system is only able to sustain global cooperation - that is, cooperation involving 200 or so countries - by a self-enforcing treaty when the gains to cooperation are `small'. Finally, I find that the ability of the international system to sustain cooperation does not hinge on whether the compliance norm of customary international law has been internalized by states or whether compliance must instead be enforced by the use of treaty-based sanctions. The constraint on international cooperation is free-rider deterrence, not compliance enforcement.
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Citations
Cites
Olson, M. (1965) · doi:10.4159/9780674041660 · Cited by 14,191
The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
Fudenberg, D., & Maskin, E. (1986) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911307 · Cited by 2,395
OLSON, M. (2009) · doi:10.2307/j.ctvjsf3ts · Cited by 1,601
Cited by
Human Well-Being and the Natural Environment
Dasgupta, P. (2001) · doi:10.1093/0199247889.001.0001 · Cited by 794
Thirteen plus one: a comparison of global climate policy architectures
Aldy, J. E., Barrett, S., & Stavins, R. N. (2003) · Climate Policy · doi:10.1016/j.clipol.2003.09.004 · Cited by 409
Self-citationEnvironment and Statecraft: The Strategy of Environmental Treaty-Making
Barrett, S. (2005) · doi:10.1093/0199286094.001.0001 · Cited by 373
Self-citationCommitment failures are unlikely to undermine public support for the Paris agreement
Beiser-McGrath, L. F., & Bernauer, T. (2019) · Nature Climate Change · doi:10.1038/s41558-019-0414-z · Cited by 70
Metadata
- Authors
- Barrett, S.
- Venue
- Journal of Theoretical Politics
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 1999-10
- Volume
- 11
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 519-541
- ISSN
- 0951-6298 (ISSN-L)
- 1460-3667
- OpenAlex
- W1998406066
- Cited by
- 249
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 104.75
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Barrett, S. (1999). A Theory of Full International Cooperation. Journal of Theoretical Politics. https://doi.org/10.1177/0951692899011004004
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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