Connecting the dots: illusory pattern perception predicts belief in conspiracies and the supernatural

May combine two claims.

In Study 5, manipulating belief in a specific conspiracy theory influenced the extent to which people perceive patterns in world events, which in turn predicted unrelated irrational beliefs.

“In Study 5, we manipulated belief in a specific conspiracy theory. This manipulation influenced the extent to which people perceive patterns in world events, which in turn predicted unrelated irrational beliefs.”

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In Study 1, perceiving patterns in randomly generated coin toss outcomes was significantly correlated with both measures of conspiracy beliefs and with supernatural beliefs (rs > .36, ps < .001).

“Study 1 revealed that such irrational beliefs are related to perceiving patterns in randomly generated coin toss outcomes.”

• Also stated in: § Results and Discussion · plain

  “Perceiving patterns in randomly generated coin toss outcomes was significantly correlated with both measures of conspiracy beliefs, and with supernatural beliefs (rs > .36, ps < .001).”

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The pattern perception measure was significantly correlated with belief in existing conspiracy theories (r = .23, p = .002), belief in fictitious conspiracy theories (r = .29, p < .001), and magical ideation (r = .32, p < .001).

“Furthermore, consistent with Study 1, we found that the pattern perception measure was significantly correlated with belief in existing conspiracy theories (r = .23, p = .002), belief in fictitious conspiracy theories (r = .29, p < .001), and magical ideation (r = .32, p < .001).”

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In Study 3, participants clearly saw patterns in the structured Vasarely paintings (M = 5.82, SD = 1.08) but did not clearly see patterns in the unstructured Pollock paintings (M = 2.74, SD = 1.40), as intended with the manipulation.

“Participants clearly saw patterns in the structured Vasarely paintings (M = 5.82, SD = 1.08), but they did not clearly see patterns in the unstructured Pollock paintings (M = 2.74, SD = 1.40), as intended with this manipulation.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

The first string presented to participants emerged by chance as symmetrical (HTHHHHHHTH).

“Consistent with the notion that it is often hard to distinguish random sequences from sequences that truly emerged through a nonrandom process (Williams & Griffiths, 2013), our first string presented to participants emerged by chance as symmetrical (HTHHHHHHTH).”

• cites Williams & Griffiths, 2013Not checked yet

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In Study 4, the contrast 1 x agreement interaction was highly significant for patterns in life and patterns in coin tosses, and marginal for patterns in paintings.

“the crucial contrast 1 x agreement interaction was highly significant for patterns in life and patterns in coin tosses, and marginal for patterns in paintings (see Table 5).”

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In Study 4, Step 2 of the hierarchical regression was significant for patterns in life and patterns in coin tosses, and marginal for patterns in paintings.

“Step 2 was significant for patterns in life (ΔR 2 = .10) F(2, 404) = 26.87, p < .001, and for patterns in coin tosses (ΔR 2 = .07) F(2, 396) = 16.45, p < .001, and it was marginal for patterns in paintings (ΔR 2 = .01) F(2, 400) = 2.59, p = .076.”

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In Study 3, recognizing patterns in the highly structured Vasarely paintings was unrelated to belief in existing conspiracy theories and belief in fictitious conspiracy theories, and negatively predicted supernatural beliefs.

“Recognizing patterns in the highly structured Vasarely paintings, however, was unrelated to belief in existing conspiracy theories (r = .00, p = .98) and belief in fictitious conspiracy theories (r = .03, p = .77), and negatively predicted supernatural beliefs (r = −.31, p = .002).”

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In Study 3, participants in the unstructured Pollock condition reported stronger belief in existing conspiracy theories and stronger supernatural beliefs than participants in the structured Vasarely condition.

“participants believed existing conspiracy theories more strongly (M = 2.95, SD = 0.79), and reported stronger supernatural beliefs (M = 2.22, SD = 0.67) after evaluating the unstructured Pollock paintings than after evaluating the structured Vasarely paintings (for belief in existing conspiracy theories, M = 2.67, SD = 0.70; for supernatural beliefs, M = 2.03, SD = 0.68).”

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In Study 3, in the overall sample, pattern perception was uncorrelated with belief in existing conspiracy theories, belief in fictitious conspiracy theories, and magical ideation.

“in the overall sample the pattern perception measure was uncorrelated with belief in existing conspiracy theories (r = −.01, p = .92), with belief in fictitious conspiracy theories (r = .07, p = .33), and with magical ideation (r = −.08, p = .28)”

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In Study 4, participants in the paranormal and conspiracy conditions perceived more patterns in life and more patterns in coin tosses than participants in the skeptic condition.

“Participants perceived more patterns in life in the paranormal (M = 4.38, SD = 1.22) and conspiracy (M = 4.31, SD = 1.30) conditions than in the skeptic condition (M = 4.24, SD = 1.13). Likewise, participants perceived more patterns in coin tosses in the paranormal (M = 2.62, SD = 1.24) and conspiracy (M = 2.74, SD = 1.20) conditions than in the skeptic condition (M = 2.48, SD = 1.29).”

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In Study 3, perceived familiarity did not differ significantly between the structured and unstructured painting conditions, and average familiarity ratings were very low.

“An ANOVA on perceived familiarity did not reveal a significant effect of the manipulation, F < 1. Average ratings on familiarity were very low on the scale (M = 1.64, SD = 1.21), suggesting that participants were not familiar with the paintings.”

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In Study 4, Step 1 of the hierarchical regression was significant for all three indicators of pattern perception: patterns in life, patterns in paintings, and patterns in coin tosses.

“Step 1 was significant for all three indicators of pattern perception: patterns in life, (R 2 = .12) F(3, 406) = 18.60, p < .001; patterns in paintings, (R 2 = .03) F(3, 402) = 4.64, p = .003; patterns in coin tosses, (R 2 = .04) F(3, 398) = 5.22, p = .002.”

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In Study 3, the univariate effect of the manipulation was significant for belief in existing conspiracy theories and supernatural beliefs, but not for belief in fictitious conspiracy theories.

“The univariate effect was significant for belief in existing conspiracy theories, F(1, 203) = 6.84, p = .010, η2 = .03, and for supernatural beliefs, F(1, 203) = 3.89, p = .050; η2 = .02, but not for belief in fictitious conspiracy theories, F(1, 203) = 1.15, p = .284.”

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In Study 3, perceiving patterns in the unstructured Pollock paintings significantly predicted belief in existing conspiracy theories, belief in fictitious conspiracy theories, and supernatural beliefs.

“perceiving patterns in the unstructured Pollock paintings significantly predicted belief in existing conspiracy theories (r = .36, p < .001), belief in fictitious conspiracy theories (r = .31, p = .002), and supernatural beliefs (r = .32, p = .001).”

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In Study 4, agreement with the skeptic blog correlated negatively with patterns in life and patterns in coin tosses, and did not correlate with patterns in paintings.

“Agreement with the skeptic blog, however, correlated negatively with patterns in life (r = −.16, p = .065) and patterns in coin tosses, (r = −.21, p = .014) and did not correlate with patterns in paintings (r = .05, p = .60).”

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In Study 4, agreement with the conspiracy theory blog correlated positively with patterns in life and patterns in coin tosses, and marginally with patterns in paintings.

“as did agreement with the conspiracy theory blog (patterns in life, r = .52, p < .001; patterns in paintings, r = .16, p = .070; patterns in coin tosses, r = .48, p < .001).”

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Study 1 revealed significant correlations between conspiracy beliefs, supernatural beliefs, and a tendency to perceive patterns in randomness.

“Study 1 revealed significant correlations between conspiracy beliefs, supernatural beliefs, and a tendency to perceive patterns in randomness.”

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In Study 5, following a manipulation of belief in one conspiracy theory, people saw events in the world as more strongly causally connected, which in turn predicted unrelated irrational beliefs.

“Following a manipulation of belief in one conspiracy theory, people saw events in the world as more strongly causally connected, which in turn predicted unrelated irrational beliefs.”

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In Study 2, intuitive pattern search predicted pattern perception, which in turn predicted irrational belief (indirect effect).

“In Study 2 we manipulated participants' intuitive pattern search, and results revealed an indirect effect such that intuitive pattern search predicted pattern perception, which in turn predicted irrational belief.”

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In Study 3, only seeing patterns in chaotic stimuli predicted irrational beliefs, and not detecting patterns in structured stimuli.

“We found that only seeing patterns in chaotic stimuli predicted irrational beliefs, and not detecting patterns in structured stimuli.”

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Some of the coin toss sequences used in the studies contain relatively long chunks of the same outcome (Heads or Tails), making it difficult for people to discriminate between real and illusory patterns.

“Indeed, some of our coin toss sequences contain relatively long chunks of the same outcome (Heads or Tails), making it difficult for people to discriminate between real and illusory patterns (Williams & Griffiths, 2013).”

• cites Williams & Griffiths, 2013Not checked yet

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In Study 2, and for some of the dependent variables in Study 5, only an indirect effect, and not a direct effect of the manipulation on irrational beliefs, was found.

“In Study 2, and for some of the dependent variables in Study 5, we only found an indirect effect, and not a direct effect of the manipulation on irrational beliefs.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

Pattern perception enables people to predict an uncertain future by connecting the dots and establishing meaningful relations between stimuli.

“Pattern perception thus enables people to predict an uncertain future by ‘connecting the dots’ and establishing meaningful relations between stimuli.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.

There is little direct empirical evidence available to support the role of illusory pattern perception in irrational beliefs in general, and particularly in the domain of conspiracy theories.

“Given how fundamental and widely accepted this assumption is, however, it is surprising how little direct empirical evidence there is available to support the role of illusory pattern perception in irrational beliefs in general, and particularly in the domain of conspiracy theories.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Habitual gamblers are more likely than non-habitual gamblers to detect patterns in random stimuli.

“Related to this, habitual gamblers are more likely than non‐habitual gamblers to detect patterns in random stimuli (Wilke, Scheibehenne, Gaissmaier, McCanney, & Barrett, 2014).”

• cites Wilke, Scheibehenne, Gaissmaier, McCanney, & Barrett, 2014Not checked yet

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In a study of the hot hand in basketball, both spectators and players believed that the chance of players hitting a shot was related to the success of their previous shot, but in reality the relationship between hits and misses of succeeding shots by the same player did not statistically deviate from chance.

“In a study of the “hot hand in basketball”, both spectators and players believed that the chance of players hitting a shot was related to the success of their previous shot. In reality, the relationship between hits and misses of succeeding shots by the same player did not statistically deviate from chance (Gilovich, Vallone, & Tversky, 1985).”

• cites Gilovich, Vallone, & Tversky, 1985Not checked yet

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Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Pigeons seem subject to illusory pattern perception.

“Even pigeons seem subject to illusory pattern perception.”

• cites Skinner (1948)Not checked yet

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Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Belief in conspiracy theories often constitutes attempts to understand distressing events that are difficult to understand otherwise.

“One common proposition is that belief in conspiracy theories often constitutes attempts to understand distressing events that are difficult to understand otherwise (Hofstadter, 1966; see also Bale, 2007).”

• cites Hofstadter, 1966Not checked yet

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• cites Bale, 2007Not checked yet

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Irrational beliefs help people make sense of their world by increasing a subjective sense of predictability, and pattern perception is a key element of this process.

“These arguments suggest that irrational beliefs help people make sense of their world by increasing a subjective sense of predictability, and pattern perception is a key element of this process.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

Supernatural beliefs help people to make sense of their life and to predict the future.

“In a similar vein, supernatural beliefs help people to make sense of their life and to predict the future.”

• cites Mazur, 2008Not checked yet

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• cites Shermer, 2011Not checked yet

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One recent study found no relationship between conspiracy beliefs and subjective randomness.

“Indeed, one recent study tested the relationship of conspiracy beliefs with people's subjective perception of randomness in binary strings that varied in their actual level of complexity. This study found no relationship between conspiracy beliefs and subjective randomness (Dieguez, Wagner‐Egger, & Gauvrit, 2015).”

• cites Dieguez, Wagner‐Egger, & Gauvrit, 2015Not checked yet

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Conspiracy beliefs are correlated with constructs such as paranormal beliefs, the tendency to attribute agency and intentionality where it does not exist, and the conjunction fallacy.

“For instance, conspiracy beliefs are correlated with constructs such as paranormal beliefs (Barron, Morgan, Towell, Altemeyer, & Swami, 2014; Darwin, Neave, & Holmes, 2011; Lobato, Mendoza, Sims, & Chin, 2014; Newheiser et al., 2011; Swami et al., 2011), the tendency to attribute agency and intentionality where it does not exist (Douglas, Sutton, Callan, Dawtry, & Harvey, 2016; Imhoff & Bruder,”

• cites Barron, Morgan, Towell, Altemeyer, & Swami, 2014; Darwin, Neave, & Holmes, 2011; Lobato, Mendoza, Sims, & Chin, 2014; Newheiser et al., 2011; Swami et al., 2011Not checked yet

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• cites Douglas, Sutton, Callan, Dawtry, & Harvey, 2016; Imhoff & Bruder, 2014Not checked yet

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• cites Brotherton & French, 2014Not checked yet

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The findings of Studies 1 and 2 are restricted by the fact that all coin toss sequences were random, and there was no base-rate comparison with nonrandom sequences.

“These findings are restricted, however, by the fact that all coin toss sequences were random, and there was no base‐rate comparison with nonrandom sequences.”

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Intuitively searching for patterns in the coin toss sequences increases pattern perception, which in turn predicts irrational beliefs.

“Although the lack of a direct effect precludes conclusions about causality, the findings of the present study suggest that intuitively searching for patterns in the coin toss sequences increases pattern perception, which in turn predicts irrational beliefs.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

The studies reported in this article were programmed in Qualtrics such that each IP-address could participate only once.

“The studies reported in this article were programmed in Qualtrics such that each IP‐address could participate only once.”

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In Study 3, the modern art painting manipulation had no significant effect on participants' mood, so effects of the manipulation cannot be attributed to mood.

“An ANOVA revealed no significant effect of the modern art painting manipulation on participants' mood, F < 1 (M = 72.93, SD = 17.91). Effects of the manipulation can thus not be attributed to participants' mood.”

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The Study 3 findings suggest that only perceiving patterns in random or chaotic stimuli (illusory pattern perception) predicts irrational beliefs, and not recognizing patterns in structured stimuli.

“These findings suggest that only perceiving patterns in random or chaotic stimuli (i.e., illusory pattern perception) predicts irrational beliefs, and not recognizing patterns in structured stimuli.”

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Belief in one conspiracy theory predicts belief in other, unrelated conspiracy theories.

“A common research finding is that belief in one conspiracy theory predicts belief in other, unrelated conspiracy theories.”

• cites Goertzel, 1994Not checked yet

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• cites Douglas & Sutton, 2011 sourceNot checked yet

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• cites Lewandowsky, Oberauer, & Gignac, 2013Not checked yet

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Acceptance of a conspiracy theory implies an increase in the extent to which people perceive patterns in world events, which in turn is associated with other, unrelated irrational beliefs.

“Put differently, acceptance of a conspiracy theory implies an increase in the extent to which people perceive patterns in world events, as reflected in the belief that instead of being a coincidence, many events that happen in the world are somehow causally related. This perception of patterns in world events is associated with other, unrelated irrational beliefs.”

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The Study 4 findings indicate that agreeing with paranormal beliefs and conspiracy theories, but not agreeing with a skeptic, predicts pattern perception.

“These findings indicate that agreeing with paranormal beliefs and conspiracy theories, but not agreeing with a skeptic, predicts pattern perception.”

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In Study 5, analyzing the full 9-item conspiracy belief scale including items referring to the US government yielded similar results: a significant effect of the conspiracy manipulation and a significant indirect effect through pattern perception for world events.

“If we analyzed the full 9‐item scale including the items referring to the US government, results were similar. Specifically, the effect of the conspiracy manipulation was significant, F(1, 214) = 8.01, p = .005; η2 = .04, as was the indirect effect through pattern perception for world events (B = 0.05, SE = .03) CI95%[.01; 0.11].”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Previous research offers explanations for the link between conspiracy theories and supernatural beliefs, such as anti-conformist tendencies and an inclination to reject conventional explanations or authority opinions.

“Previous research offers various explanations for the link between conspiracy theories and supernatural beliefs, such as anti‐conformist tendencies and an inclination to reject conventional explanations or authority opinions (e.g., Swami et al., 2011).”

• cites Swami et al., 2011Not checked yet

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Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Psychological theories have assumed that conspiracy and supernatural beliefs are rooted in largely similar underlying cognitive processes, specifically illusory pattern perception.

“Although people hold many different conspiracy and supernatural beliefs, psychological theories have assumed such beliefs to be rooted in largely similar underlying cognitive processes, specifically illusory pattern perception—that is, a tendency to perceive meaningful patterns in stimuli that were actually generated through a random process (Shermer, 2011; Whitson & Galinsky, 2008; Wiseman & Watt”

• cites Shermer, 2011Not checked yet

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• cites Whitson & Galinsky, 2008Not checked yet

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• cites Wiseman & Watt, 2006Not checked yet

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The present findings seem inconsistent with a study that did not find significant correlations between pattern perception in binary outcomes and conspiracy beliefs.

“At first blush, the present findings seem inconsistent with a study that did not find significant correlations between pattern perception in binary outcomes and conspiracy beliefs (Dieguez et al., 2015).”

• cites Dieguez et al., 2015Not checked yet

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Being exposed to a conspiracy theory increased the extent to which people perceive patterns in world events, which in turn predicts a range of unrelated irrational beliefs.

“These findings reveal that being exposed to a conspiracy theory increased the extent to which people perceive patterns in world events, which in turn predicts a range of unrelated irrational beliefs.”

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Illusory pattern perception was quite susceptible to the experimental manipulations, which subsequently accounted for people's irrational beliefs.

“As the results reveal, illusory pattern perception was quite susceptible to the experimental manipulations, which subsequently accounted for people's irrational beliefs.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

People with high education levels, or with strong analytic thinking skills, are less susceptible to irrational beliefs than people with low education levels or weak analytic thinking skills.

“This is consistent with the observation that people with high education levels, or with strong analytic thinking skills, are less susceptible to irrational beliefs than people with low education levels or weak analytic thinking skills (Aarnio & Lindeman, 2005; Douglas et al., 2016; Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012; Musch & Ehrenberg, 2002; Swami, Voracek, Stieger, Tran, & Furnham, 2014; Van Prooijen, 2”

• cites Aarnio & Lindeman, 2005Not checked yet

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• cites Douglas et al., 2016Not checked yet

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• cites Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012Not checked yet

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These findings were highly robust across studies, and were observed on two different measures of conspiracy beliefs (real and fictitious conspiracy theories) and on an extensive and validated measure of supernatural belief.

“These findings were highly robust across studies, and were observed on two different measures of conspiracy beliefs (i.e., real and fictitious conspiracy theories), and on an extensive and validated measure of supernatural belief (Eckblad & Chapman, 1983).”

• cites Eckblad & Chapman, 1983Not checked yet

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The relatively large base-rate variance in these variables precludes a direct influence of relatively subtle manipulations in between-subjects designs.

“We suspect that the relatively large base‐rate variance in these variables precludes a direct influence of relatively subtle manipulations in between‐subjects designs.”

• AssumptionRests on an assumption: From the outset people differ substantially in how strongly they endorse conspiracy theories and supernatural beliefs, with some people being convinced skeptics and others being highly susceptible to such beliefs.
• AssumptionRests on an assumption: People are likely to vary significantly in their sensitivity to subtle experimental manipulations.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

It would be premature to dismiss illusory pattern perception as a cognitive mechanism underlying irrational beliefs on the basis of only one set of studies that did not find evidence for this mechanism.

“Our research suggests, however, that it would be premature to dismiss illusory pattern perception as a cognitive mechanism underlying irrational beliefs on the basis of only one set of studies that did not find evidence for this mechanism.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

Most supernatural beliefs are impossible given the laws of physics as we currently understand them, whereas conspiracy theories often can at least theoretically be true.

“Whereas most supernatural beliefs are impossible given the laws of physics as we currently understand them, conspiracy theories often can at least theoretically be true—and sometimes conspiracies do occur (e.g., Watergate; the Tuskegee syphilis experiment; the Milli Vanilli entertainment fraud), which may reinforce other, less realistic conspiracy theories.”

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Unlike supernatural beliefs, conspiracy beliefs typically have a clear intergroup dimension, with a hostile outgroup considered deceptive and threatening to one's ingroup.

“Unlike supernatural beliefs, conspiracy beliefs typically have a clear intergroup dimension given that by definition a hostile outgroup (i.e., the conspiracy) is considered to be deceptive and threatening to one's ingroup (e.g., fellow citizens; Crocker, Luhtanen, Broadnax, & Blaine, 1999; Kramer & Schaffer, 2014; Van Prooijen & Van Lange, 2014).”

• cites Crocker et al., 1999Not checked yet

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• cites Kramer & Schaffer, 2014Not checked yet

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• cites Van Prooijen & Van Lange, 2014Not checked yet

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In Study 5, the measure of patterns in world events correlated moderately but not strongly with irrational beliefs (.22 < rs < .44), suggesting related but distinct constructs.

“Furthermore, in Study 5 our measure of patterns in world events correlated moderately but not strongly with irrational beliefs (see Table 6; .22 < rs < .44), suggesting related but distinct constructs.”

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Both conspiracy and supernatural beliefs are widespread among the population of normal, mentally sane adults.

“It has frequently been noted that both conspiracy and supernatural beliefs are widespread among the population of normal, mentally sane adults (Lindeman & Aarnio, 2007; Oliver & Wood, 2014; Sunstein & Vermeule, 2009; Wiseman & Watt, 2006).”

• cites Lindeman & Aarnio, 2007Not checked yet

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• cites Oliver & Wood, 2014Not checked yet

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• cites Sunstein & Vermeule, 2009Not checked yet

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There are qualitative differences between conspiracy beliefs and supernatural beliefs.

“Besides similarities, we should recognize that there are also qualitative differences between conspiracy beliefs and supernatural beliefs.”

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Illusory pattern perception is one of the processes that binds conspiracy beliefs and supernatural beliefs, and is likely part of the reason why these beliefs are strongly correlated.

“Illusory pattern perception is one of the processes that binds these types of irrational beliefs, and is likely part of the reason why these beliefs are strongly correlated (Barron et al., 2014; Darwin et al., 2011; Lobato et al., 2014; Newheiser et al., 2011; Swami et al., 2011).”

• cites Barron et al., 2014Not checked yet

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• cites Darwin et al., 2011Not checked yet

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• cites Lobato et al., 2014Not checked yet

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