The power of predictions: An emerging paradigm for psychological research
Open accessAbstract
In the last two decades, neuroscience studies have suggested that various psychological phenomena are produced by predictive processes in the brain. When considered together, these studies form a coherent, neurobiologically inspired program for guiding psychological research about the mind and behavior. In this article, we consider the common assumptions and hypotheses that unify an emerging framework and discuss the ramifications of such a framework, both for improving the replicability and robustness of psychological research and for renewing psychological theory by suggesting an alternative ontology of the human mind.
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All brains face an inverse inference problem: ambiguous, noisy sense data arrives from the body and environment, and the brain must infer causes.
“All brains are faced with an inverse inference problem: ambiguous, noisy sense data continually arrives from inside the animal’s body (the result of allostasis) and from the surrounding environment (the animal’s niche). The brain does not have access to the causes of the sense data so it must infer them.”
From What is an emotion? (2019) · cites this paper as [6]
The Abstract describes predictions as explanations of the causes of sensations, and “Predictive Processing: Some Core Hypotheses” says the brain compares its internal model with sensory information from the body and world. These passages support inference from sensory input, but they do not explicitly establish that all brains face an inverse problem involving continually arriving, ambiguous and noisy data whose causes are inaccessible. (LLM, conf=0.79)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredPredictions of the future are continually generated within the brain based on previous life experiences, as an array of parallel predictive simulations that come with a certain probability.
“First, predictions of the future are continually generated within the brain: based on previous life experiences, an array of parallel predictive simulations are computed that all come with a certain probability. 96,[101][102]2][103][104][105][106][107][108][109][110][111][112]”
From A new science of emotion: implications for functional neurological disorder (2022) · cites this paper as [103]
In “Predictive Processing: Some Core Hypotheses” (page unavailable), the paper says the brain continually runs a generative internal model that recombines past experiences to predict expected sensory inputs. It does not say that the brain computes an array of parallel predictive simulations, each assigned a probability; its reference to “parallel trajectories” in the Abstract describes research approaches, not simulations. (LLM, conf=0.84)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredPredictive processing to guide allostasis is rooted in the brain's cortical cytoarchitecture.
“Predictive processing to guide the performance of allostasis is rooted in the brain's cortical cytoarchitecture.”
From A new science of emotion: implications for functional neurological disorder (2022) · cites this paper as [103]
In “The role of energy regulation in mental events” (page not supplied), the paper links cortical anatomy to the proposed flow of prediction signals and links that architecture to anticipatory bodily regulation, or allostasis. It presents this anatomical account as a hypothesis, however, whereas the citing sentence states the connection without that qualification. (LLM, conf=0.78)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredBased on past experiences that share features of equivalence with the present, the brain uses concepts that were relevant then, with all possible futures and associated action plans, to deal with and understand current incoming sensory signals.
“Based on past experiences that share features of equivalence with the present, our brain uses the concepts (i.e.abstract mental representations) that were relevant then, with all the possible futures and associated action plans to deal with and understand the current incoming sensory signals.”
From A new science of emotion: implications for functional neurological disorder (2022) · cites this paper as [103]
In “Predictive Processing: Some Core Hypotheses” (page unavailable), the paper says an internal model draws on past experience to predict sensory inputs associated with upcoming actions. It does not say the brain selects concepts from equivalent past experiences or considers all possible futures and associated action plans; those details go beyond the passage. (LLM, conf=0.86)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredPredictions in the cortex run from less laminated structures to higher laminated structures.
“Predictions in the cortex run from less laminated structures (i.e.four-layered agranular tissue referred to as limbic cortices including: ventral anterior insula, cingulate and posterior orbitofrontal/ventromedial prefrontal cortex; and the primary motor cortex with a small granular layer) to higher laminated structures (i.e.six-layered eulaminate areas such as the mid-to-posterior insula as the p”
From A new science of emotion: implications for functional neurological disorder (2022) · cites this paper as [103]
In “The role of energy regulation in mental events” (page unavailable), the paper hypothesizes that limbic cortices originate prediction signals that propagate through a cortical hierarchy. It does not specify that this flow runs from less laminated to more laminated cortex or give the cited layer counts, so the claim’s anatomical specificity is unsupported. (LLM, conf=0.83)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
A brain constructs inferences by remembering past events similar to present conditions.
“So, a brain constructs inferences — hypotheses about the causes of sensations — by remembering past events that are similar to present conditions. This is the basic hypothesis of predictive coding approaches to understanding brain function [6].”
From What is an emotion? (2019) · cites this paper as [6]
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References 102 · Cited by 216
Research works printed but not linked: 11
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- Tamir DI, & Thornton MA (2018). Modeling the Predictive Social Mind. Trends Cogn Sci, 22(3), 201– 212. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2017.12.005 29361382 PMC5828990 · DOI
- Helmholtz H von (1860/1962) Handbuch der physiologischen optik, Vol. 3, ed. And trans. Southall JPC. Dover (Original work published in 1860; Dover English edition in 1962).
- Johnson-Laird PN (1983). Mental Models: Towards a Cognitive Science of Language, Inference, and Consciousness. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press
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- Authors
- Hutchinson, J. B., & Barrett, L. F.
- Affiliations
- University of Oregon (US)
- Northeastern University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Barrett, Lisa Feldman
- Venue
- Current Directions in Psychological Science
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2019-04-16
- Volume
- 28
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 280-291
- ISSN
- 0963-7214 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-8721
- PMC
- PMC6867616
- OpenAlex
- W2937517290
- Cited by
- 216
- References
- 102
- Citations by year
- 2026: 14 · 2025: 23 · 2024: 41 · 2023: 28 · 2022: 27 · 2021: 16 · 2020: 52 · 2019: 12 · 2018: 2 · 2017: 1
- FWCI
- 15.54
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
- Locations
- Current Directions in Psychological Science (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- PubMed Central (acceptedVersion)
- Funders
- army research institute for the behavioral and social sciences (W911NF-16-1-019)
- National Institute of Mental Health (R01 MH109464, R01 MH113234)
- National Cancer Institute (U01 CA193632)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural and Behavioral Psychology Studies
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Cognitive Science and Education Research
- Keywords
- predictive processing, mind and behavior, ontology of mind, replicability, psychological theory, research programs
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