Nothing Happens by Accident, or Does It? A Low Prior for Randomness Does Not Explain Belief in Conspiracy Theories
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 49 of the 49 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Belief in conspiracy theories has often been associated with a biased perception of randomness, akin to a nothing-happens-by-accident heuristic. Indeed, a low prior for randomness (i.e., believing that randomness is a priori unlikely) could plausibly explain the tendency to believe that a planned deception lies behind many events, as well as the tendency to perceive meaningful information in scattered and irrelevant details; both of these tendencies are traits diagnostic of conspiracist ideation. In three studies, we investigated this hypothesis and failed to find the predicted association between low prior for randomness and conspiracist ideation, even when randomness was explicitly opposed to malevolent human intervention. Conspiracy believers' and nonbelievers' perceptions of randomness were not only indistinguishable from each other but also accurate compared with the normative view arising from the algorithmic information framework. Thus, the motto "nothing happens by accident," taken at face value, does not explain belief in conspiracy theories.
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“It is also stronger among people who habitually seek meaning and patterns in the environment, including believers in paranormal phenomena (e.g., Bruder, Haffke, Neave, Nouripanah, & Imhoff, 2013; but see Dieguez, Wagner-Egger, & Gauvrit, 2015).”
From The Psychology of Conspiracy Theories (2017) · cites this paper as Dieguez, Wagner-Egger, & Gauvrit, 2015
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredIn the citing paper
“they might be especially drawn to conspiracy theories and related movements that are both unpopular and identify the”
From The dark side of social movements: social identity, non-conformity, and the lure of conspiracy theories (2020) · cites this paper as [60]
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Metadata
- Authors
- Dieguez, S., Wagner-Egger, P., & Gauvrit, N.
- Affiliations
- Laboratory for Cognitive and Neurological Sciences, Department of Medicine, University of Fribourg
- Department of Psychology, University of Fribourg
- École Pratique des Hautes Études (FR)
- ORCID
- Gauvrit, Nicolas
- Venue
- Psychological Science
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2015-09-21
- Volume
- 26
- Issue
- 11
- Pages
- 1762-1770
- ISSN
- 0956-7976 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-9280
- OpenAlex
- W2173290003
- Cited by
- 87
- References
- 49
- Citations by year
- 2026: 8 · 2025: 3 · 2024: 1 · 2023: 23 · 2022: 14 · 2021: 4 · 2020: 8 · 2019: 2 · 2018: 7 · 2017: 11 · 2016: 4 · 2015: 2
- FWCI
- 26.53
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- journals.sagepub.com/page/policies/text-and-data-mining-license (tdm)
- Locations
- Psychological Science (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Misinformation and Its Impacts
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Paranormal Experiences and Beliefs
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Keywords
- conspiracy theories, conspiracist ideation, randomness perception, algorithmic information theory
- MeSH terms
- Adolescent, Adult, Culture, Delusions, Female, Humans, Deception, Male, Middle Aged, Politics, Thinking, Young Adult
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