Cited by 542Philosophy and Theoretical ScienceFree Will and AgencyPhilosophy and History of Science

Consciousness cannot be separated from function

Cohen, Michael A., Dennett, Daniel C.·2011·Trends in Cognitive Sciences

Abstract

Numerous theories of consciousness hold that there are separate neural correlates of conscious experience and cognitive function, aligning with the assumption that there are 'hard' and 'easy' problems of consciousness. Here, we argue that any neurobiological theory based on an experience/function division cannot be empirically confirmed or falsified and is thus outside the scope of science. A 'perfect experiment' illustrates this point, highlighting the unbreachable boundaries of the scientific study of consciousness. We describe a more nuanced notion of cognitive access that captures personal experience without positing the existence of inaccessible conscious states. Finally, we discuss the criteria necessary for forming and testing a falsifiable theory of consciousness.

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Crossref · 10.1016/j.tics.2011.06.008

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79 of 79 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • The majority of respondents do not adhere to a fully functionalist interpretation of consciousness.

    “This suggests that the majority of respondents do not adhere to a fully functionalist interpretation of consciousness (Dennett 1991; Cohen and Dennett 2011), although respondents are divided about this issue.”
  • This may explain the historical affinity between Active Inference based accounts of consciousness and Global Workspace Theory.

    “This may explain the historical affinity between Active Inference based accounts of consciousness and Global Workspace Theory (Hohwy, 2013; Whyte, 2019), which identifies access consciousness as the primary (and perhaps exclusive) explanandum for the science of consciousness (Cohen & Dennett, 2011; Dehaene et al., 2006; Naccache, 2018).”
  • For this reason, IIT does not regard functional (or behavioural) properties as reliable indicators or satisfying explanations of consciousness.

    “For this reason, IIT does not regard functional (or behavioural) properties as reliable indicators or satisfying explanations of consciousness (Ellia et al., 2021; Tononi & Koch, 2015; cf. Cohen & Dennett, 2011).”

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Authors
Cohen, M. A., & Dennett, D. C.
Affiliations
  • Harvard University (US)
  • Tufts University (US)
Corresponding author
  • Cohen, Michael A.
  • Dennett, Daniel C.
Venue
Trends in Cognitive Sciences
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2011-08
Volume
15
Issue
8
Pages
358-364
ISSN
1364-6613 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2049524306
Cited by
542
References
79
Citations by year
2026: 53 · 2025: 36 · 2024: 29 · 2023: 79 · 2022: 42 · 2021: 30 · 2020: 25 · 2019: 37 · 2018: 53 · 2017: 35 · 2016: 12 · 2015: 35 · 2014: 21 · 2013: 32 · 2012: 20
FWCI
3.15
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Trends in Cognitive Sciences (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Funders
National Science Foundation
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Free Will and Agency
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy and History of Science
Keywords
consciousness, hard problem of consciousness, neural correlates of consciousness, subjective experience, cognitive function, falsifiability, cognitive access, personal experience, theory of consciousness
MeSH terms
Animals, Brain, Brain Mapping, Consciousness, Humans, Models, Biological

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