Cited by 25Feminist Epistemology and Gender StudiesGame Theory and Voting SystemsGame Theory and Applications

Epistemic network injustice

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Spiekermann, Kai·2020·Politics, Philosophy & Economics

Abstract

To find out what is in one’s own best interest, it is helpful to ask one’s epistemic peers. However, identifying one’s epistemic peers is not a trivial task. I consider a stylized political setting, an electoral competition of ‘Masses’ and ‘Elites’. To succeed, the Masses need to know which alternative on offer is truly in their interest. To find out, the Masses can pool their privately held information in a pre-election ballot, provided that they can reliably find out with whom they should pool information. I investigate the process of finding the relevant peer group for information pooling by modelling this group formation process as dynamic network change. The simulations show that the Masses can succeed in finding the right peers, but they also suggest reasons why the Elites may often be more successful. This phenomenon generalizes to the notion of Epistemic Network Injustice. Such injustice arises when a subset of citizens is systematically deprived of connections to helpful epistemic peers, leading to their reduced political influence. Epistemic Network Injustice is a new form of epistemic injustice, related to but distinct from the notion introduced by Miranda Fricker.

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Research works printed but not linked: 5

  1. Dietrich, F. and Spiekermann, K. (forthcoming). Jury theorems. In Fricker, M., Graham, P. J., Henderson, D., Pedersen, N., and Wyatt, J., editors, The Routledge Companion to Social Epistemology . Routledge.
  2. Haslanger, S. (2017). Culture and Critique. Proceedings, of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary volume , pages 1-22.
  3. List, C. and Spiekermann, K. (2016). Core Voter Knowledge and the Condorcet Jury Theorem. In Kornblith, H. and McLaughlin, B. P., editors, Goldman and His Critics , pages 219-233. Wiley.
  4. Miller, N. R. (1986). Information, Electorates, and Democracy: Some Extentions and Interpretations of the Condorcet Jury Theorem. In Grofman, B. and Owen, G., editors, Information Pooling and Group Decision Making , pages 173-192. JAI Press, Greenwich, Conn.
  5. Stanley, J. (2017). How propaganda works . Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey and Oxford.

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Authors
Spiekermann, K.
Affiliations
London School of Economics and Political Science (GB)
Corresponding author
Spiekermann, Kai
Venue
Politics, Philosophy & Economics
Published
2019-09-19
Volume
19
Issue
1
Pages
83-101
ISSN
  • 1470-594X (ISSN-L)
  • 1741-3060
OpenAlex
W4246342425
Cited by
25
References
18
Citations by year
2026: 1 · 2025: 2 · 2024: 5 · 2023: 14 · 2022: 2 · 2021: 1
FWCI
1.51
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Politics Philosophy & Economics (publishedVersion)
  • London School of Economics and Political Science Research Online (London School of Economics and Political Science) (submittedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
Keywords
epistemic injustice, information pooling, dynamic network formation, epistemic democracy, electoral competition, elite and masses, Miranda Fricker

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