We See More Than We Can Report: “Cost Free” Color Phenomenality Outside Focal Attention
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The distinction between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness is a subject of intensive debate. According to one view, visual experience overflows the capacity of the attentional and working memory system: We see more than we can report. According to the opposed view, this perceived richness is an illusion—we are aware only of information that we can subsequently report. This debate remains unresolved because of the inevitable reliance on report, which is limited in capacity. To bypass this limitation, this study utilized color diversity—a unique summary statistic—which is sensitive to detailed visual information. Participants were shown a Sperling-like array of colored letters, one row of which was precued. After reporting a letter from the cued row, participants estimated the color diversity of the noncued rows. Results showed that people could estimate the color diversity of the noncued array without a cost to letter report, which suggests that color diversity is registered automatically, outside focal attention, and without consuming additional working memory resources.
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Citations
Cites
The information available in brief visual presentations
Sperling, G. (1960) · Psychological Monographs: General and Applied · doi:10.1037/h0093759 · Cited by 4,042
On a confusion about a function of consciousness
Block, N. (1995) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00038188 · Cited by 3,364 · cited 1×
“According to the rich-experience hypothesis proposed by Block, Lamme, and colleagues (Block, 1995, 2007, 2011; Lamme, 2006), visual consciousness arises Corresponding Authors: Marius Usher, Tel Aviv University, School of Psychology, Ramat-Aviv, Tel Aviv 69978, Israel E-mail:…”
BackgroundConscious, preconscious, and subliminal processing: a testable taxonomy
Dehaene, S., Changeux, J.-P., Naccache, L., Sackur, J., & Sergent, C. (2006) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2006.03.007 · Cited by 2,067
Towards a true neural stance on consciousness
Lamme, V. A. F. (2006) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2006.09.001 · Cited by 1,149 · cited 4×
“According to the rich-experience hypothesis proposed by Block, Lamme, and colleagues (Block, 1995, 2007, 2011; Lamme, 2006), visual consciousness arises Corresponding Authors: Marius Usher, Tel Aviv University, School of Psychology, Ramat-Aviv, Tel Aviv 69978, Israel E-mail:…”
BackgroundResultInfluentialConsciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience
Block, N. (2007) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x07002786 · Cited by 1,146
Attention and consciousness: two distinct brain processes
Koch, C., & Tsuchiya, N. (2007) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2006.10.012 · Cited by 1,046
Empirical support for higher-order theories of conscious awareness
Lau, H., & Rosenthal, D. (2011) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2011.05.009 · Cited by 869 · cited 2×
“We focused on color information because it is a major component of visual phenomenology1 and has been argued to be lost outside focal attention (Lau & Rosenthal, 2011).”
BackgroundMethodConsciousness cannot be separated from function
Cohen, M. A., & Dennett, D. C. (2011) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2011.06.008 · Cited by 542
Cited by
Integrated information theory: from consciousness to its physical substrate
Tononi, G., Boly, M., Massimini, M., & Koch, C. (2016) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn.2016.44 · Cited by 1,727
No-Report Paradigms: Extracting the True Neural Correlates of Consciousness
Tsuchiya, N., Wilke, M., Frässle, S., & Lamme, V. A. F. (2015) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2015.10.002 · Cited by 551
Whitney, D., & Yamanashi Leib, A. (2018) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-010416-044232 · Cited by 453
What is the Bandwidth of Perceptual Experience?
Cohen, M. A., Dennett, D. C., & Kanwisher, N. (2016) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2016.03.006 · Cited by 419
Automaticity: Componential, Causal, and Mechanistic Explanations
Moors, A. (2016) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-122414-033550 · Cited by 210
Metadata
- Authors
- Bronfman, Z. Z., Brezis, N., Jacobson, H., & Usher, M.
- Venue
- Psychological Science
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2014-05-09
- Volume
- 25
- Issue
- 7
- Pages
- 1394-1403
- ISSN
- 0956-7976 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-9280
- OpenAlex
- W2169977393
- Cited by
- 142
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 4.94
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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