Beyond Dominance and Competence: A Moral Virtue Theory of Status Attainment
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 51 of the 51 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Recognition has grown that moral behavior (e.g., generosity) plays a role in status attainment, yet it remains unclear how, why, and when demonstrating moral characteristics enhances status. Drawing on philosophy, anthropology, psychology, and organizational behavior, I critically review a third route to attaining status: virtue , and propose a moral virtue theory of status attainment to provide a generalized account of the role of morality in status attainment. The moral virtue theory posits that acts of virtue elicit feelings of warmth and admiration (for virtue), and willing deference, toward the virtuous actor. I further consider how the scope and priority of moralities and virtues endorsed by a moral community are bound by culture and social class to affect which moral characteristics enhance status. I end by outlining an agenda for future research into the role of virtue in status attainment.
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Citations
Cites
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The self-importance of moral identity
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“…discuss how witnesses’ individual differences affect the virtue route; instead, it assumes that people are, in general, moral beings who genuinely care about others (e.g., Batson, 1990), and who desire to maintain a positive moral identity (e.g., Aquino & Reed, 2002; Strohminger & Nichols, 2015).”
BackgroundEvolution of indirect reciprocity
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On Justification: Economies of Worth
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“Given its broad scope, admiration is considered an umbrella term for “other-praising” emotions including admiration for virtue or elevation (Algoe & Haidt, 2009), (affective) respect (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001), inspiration (Thrash & Elliot, 2004), and awe (Keltner & Haidt, 2003).”
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Background8 Social Hierarchy: The Self‐Reinforcing Nature of Power and Status
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Cited by
Prestige-biased social learning: current evidence and outstanding questions
Jiménez, Á. V., & Mesoudi, A. (2019) · Palgrave Communications · doi:10.1057/s41599-019-0228-7 · Cited by 204
Examining the trade‐off between confidence and optimism in future forecasts
Stavrova, O., & Evans, A. M. (2019) · Journal of Behavioral Decision Making · doi:10.1002/bdm.2087 · Cited by 12
Cortisol awakening response and testosterone jointly affect adolescents' theory of mind
Wang, H., Zhang, S., Wu, S., Qin, S., & Liu, C. (2022) · Hormones and Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.yhbeh.2022.105258 · Cited by 7
Metadata
- Authors
- Bai, F.
- Venue
- Personality and Social Psychology Review
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2016-05-24
- Volume
- 21
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 203-227
- ISSN
- 1088-8683 (ISSN-L)
- 1532-7957
- OpenAlex
- W2396385619
- Cited by
- 73
- References
- 51
- FWCI
- 17.15
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Bai, F. (2017). Beyond Dominance and Competence: A Moral Virtue Theory of Status Attainment. Personality and Social Psychology Review. https://doi.org/10.1177/1088868316649297
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