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The social ontology of intentions

Duranti, Alessandro · 2006 · Discourse Studies
Cited by 75

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

This article addresses the issue of how to develop a theory of interpretation of social action (discourse included) that takes into consideration culture-specific claims about intentions while simultaneously allowing for a pan-human, universal dimension of intentionality. It is argued that to achieve such a goal, it is necessary to agree on a basic definition of intentionality and on the conditions that allow for its investigation. After briefly discussing the limitations of applying an (English-based) ‘narrow’ notion of intention to the analysis of other languages and cultures, a more general and basic analytic notion of intentionality is proposed, that is, as aboutness (as defined by Husserl). By applying this more general notion of intentionality, we can then examine both the content of intentional acts and the conditions that allow for their study across cultural contexts through ‘bracketing’. This is made possible by the social ontology of intentions, which is what enables the analysis of human conduct and its interpretation. Our methods and hypotheses must be evaluated over and against such an existential premise.

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Metadata

Authors
Duranti, A.
Venue
Discourse Studies
Published
2006-02
Volume
8
Issue
1
Pages
31-40
ISSN
  • 1461-4456 (ISSN-L)
  • 1461-7080
OpenAlex
W2114192985
Cited by
75
References
2
FWCI
66.97
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The social ontology of intentions. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1177/1461445606059548
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Duranti, A. (2006). The social ontology of intentions. Discourse Studies. https://doi.org/10.1177/1461445606059548

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