The social ontology of intentions
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This article addresses the issue of how to develop a theory of interpretation of social action (discourse included) that takes into consideration culture-specific claims about intentions while simultaneously allowing for a pan-human, universal dimension of intentionality. It is argued that to achieve such a goal, it is necessary to agree on a basic definition of intentionality and on the conditions that allow for its investigation. After briefly discussing the limitations of applying an (English-based) ‘narrow’ notion of intention to the analysis of other languages and cultures, a more general and basic analytic notion of intentionality is proposed, that is, as aboutness (as defined by Husserl). By applying this more general notion of intentionality, we can then examine both the content of intentional acts and the conditions that allow for their study across cultural contexts through ‘bracketing’. This is made possible by the social ontology of intentions, which is what enables the analysis of human conduct and its interpretation. Our methods and hypotheses must be evaluated over and against such an existential premise.
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Cites
Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind
Searle, J. R. (1983) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139173452 · Cited by 4,575
Talking Culture: Ethnography and Conversation Analysis
Moerman, M. (1988) · doi:10.9783/9780812200355 · Cited by 542
Cited by
Husserl, intersubjectivity and anthropology
Duranti, A. (2010) · Anthropological Theory · doi:10.1177/1463499610370517 · Cited by 449
Self-citationIntroduction: Cultural and Linguistic Anthropology and the Opacity of Other Minds
Robbins, J., & Rumsey, A. (2008) · Anthropological Quarterly · doi:10.1353/anq.0.0005 · Cited by 397
Agency: The Relation between Meaning, Power, and Knowledge
Kockelman, P. (2007) · Current Anthropology · doi:10.1086/512998 · Cited by 196
“Duranti (2006) tackles this issue in a short essay, but there is much more to be said about it.”
BackgroundMayer, A., & Träuble, B. E. (2013) · International Journal of Behavioral Development · doi:10.1177/0165025412454030 · Cited by 160
Metadata
- Authors
- Duranti, A.
- Venue
- Discourse Studies
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2006-02
- Volume
- 8
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 31-40
- ISSN
- 1461-4456 (ISSN-L)
- 1461-7080
- OpenAlex
- W2114192985
- Cited by
- 75
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 66.97
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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