The DOI matches its Crossref record; 26 of the 26 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Nature of Common-Pool Resource Problems
Abstract
This article presents a conceptual framework for theoretical and empirical analysis of the multiplicity of behavioral problems encountered in common-pool resources (CPRs). This framework is used to specify more clearly the strategic content of CPR dilemmas and to show their interaction. The framework shows how general theoretical constructs (e.g., Prisoner's Dilemma and coordination games) apply to these behavioral dilemmas. Finally, results from a case study and a set of laboratory experiments demonstrate the applicability of this framework in designing and conducting empirical research on CPRs.
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Cites
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Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action
Field, B. C., & Ostrom, E. (1992) · Land Economics · doi:10.2307/3146384 · Cited by 18,859
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(2013) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.103.6.i · Cited by 7,220
College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
Gale, D., & Shapley, L. S. (1962) · The American Mathematical Monthly · doi:10.1080/00029890.1962.11989827 · Cited by 5,985
The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery
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The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods
Cornes, R., & Sandler, T. (1996) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139174312 · Cited by 2,637
College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
Gale, D., & Shapley, L. S. (1962) · American Mathematical Monthly · doi:10.2307/2312726 · Cited by 2,082
(2015) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9781315685366 · Cited by 2,046
Economic Theory and Exhaustible Resources
Dasgupta, P. S., & Heal, G. M. (1980) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511628375 · Cited by 1,471
Cited by
Property-Rights Regimes and Natural Resources: A Conceptual Analysis
Schlager, E., & Ostrom, E. (1992) · Land Economics · doi:10.2307/3146375 · Cited by 2,663
Self-citationCovenants with and without a Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible
Ostrom, E., Walker, J., & Gardner, R. (1992) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1964229 · Cited by 2,063
Self-citationCoping with Asymmetries in the Commons: Self-Governing Irrigation Systems Can Work
Ostrom, E., & Gardner, R. (1993) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.7.4.93 · Cited by 600
Self-citationUnderstanding the value of (big) data
Pantelis, K., & Aija, L. (2013) · 2013 IEEE International Conference on Big Data · doi:10.1109/bigdata.2013.6691691 · Cited by 121
A multi-agent reinforcement learning model of common-pool resource appropriation
Perolat, J., Leibo, J. Z., Zambaldi, V., Beattie, C., Tuyls, K., & Graepel, T. (2017) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1707.06600 · Cited by 109
Metadata
- Authors
- GARDNER, R., OSTROM, E., & WALKER, J. M.
- Venue
- Rationality and Society
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 1990-07
- Volume
- 2
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 335-358
- ISSN
- 1043-4631 (ISSN-L)
- 1461-7358
- OpenAlex
- W2064150245
- Cited by
- 324
- References
- 26
- FWCI
- 31.83
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.