The dark side of social movements: social identity, non-conformity, and the lure of conspiracy theories
Open accessAbstract
Social change does not always equal social progress-there is a dark side of social movements. We discuss conspiracy theory beliefs - beliefs that a powerful group of people are secretly working towards a malicious goal - as one contributor to destructive social movements. Research has linked conspiracy theory beliefs to anti-democratic attitudes, prejudice and non-normative political behavior. We propose a framework to understand the motivational processes behind conspiracy theories and associated social identities and collective action. We argue that conspiracy theories comprise at least two components - content and qualities-that appeal to people differently based on their motivations. Social identity motives draw people foremost to contents of conspiracy theories while uniqueness motives draw people to qualities of conspiracy theories.
AI snapshot
Written from the paper’s full text.
TL;DR
This conceptual article argues that conspiracy theories contribute to destructive, anti-democratic social movements, and proposes that conspiracy theories lure people through two distinct components—content and qualities—that appeal differently depending on people's motives. Social identity motives are proposed to draw people primarily to the content of a conspiracy theory, while uniqueness motives draw them primarily to its qualities.
Key findings
- Conspiracy theory beliefs are linked in the reviewed literature to political alienation and cynicism, decreased intentions to volunteer for charity, reduced engagement in normative democratic practices like voting, and motivation for unlawful anti-democratic behavior (e.g., attacking people in power); they are also linked to right-wing authoritarianism, political extremism across the spectrum, and grandiose beliefs about the nation.
- The paper proposes that conspiracy theories comprise at least two motivational allures: *content* (the unique narrative elements—specific conspirator, goal, events explained) and *qualities* (structural properties common to all conspiracy theories, e.g., being epistemic and counter-normative).
- Social identity motives are argued to draw people foremost to content: e.g., before the 2012 U.S. election Democrats and Republicans equally expected electoral fraud, but after Obama's re-election Republicans were more likely to believe fraud had occurred; collective narcissism was associated with belief that foreign governments, but not the U.S. government, conspire.
- Uniqueness motives are argued to draw people foremost to qualities: participants with high (vs. low) uniqueness needs were only more likely to believe a novel conspiracy theory if it was supported by a minority (vs. majority) of people.
- Cited contextual figures: U.S. measles cases rose from 86 in 2016 to 1,282 in 2019; the current European Parliament holds as many as nine far-right parties; the hashtag #Qanon was used almost as many times (15 million) as #metoo.
Methods
- Design: conceptual/theoretical article proposing a framework; no new empirical data are collected or analyzed.
- Evidence base: synthesis of prior published research on conspiracy beliefs, social identity, collective narcissism, uniqueness needs, and political behavior, illustrated with examples (e.g., "The Great Replacement," QAnon, 9/11, electoral fraud beliefs).
- Main analysis: theoretical distinction between content-drawn motives (social identity) and quality-drawn motives (epistemic, uniqueness), used to generate predictions about conspiracy-linked social movements; the authors note they use "conspiracy theory beliefs" as an overarching, simplifying term across studies that differ in focus on real-world conspiracy theories, novel conspiracy theories, conspiracy thinking, and conspiracy mentality.
Limitations
- Stated: the motivational distinction between content and qualities is "a theoretical one"; in the real world none of the constructs operate in isolation, people are driven by multiple motives, and motives can interact with each other as can content and qualities.
- Stated: studies differ in their focus on beliefs in real-world conspiracy theories, novel conspiracy theories, conspiracy thinking, and conspiracy mentality, and it "goes beyond this paper" to discuss and address psychological differences between these constructs.
- Evident from the text: the framework's predictions (e.g., about "The Great Replacement," fringe movements, liberals' uniqueness needs) are not empirically tested here, and the article explicitly focuses only on destructive movements associated with conspiracy theories while acknowledging that some (true) conspiracy theories can foster democratic and progressive movements.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Claims the paper makes
0 of 64 cited sources checked · 0 supported · 0 flagged
- Interpretationreasoning
Many conspiracy theories are closely intertwined with some of today's most powerful, destructive social movements.
“Though not all conspiracy theories are wrong, irrational, or harmful for society, many of them are in fact closely intertwined with some of today's most powerful, destructive social movements.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationcitation
Conspiracy theories can be one reason for social movements that threaten social health, economic prosperity, and democratic principles.
“We argue that conspiracy theories --theories that a powerful group of people are secretly working towards a malevolent or unlawful goal [8**] can be one reason.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites 8**
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationcitation
Beliefs in certain conspiracies can pose a serious threat to democracy.
“While healthy skepticism of government and elites is necessary for a functioning democracy, beliefs in certain conspiracies can pose a serious threat to democracy.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Conspiracy theory beliefs are linked to decreased intentions to volunteer for a charity.
“decreased intentions to 1 volunteer for a charity [13]”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [13] source
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation
Conspiracy theory beliefs demotivate people to engage in normal, democratic practices like voting.
“demotivate people to engage in normal, democratic practices [see 14] like voting [15, but see 16].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites [14]
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [15] source
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [16]
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation
Conspiracy theory beliefs are linked to political alienation and cynicism.
“Conspiracy theory beliefs are linked to political alienation and cynicism [10-12]”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked - Premisecitation
People holding stronger conspiracy theory beliefs hold stronger hostile intentions towards outgroups.
“hold stronger hostile intentions towards outgroups [23*].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites 23*
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation
Conspiracy beliefs have been linked to grandiose beliefs about the nation.
“grandiose beliefs about the nation [21, 22, 23*].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked - Premisecitation
People holding stronger conspiracy theory beliefs are more open to everyday crimes.
“People holding stronger conspiracy theory beliefs are more open to everyday crimes [24]”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [24] source
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation
Conspiracy beliefs have been linked to political extremism across the political spectrum.
“political extremism across the political spectrum [20]”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [20] source
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation
Conspiracy theories can motivate unlawful anti-democratic political behavior.
“Conspiracy theories can even motivate unlawful anti-democratic political behavior (e.g., attacking people in power; [17**,18].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites 17**
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [18] source
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation
Conspiracy beliefs are higher when people want to feel good about themselves and the groups they belong to.
“conspiracy beliefs are higher when people want to (1) feel good about themselves and the groups they belong to [31,32,21]”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked - Premisecitation
Conspiracy beliefs are higher when people want to make sense of their environment.
“(2) make sense of their environment [33][34][35]”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked - Premisecitation
Conspiracy beliefs have been linked to right-wing authoritarianism.
“Conspiracy beliefs have been linked to right-wing authoritarianism [19]”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [19] source
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation
Conspiracy beliefs are higher when people want to feel safe and in control.
“(3) feel safe and in control [36][37][38].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked - Premisecitation
Jewish conspiracy theory beliefs are related to prejudice and discrimination against Jewish people and several other outgroups.
“Jewish conspiracy theory beliefs are related to prejudice and discrimination against Jewish people [25][26][27][28] and several other outgroups [29**].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked - Interpretationcitation
Various psychological needs may draw people to conspiracy theories primarily because their qualities promise to meet these needs.
“Various psychological needs may draw people to conspiracy theories, primarily because their qualities promise [see 30] to meet these needs.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [30] source
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation
Social identities are connected with motives including the need to hold positive beliefs about ingroups and negative beliefs about outgroups.
“Social identities are connected with different motives including the need to hold positive beliefs about ingroups and negative beliefs about outgroups [44].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [44] source
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation
Conspiracy theories might only be epistemically relevant when a situation is uncertain and conspiracy theory explanations are particularly salient.
“research suggests that conspiracy theories might only be epistemically relevant when a situation is uncertain and conspiracy theory explanations are particularly salient [34; see also 52].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites [34] source
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [52]
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation
Participants' beliefs in conspiracy theories depended on who the alleged conspirator was.
“This is consistent with evidence that participants' beliefs in conspiracy theories depended on who the alleged conspirator was [39, 40, 41**].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites [39]
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [40]
Not checked in the free run.
- cites 41**
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
The specific content of a conspiracy theory is crucial for its appeal.
“In both of these examples, the specific content of the conspiracy theory (e.g., who conspired) is crucial for its appeal.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationnone given
Social identity motives draw people foremost to the content of conspiracy theories.
“Social identity motives draw people foremost to the content of a conspiracy theory”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: People are prone to form social identities in which group membership becomes part of the self.
- Premisecitation
Social identity motives increased participants' likelihood to believe in fake news that represented their own political party as moral.
“social identity motives increased participants' likelihood to believe in fake news that represented their own political party as moral [47].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [47] source
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation
Participants who believed in one conspiracy theory were also more likely to believe in others, even when they were contradictory.
“This is consistent with findings that participants who believed in one conspiracy theory were also more likely to believe in others, even when they were contradictory [42,43].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites [42] source
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [43]
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
Motives behind conspiracy theories are qualitatively different for those enticed by the content of the conspiracy theory as opposed to those enticed by the qualities of the conspiracy theory.
“We argue that motives behind conspiracy theories are qualitatively different for those who are enticed by the content of the conspiracy theory as opposed to those enticed by the qualities of the conspiracy theory.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Conspiracy theories comprise at least two motivational allures: content and qualities.
“We propose that conspiracy theories comprise at least two motivational allures -content and qualities -that draw people toward them.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: An overarching framework that captures how motives are linked to belief in conspiracy theories is missing.
- Interpretationreasoning
Depending on context and motivational states, different contents or qualities are more alluring.
“We argue that depending on context and motivational states, different contents or qualities are more alluring.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Participants were more likely to believe conspiracy theories that aligned with their party's political stances and vilified the opposite party.
“participants were more likely to believe conspiracy theories that aligned with their party's political stances and vilified the opposite party [39][40][41]48,49,50].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites [39]
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [40]
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [41] source
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
Uniqueness motives draw people foremost to the qualities of conspiracy theories.
“uniqueness motives draw people foremost to the qualities of a conspiracy theory.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation
People who believe in their group's superiority but are anxious about its recognition are drawn to conspiracy theories about outgroup members.
“research suggests that people who believe in their group's superiority but are anxious about its recognition are drawn to conspiracy theories about outgroup members [21, see also 22,23*].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked - Interpretationreasoning
All conspiracy theories are unconventional.
“and are unconventional (i.e., challenge social agreed upon knowledge and beliefs).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
People sometimes turn to conspiracy theories foremost because of their qualities.
“We take this as preliminary evidence that people sometimes turn to conspiracy theories foremost because of their qualities (here: ability to explain an event).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
For people with high uniqueness needs, the content of the conspiracy theory could be secondary to its qualities.
“It seems that for people with high uniqueness needs, the content of the conspiracy theory could be secondary to its qualities.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation
Social identity motives might be a major driver of conspiracy movements concerned with loss of status.
“Social identity motives might be a major driver of conspiracy movements that are concerned with the loss of status such as”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Democrats are more likely than Republicans to believe that the 9/11 terrorist attacks were an inside job.
“Democrats are more likely than Republicans to believe that the 9/11 terrorist attacks were an inside job [54].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [54]
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationcitation
If alternative explanations for events are present, conspiracy theories can forfeit their epistemic allure.
“If alternative explanations for events are present, conspiracy theories can forfeit their epistemic allure.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Uniqueness needs may be particularly relevant for understanding people's engagement in fringe movements.
“Uniqueness needs may be particularly relevant for understanding people's engagement in fringe movements.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Social identity concerns might foster social movements that advance political polarization and intergroup aggression.
“Social identity concerns might also foster social movements that advance political polarization and intergroup aggression.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Uniqueness needs may partly explain why conspiracy theories are often connected to movements that deviate from democratic norms.
“Uniqueness 2 needs may also partly explain why conspiracy theories are often connected to movements that deviate from democratic norms.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Stronger uniqueness needs are linked to stronger conspiracy theory beliefs.
“studies found that stronger uniqueness needs were linked to stronger conspiracy theory beliefs [31,32,36].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked - Premisecitation
Participants with high uniqueness needs were only more likely to believe in a novel conspiracy theory if it was supported by a minority of people.
“participants with high (vs.low) uniqueness needs were only more likely to believe in a novel conspiracy theory if it was supported by a minority (vs.majority) of people [31].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [31] source
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
People with high uniqueness needs might be more likely to choose political actions that deviate from social norms.
“they might also be more likely to choose political actions that deviate from social norms (e.g., shadowing alleged conspirators).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
All conspiracy theories assert to know of secret information.
“all conspiracy theories assert to know of secret information [32]”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [32] source
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation
Republicans are more likely than Democrats to endorse Qanon.
“Republicans are more likely than Democrats to endorse Qanon -the far-right theory that a Deep State is conspiring against President Trump [53].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [53] source
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationcitation
People are likely most allured by conspiracy theories and movements that promise to fulfill the highest number of relevant needs at the same time.
“people are likely most allured by conspiracy theories and movements that promise to fulfill the highest number of relevant needs at the same time [see 30].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [30] source
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
Liberals might be especially drawn to conspiracy theories and related movements that are both unpopular and identify the correct conspirators.
“they might be especially drawn to conspiracy theories and related movements that are both unpopular and identify the”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [60] source
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation
The belief that gender studies is a conspiracy mediated the relationship between Catholic collective narcissism and hostile intentions towards people who undercut the values of the Catholic church.
“This belief mediated the relationship between Catholic collective narcissism and hostile intentions towards people who undercut the values of the Catholic church.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites 23*
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
Conspiracy theories pose a threat to democratic systems.
“Conspiracy theories pose a threat to democratic systems.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Catholic collective narcissism predicted the belief that gender studies, theory and activism is a conspiracy to secretly destroy Christian tradition.
“Found that Catholic collective narcissism predicted the belief that gender studies, theory and activism is a conspiracy to secretly destroy Christian tradition.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites 23*
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation
Liberals tend to have stronger uniqueness needs.
“because liberals tend to have stronger uniqueness needs [59]”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [59]
Not checked in the free run.
- May combine two claims. 6
- Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 2
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningSocial identity motives might foster a vicious cycle where conspiracy theories intensify inter-group conflict and inter-group conflict fosters conspiracy theories.
“social identity motives might foster a vicious cycle where conspiracy theories intensify inter-group conflict and inter-group conflict fosters conspiracy theories.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningPeople are driven by multiple motives and conspiracy theories can meet these various motives at the same time.
“People are driven by multiple motives and conspiracy theories can meet these various motives at the same time.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationBy challenging official narratives, conspiracy theories can undermine people's trust in broader societal structures, leading to alienation and anomie, which is linked to non-normative political activism.
“by challenging official narratives conspiracy theories can actually undermine people's trust in broader societal structures [cf.56] leading to alienation and anomie [10-12, 57, 58] which in turn is linked to non-normative political activism [17**,18].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 5 sources checkedClassified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningMotives can interact with each other, as can the content and qualities of conspiracy theories.
“Further, motives can interact with each other, as can the content and qualities of conspiracy theories.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
InterpretationreasoningPeople might be allured by fringe movements because their ideas are extremely unusual and non-normative rather than substantive.
“People might be allured by these movements because their ideas are extremely unusual and non-normative rather than substantive (e.g., chemtrails) .”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationFalse information on Twitter travels faster and reaches larger audiences than accurate information.
“false information on Twitter travels faster and reaches larger audiences than accurate information [61].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [61]
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationHigh conspiracy mentality decreased participants' intention to take normative political action but increased their intention to take non-normative political action.
“Found that a high (vs.low) conspiracy theory mentality decreased participants' intention to take normative political action but increased their intention to take non-normative political action.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites 17**
Not checked in the free run.
The paper relies on this without support.
An overarching framework that captures how motives are linked to belief in conspiracy theories is missing.
“Yet, an overarching framework that captures how these motives are linked to belief in conspiracy theories is missing.”
The paper relies on this without support.
People are prone to form social identities in which group membership becomes part of the self.
“People are prone to form social identities in which group membership becomes part of the self.”
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
Social movements sometimes embrace antidemocratic conspiracy theories that contribute to erosion, as well as explicit antigovernment paramilitary, White power movements.
“Even more problematic is that social movements sometimes embrace antidemocratic conspiracy theories (e.g., the Deep State is conspiring against Donald Trump, the 9/11 attacks were an inside job) that contribute to erosion (Sternisko et al., 2020), as well as explicit antigovernment paramilitary, White power movements (Belew, 2018).”
From How to study democratic backsliding (2024) · cites this paper as Sternisko et al., 2020
Political conspiracy theories and misinformation can affect voting decisions, health-related conspiracy theories can influence people's medical choices (e.g. vaccination), and misinformation and conspiracy theories can fuel conflict between groups.
“Moreover, political conspiracy theories and misinformation can affect voting decisions, health-related conspiracy theories can influence people's medical choices (e.g. vaccination), and misinformation and conspiracy theories can fuel conflict between groups (29, 30).”
From The impact of generative artificial intelligence on socioeconomic inequalities and policy making (2024) · cites this paper as [30]
Cites
The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior
Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (2004) · Political Psychology · doi:10.4324/9780203505984-16 · Cited by 13,467 · see citing works
Psychology of intergroup relations
Austin, W. G., & Worchel, S. (1986) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 10,626 · see citing works
The spread of true and false news online
Vosoughi, S., Roy, D., & Aral, S. (2018) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.aap9559 · Cited by 8,847 · see citing works
Understanding Conspiracy Theories
Douglas, K. M., Uscinski, J. E., Sutton, R. M., Cichocka, A., Nefes, T., Ang, C. S., & Deravi, F. (2019) · Political Psychology · doi:10.1111/pops.12568 · Cited by 1,511 · see citing works
Self-citationThe Psychology of Conspiracy Theories
Douglas, K. M., Sutton, R. M., & Cichocka, A. (2017) · Current Directions in Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/0963721417718261 · Cited by 1,316 · see citing works
Self-citationSpeaking (Un–)Truth to Power: Conspiracy Mentality as A Generalised Political Attitude
Imhoff, R., & Bruder, M. (2014) · European Journal of Personality · doi:10.1002/per.1930 · Cited by 831 · see citing works
The Partisan Brain: An Identity-Based Model of Political Belief
Van Bavel, J. J., & Pereira, A. (2018) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2018.01.004 · Cited by 743 · see citing works
Jolley, D., & Douglas, K. M. (2014) · British Journal of Psychology · doi:10.1111/bjop.12018 · Cited by 685 · see citing works
Dead and Alive: Beliefs in Contradictory Conspiracy Theories
Wood, M. J., Douglas, K. M., & Sutton, R. M. (2012) · Social Psychological and Personality Science · doi:10.1177/1948550611434786 · Cited by 660 · see citing works
Swami, V., Chamorro‐Premuzic, T., & Furnham, A. (2010) · Applied Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1002/acp.1583 · Cited by 499 · see citing works
The Ideological-Conflict Hypothesis: Intolerance Among Both Liberals and Conservatives
Brandt, M. J., Reyna, C., Chambers, J. R., Crawford, J. T., & Wetherell, G. (2014) · Current Directions in Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/0963721413510932 · Cited by 432 · see citing works
Someone is pulling the strings: hypersensitive agency detection and belief in conspiracy theories
Douglas, K. M., Sutton, R. M., Callan, M. J., Dawtry, R. J., & Harvey, A. J. (2016) · Thinking & Reasoning · doi:10.1080/13546783.2015.1051586 · Cited by 414 · see citing works
van der Linden, S. (2015) · Personality and Individual Differences · doi:10.1016/j.paid.2015.07.045 · Cited by 391 · see citing works
van Prooijen, J., Douglas, K. M., & De Inocencio, C. (2018) · European Journal of Social Psychology · doi:10.1002/ejsp.2331 · Cited by 355 · see citing works
Addicted to answers: need for cognitive closure and the endorsement of conspiracy beliefs
Marchlewska, M., Cichocka, A., & Kossowska, M. (2018) · European Journal of Social Psychology · doi:10.1002/ejsp.2308 · Cited by 311 · see citing works
‘They will not control us’: Ingroup positivity and belief in intergroup conspiracies
Cichocka, A., Marchlewska, M., Golec de Zavala, A., & Olechowski, M. (2016) · British Journal of Psychology · doi:10.1111/bjop.12158 · Cited by 295 · see citing works
Self-citationExposure to intergroup conspiracy theories promotes prejudice which spreads across groups
Jolley, D., Meleady, R., & Douglas, K. M. (2020) · British Journal of Psychology · doi:10.1111/bjop.12385 · Cited by 268 · see citing works
Imhoff, R., & Lamberty, P. (2018) · European Journal of Social Psychology · doi:10.1002/ejsp.2494 · Cited by 267 · see citing works
Too special to be duped: need for uniqueness motivates conspiracy beliefs
Imhoff, R., & Lamberty, P. K. (2017) · European Journal of Social Psychology · doi:10.1002/ejsp.2265 · Cited by 260 · see citing works
Collective narcissism and anti-Semitism in Poland
Golec de Zavala, A., & Cichocka, A. (2012) · Group Processes & Intergroup Relations · doi:10.1177/1368430211420891 · Cited by 253 · see citing works
Imhoff, R., Dieterle, L., & Lamberty, P. (2021) · Social Psychological and Personality Science · doi:10.1177/1948550619896491 · Cited by 208 · see citing works
Harmful Ideas, The Structure and Consequences of Anti‐<scp>S</scp>emitic Beliefs in<scp>P</scp>oland
Bilewicz, M., Winiewski, M., Kofta, M., & Wójcik, A. (2013) · Political Psychology · doi:10.1111/pops.12024 · Cited by 207 · see citing works
The effect of conspiratorial thinking and motivated reasoning on belief in election fraud
Edelson, J., Alduncin, A., Krewson, C., Sieja, J. A., & Uscinski, J. E. (2017) · Political Research Quarterly · doi:10.1177/1065912917721061 · Cited by 198 · see citing works
Belief in conspiracy theories and intentions to engage in everyday crime
Jolley, D., Douglas, K. M., Leite, A. C., & Schrader, T. (2019) · British Journal of Social Psychology · doi:10.1111/bjso.12311 · Cited by 186 · see citing works
Kofta, M., Soral, W., & Bilewicz, M. (2020) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/pspa0000183 · Cited by 182 · see citing works
“I Know Things They Don’t Know!”: The Role of Need for Uniqueness in Belief in Conspiracy Theories
Lantian, A., Muller, D., Nurra, C., & Douglas, K. M. (2017) · Social Psychology · doi:10.1027/1864-9335/a000306 · Cited by 176 · see citing works
Jolley, D., Douglas, K. M., & Sutton, R. M. (2018) · Political Psychology · doi:10.1111/pops.12404 · Cited by 170 · see citing works
Marchlewska, M., Cichocka, A., Łozowski, F., Górska, P., & Winiewski, M. (2019) · The Journal of Social Psychology · doi:10.1080/00224545.2019.1586637 · Cited by 156 · see citing works
Self-citationThe partisan contours of conspiracy theory beliefs
Smallpage, S. M., Enders, A. M., & Uscinski, J. E. (2017) · Research & Politics · doi:10.1177/2053168017746554 · Cited by 139 · see citing works
Krouwel, A., Kutiyski, Y., van Prooijen, J.-W., Martinsson, J., & Markstedt, E. (2017) · Journal of Social and Political Psychology · doi:10.5964/jspp.v5i2.745 · Cited by 137 · see citing works
Golec de Zavala, A., & Federico, C. M. (2018) · European Journal of Social Psychology · doi:10.1002/ejsp.2496 · Cited by 136 · see citing works
The illusion of explanatory depth and endorsement of conspiracy beliefs
Vitriol, J. A., & Marsh, J. K. (2018) · European Journal of Social Psychology · doi:10.1002/ejsp.2504 · Cited by 118 · see citing works
Beliefs in conspiracy theories following ostracism
Poon, K.-T., Chen, Z., & Wong, W.-Y. (2020) · Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin · doi:10.1177/0146167219898944 · Cited by 115 · see citing works
The liberal illusion of uniqueness
Stern, C., West, T. V., & Schmitt, P. G. (2014) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/0956797613500796 · Cited by 98 · see citing works
Partisanship, Individual Differences, and News Media Exposure as Predictors of Conspiracy Beliefs
Hollander, B. A. (2017) · Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly · doi:10.1177/1077699017728919 · Cited by 90 · see citing works
Wood, M. J., & Gray, D. (2019) · Personality and Individual Differences · doi:10.1016/j.paid.2018.09.036 · Cited by 89 · see citing works
Examining conspiracist beliefs about the disappearance of Amelia Earhart
Swami, V., & Furnham, A. (2012) · The Journal of General Psychology · doi:10.1080/00221309.2012.697932 · Cited by 88 · see citing works
Dieguez, S., Wagner-Egger, P., & Gauvrit, N. (2015) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/0956797615598740 · Cited by 87 · see citing works
Conspiracy and Misperception Belief in the Middle East and North Africa
Nyhan, B. J., & Zeitzoff, T. (2018) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1086/698663 · Cited by 86 · see citing works
Routledge Handbook of Conspiracy Theories
Butter, M., & Knight, P. (2020) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9780429452734 · Cited by 83 · see citing works
Informational cues, partisan-motivated reasoning, and the manipulation of conspiracy beliefs
Enders, A. M., & Smallpage, S. M. (2019) · Political Communication · doi:10.1080/10584609.2018.1493006 · Cited by 82 · see citing works
Increased conspiracy beliefs among ethnic and Muslim minorities
van Prooijen, J., Staman, J., & Krouwel, A. P. M. (2018) · Applied Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1002/acp.3442 · Cited by 76 · see citing works
Lyons, B. A., Mérola, V., & Reifler, J. (2018) · Health Communication · doi:10.1080/10410236.2018.1530526 · Cited by 72 · see citing works
How (Ir)rational is it to believe in contradictory conspiracy theories?
Lukić, P., Žeželj, I., & Stanković, B. (2019) · Europe’s Journal of Psychology · doi:10.5964/ejop.v15i1.1690 · Cited by 59 · see citing works
On the measurement of conspiracy beliefs
Enders, A. M., & Smallpage, S. M. (2018) · Research & Politics · doi:10.1177/2053168018763596 · Cited by 42 · see citing works
How conspiracy theories can stimulate political engagement
Kim, Y. (2019) · Journal of Elections, Public Opinion, and Parties · doi:10.1080/17457289.2019.1651321 · Cited by 32 · see citing works
»Sometimes you just have to go in « – The link between conspiracy beliefs and political action
Lamberty, P., & Leiser, D. (2019) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/bdrxc · Cited by 28 · see citing works
The pursuit of optimal distinctiveness and consumer preferences
He, L., Feng, C., LIU, Y., & Zhou, X. (2010) · Scandinavian Journal of Psychology · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9450.2009.00802.x · Cited by 18 · see citing works
Flagged first, then by citations
Research works printed but not linked: 1
- Pereira A, Van Bavel J. Identity concerns drive belief in fake news. [unpublished data 2018], https://psyarxiv.com/7vc5d/.
Cited by
Sorted by citations
The impact of generative artificial intelligence on socioeconomic inequalities and policy making
Capraro, V., Lentsch, A., Acemoglu, D., Akgun, S., Akhmedova, A., Bilancini, E., Bonnefon, J.-F., Brañas-Garza, P., Butera, L., Douglas, K. M., et al. (2024) · PNAS Nexus · doi:10.1093/pnasnexus/pgae191 · Cited by 371 · see citing works
Self-citationHow to study democratic backsliding
Druckman, J. N. (2024) · Political Psychology · doi:10.1111/pops.12942 · Cited by 56 · see citing works
- Authors
- Sternisko, A., Cichocka, A., & Van Bavel, J. J.
- Affiliations
- New York University (US)
- University of Kent (GB)
- Venue
- Current Opinion in Psychology
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2020-10
- Volume
- 35
- Pages
- 1-6
- ISSN
- 2352-250X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3006850757
- Cited by
- 197
- References
- 48
- Citations by year
- 2026: 24 · 2025: 23 · 2024: 30 · 2023: 28 · 2022: 54 · 2021: 30 · 2020: 5 · 2019: 1 · 2017: 2
- FWCI
- 5.18
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- doi.org
- Locations
- Current Opinion in Psychology (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Kent Academic Repository (University of Kent) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Misinformation and Its Impacts
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Social and Intergroup Psychology
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence
- Keywords
- conspiracy theories, social identity, nonconformity, anti-democratic attitudes, prejudice, collective action, social change
- MeSH terms
- Attitude, Group Processes, Humans, Politics, Prejudice, Social Identification
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Claims read by deepseek-v4.1-flash under definition version 3 (extract-v3) on 2026-10-09.
Classified by jev-1.13-20260917 (gold-guideline-v0.2) on 2026-10-09.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
