The DOI matches its Crossref record; 57 of the 57 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Toward Parsimony in Bias Research: A Proposed Common Framework of Belief-Consistent Information Processing for a Set of Biases
Open accessAbstract
One of the essential insights from psychological research is that people’s information processing is often biased. By now, a number of different biases have been identified and empirically demonstrated. Unfortunately, however, these biases have often been examined in separate lines of research, thereby precluding the recognition of shared principles. Here we argue that several—so far mostly unrelated—biases (e.g., bias blind spot, hostile media bias, egocentric/ethnocentric bias, outcome bias) can be traced back to the combination of a fundamental prior belief and humans’ tendency toward belief-consistent information processing. What varies between different biases is essentially the specific belief that guides information processing. More importantly, we propose that different biases even share the same underlying belief and differ only in the specific outcome of information processing that is assessed (i.e., the dependent variable), thus tapping into different manifestations of the same latent information processing. In other words, we propose for discussion a model that suffices to explain several different biases. We thereby suggest a more parsimonious approach compared with current theoretical explanations of these biases. We also generate novel hypotheses that follow directly from the integrative nature of our perspective.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.185.4157.1124 · Cited by 28,810 · cited 2×
“Apart from the fact that this debate mainly revolved around heuristics and biases that we do not deal with here (e.g., the set of heuristics introduced by Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), an adequate treatise of the rationality and adaptivity is beyond the scope of this article for two reasons.”
The case for motivated reasoning.
Kunda, Z. (1990) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.108.3.480 · Cited by 9,022
Illusion and well‐being: A social psychological perspective on mental health
Taylor, S. E., & Brown, J. D. (1988) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.103.2.193 · Cited by 7,814 · cited 1×
“…beneficial for individuals, even if they are illusory (e.g., Alloy & Abramson, 1979; Alloy & Clements, 1992; Day & Maltby, 2003; Green & Elliott, 2010; Kay, Gaucher, et al., 2010; Kay, Moscovitch, & Laurin, 2010; Langer, 1975; Taylor & Brown, 1988, 1994; Taylor et al., 2000; Witter et al., 1985).”
REMEMBERING: A STUDY IN EXPERIMENTAL AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
Bartlett, F. C., & Burt, C. (1933) · British Journal of Educational Psychology · doi:10.1111/j.2044-8279.1933.tb02913.x · Cited by 7,475
Implicit social cognition: Attitudes, self-esteem, and stereotypes
Greenwald, A. G., & Banaji, M. R. (1995) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.102.1.4 · Cited by 6,682 · cited 1×
“…and situations (e.g., W. F. Brewer & Nakamura, 1984; Brosch et al., 2010; J. S. Bruner & Potter, 1964; Darley & Fazio, 1980; C. D. Gilbert & Li, 2013; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Hilton & von Hippel, 1996; Kveraga et al., 2007; Maier & Seligman, 1976; Mervis & Rosch, 1981; Roese & Sherman, 2007).”
Lord, C. G., Ross, L., & Lepper, M. R. (1979) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.37.11.2098 · Cited by 4,583
Motivated Skepticism in the Evaluation of Political Beliefs
Taber, C. S., & Lodge, M. (2006) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00214.x · Cited by 4,344
The Intuitive Psychologist And His Shortcomings: Distortions in the Attribution Process
Ross, L. (1977) · Advances in Experimental Social Psychology · doi:10.1016/s0065-2601(08)60357-3 · Cited by 4,170
Rosenthal, R., & Jacobson, L. (1968) · The Urban Review · doi:10.1007/bf02322211 · Cited by 3,878
Learned helplessness: Theory and evidence
Maier, S. F., & Seligman, M. E. (1976) · Journal of Experimental Psychology: General · doi:10.1037/0096-3445.105.1.3 · Cited by 2,494 · cited 1×
“…and situations (e.g., W. F. Brewer & Nakamura, 1984; Brosch et al., 2010; J. S. Bruner & Potter, 1964; Darley & Fazio, 1980; C. D. Gilbert & Li, 2013; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Hilton & von Hippel, 1996; Kveraga et al., 2007; Maier & Seligman, 1976; Mervis & Rosch, 1981; Roese & Sherman, 2007).”
Cited by
Partisan Bias in Political Judgment
Ditto, P. H., Celniker, J. B., Siddiqi, S. S., Güngör, M., & Relihan, D. P. (2025) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-030424-122723 · Cited by 25
Exaggerating differences back and forth: Two levels of intergroup accentuation
Rothermund, P., & Deutsch, R. (2024) · British Journal of Social Psychology · doi:10.1111/bjso.12699 · Cited by 9
Metadata
- Authors
- Oeberst, A., & Imhoff, R.
- Venue
- Perspectives on Psychological Science
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2023-03-17
- Volume
- 18
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1464-1487
- ISSN
- 1745-6916 (ISSN-L)
- 1745-6924
- OpenAlex
- W4327682002
- Cited by
- 168
- References
- 57
- FWCI
- 72.91
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Toward Parsimony in Bias Research: A Proposed Common Framework of Belief-Consistent Information Processing for a Set of Biases. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1177/17456916221148147
- The paper
- Oeberst, A., & Imhoff, R. (2023). Toward Parsimony in Bias Research: A Proposed Common Framework of Belief-Consistent Information Processing for a Set of Biases. Perspectives on Psychological Science. https://doi.org/10.1177/17456916221148147
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.