The Ideological Foundations of Affective Polarization in the U.S. Electorate
Abstract
Democratic and Republican partisans dislike the opposing party and its leaders far more than in the past. However, recent studies have argued that the rise of affective polarization in the electorate does not reflect growing policy or ideological differences between supporters of the two parties. According to this view, though Democratic and Republican elites are sharply divided along ideological lines, differences between the policy preferences of rank-and-file partisans remain modest. In this article, we show that there is a close connection between ideological and affective polarization. We present evidence from American National Election Studies surveys that opinions on social welfare issues have become increasingly consistent and divided along party lines and that social welfare ideology is now strongly related to feelings about the opposing party and its leaders. In addition, we present results from a survey experiment showing that ideological distance strongly influences feelings toward opposing party candidates and the party as a whole.
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Ideological polarization, sorting, and affective polarization are correlated.
“Recent work indicates that while ideological polarization, sorting, and affective polarization are correlated (Rogowski & Sutherland 2016, Bougher 2017, Webster & Abramowitz 2017), the relationship is weak, with sorting accounting for only about 5% of the variance in affective polarization (Lelkes 2018, Mason 2018a).”
From The Origins and Consequences of Affective Polarization in the United States (2019) · cites this paper as Webster & Abramowitz 2017
Issue or ideological polarization implies either symmetric polarization, in which two groups move in opposite, more extreme directions, or asymmetric polarization, in which one group becomes more extreme than the other.
“This implies either that two groups — such as liberals and conservatives or leftists and rightists — are moving in opposite, more extreme directions (symmetric polarization) or that one group is becoming more extreme than the other (asymmetric polarization10,34,47,48,73–75).”
From Cognitive–motivational mechanisms of political polarization in social-communicative contexts (2022) · cites this paper as [48]
Analysis of American National Election Studies data from 1984 to 2012 showed that attitudes about social welfare policy and, to a lesser extent, abortion and gay rights, were strongly predictive of negative feelings about the opposing party and its presidential candidates.
“For example, analysis of data from the American National Election Studies from 1984 to 2012 showed that attitudes about social welfare policy and, to a lesser extent, abortion and gay rights, were strongly predictive of negative feelings about the opposing party and its presidential candidates48.”
From Cognitive–motivational mechanisms of political polarization in social-communicative contexts (2022) · cites this paper as [48]
Issue polarization can fuel affective polarization.
“This suggests that issue polarization can fuel affective polarization.”
From Cognitive–motivational mechanisms of political polarization in social-communicative contexts (2022) · cites this paper as [48]
Liberals and conservatives differ in terms of system-justifying versus system-challenging motives, which might help to explain asymmetric polarization.
“However, they differ in terms of system-justifying (versus system-challenging) motives, which might help to explain asymmetric polarization10,34,47,48,73,74.”
From Cognitive–motivational mechanisms of political polarization in social-communicative contexts (2022) · cites this paper as [48]
Elite polarization predated the rise of mass polarization in the USA by several years, suggesting that voters began to 'catch up' to party leaders over time.
“Elite polarization predated the rise of mass polarization in the USA by several years, suggesting that voters began to ‘catch up’ to party leaders over time10,42,48.”
From Cognitive–motivational mechanisms of political polarization in social-communicative contexts (2022) · cites this paper as [48]
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References 40 · Cited by 557
- Authors
- Webster, S. W., & Abramowitz, A. I.
- Affiliations
- Emory University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Webster, Steven W.
- Venue
- American Politics Research
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2017-04-18
- Volume
- 45
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 621-647
- ISSN
- 0044-7803 (ISSN-L)
- 1532-673X
- 1552-3373
- OpenAlex
- W2606256248
- Cited by
- 557
- References
- 40
- Citations by year
- 2026: 58 · 2025: 72 · 2024: 55 · 2023: 62 · 2022: 97 · 2021: 43 · 2020: 64 · 2019: 77 · 2018: 26 · 2017: 3
- FWCI
- 226.06
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- American Politics Research (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Media Influence and Politics
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Populism, Right-Wing Movements
- Keywords
- affective polarization, ideological polarization, partisanship, party identification, ideological distance, American National Election Studies, survey experiment
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