The DOI matches its Crossref record; 19 of the 19 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
People Reject Algorithms in Uncertain Decision Domains Because They Have Diminishing Sensitivity to Forecasting Error
Open accessAbstract
Will people use self-driving cars, virtual doctors, and other algorithmic decision-makers if they outperform humans? The answer depends on the uncertainty inherent in the decision domain. We propose that people have diminishing sensitivity to forecasting error and that this preference results in people favoring riskier (and often worse-performing) decision-making methods, such as human judgment, in inherently uncertain domains. In nine studies ( N = 4,820), we found that (a) people have diminishing sensitivity to each marginal unit of error that a forecast produces, (b) people are less likely to use the best possible algorithm in decision domains that are more unpredictable, (c) people choose between decision-making methods on the basis of the perceived likelihood of those methods producing a near-perfect answer, and (d) people prefer methods that exhibit higher variance in performance (all else being equal). To the extent that investing, medical decision-making, and other domains are inherently uncertain, people may be unwilling to use even the best possible algorithm in those domains.
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Cited by
What influences algorithmic decision-making? A systematic literature review on algorithm aversion
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Metadata
- Authors
- Dietvorst, B. J., & Bharti, S.
- Venue
- Psychological Science
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2020-09-11
- Volume
- 31
- Issue
- 10
- Pages
- 1302-1314
- ISSN
- 0956-7976 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-9280
- OpenAlex
- W2974452734
- Cited by
- 273
- References
- 19
- FWCI
- 20.90
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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