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Beyond Dominance and Competence: A Moral Virtue Theory of Status Attainment

Bai, Feng · 2017 · Personality and Social Psychology Review
Cited by 73

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 51 of the 51 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

Recognition has grown that moral behavior (e.g., generosity) plays a role in status attainment, yet it remains unclear how, why, and when demonstrating moral characteristics enhances status. Drawing on philosophy, anthropology, psychology, and organizational behavior, I critically review a third route to attaining status: virtue , and propose a moral virtue theory of status attainment to provide a generalized account of the role of morality in status attainment. The moral virtue theory posits that acts of virtue elicit feelings of warmth and admiration (for virtue), and willing deference, toward the virtuous actor. I further consider how the scope and priority of moralities and virtues endorsed by a moral community are bound by culture and social class to affect which moral characteristics enhance status. I end by outlining an agenda for future research into the role of virtue in status attainment.

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Metadata

Authors
Bai, F.
Venue
Personality and Social Psychology Review
Published
2016-05-24
Volume
21
Issue
3
Pages
203-227
ISSN
  • 1088-8683 (ISSN-L)
  • 1532-7957
OpenAlex
W2396385619
Cited by
73
References
51
FWCI
17.15
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Beyond Dominance and Competence: A Moral Virtue Theory of Status Attainment. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1177/1088868316649297
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Bai, F. (2017). Beyond Dominance and Competence: A Moral Virtue Theory of Status Attainment. Personality and Social Psychology Review. https://doi.org/10.1177/1088868316649297

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.