Is Implicit Theory of Mind a Real and Robust Phenomenon? Results From a Systematic Replication Study
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 9 of the 9 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Recently, theory-of-mind research has been revolutionized by findings from novel implicit tasks suggesting that at least some aspects of false-belief reasoning develop earlier in ontogeny than previously assumed and operate automatically throughout adulthood. Although these findings are the empirical basis for far-reaching theories, systematic replications are still missing. This article reports a preregistered large-scale attempt to replicate four influential anticipatory-looking implicit theory-of-mind tasks using original stimuli and procedures. Results showed that only one of the four paradigms was reliably replicated. A second set of studies revealed, further, that this one paradigm was no longer replicated once confounds were removed, which calls its validity into question. There were also no correlations between paradigms, and thus, no evidence for their convergent validity. In conclusion, findings from anticipatory-looking false-belief paradigms seem less reliable and valid than previously assumed, thus limiting the conclusions that can be drawn from them.
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Cites
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Empirical failures of the claim that autistic people lack a theory of mind.
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What Do Theory-of-Mind Tasks Actually Measure? Theory and Practice
Quesque, F., & Rossetti, Y. (2020) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/1745691619896607 · Cited by 287
Great apes use self-experience to anticipate an agent’s action in a false-belief test
Kano, F., Krupenye, C., Hirata, S., Tomonaga, M., & Call, J. (2019) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1910095116 · Cited by 247
“Of special note, one interesting result from previous replication studies is that, while some researchers found a chance-level effect for FB2 (26), others found a below-chance effect for FB2 (as well as an above-chance effect for FB1) in the DLS results (23, 25).”
ResultTheory of mind in animals: current and future directions
Krupenye, C., & Call, J. (2019) · WIREs Cognitive Science · doi:10.1002/wcs.1503 · Cited by 180
Metadata
- Authors
- Kulke, L., von Duhn, B., Schneider, D., & Rakoczy, H.
- Venue
- Psychological Science
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2018-04-16
- Volume
- 29
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 888-900
- ISSN
- 0956-7976 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-9280
- OpenAlex
- W2799911607
- Cited by
- 172
- References
- 9
- FWCI
- 37.94
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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