The DOI matches its Crossref record; 70 of the 70 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Memory and Mystery: The Cultural Selection of Minimally Counterintuitive Narratives
Open accessAbstract
We hypothesize that cultural narratives such as myths and folktales are more likely to achieve cultural stability if they correspond to a minimally counterintuitive (MCI) cognitive template that includes mostly intuitive concepts combined with a minority of counterintuitive ones. Two studies tested this hypothesis, examining whether this template produces a memory advantage, and whether this memory advantage explains the cultural success of folktales. In a controlled laboratory setting, Study 1 found that an MCI template produces a memory advantage after a 1‐week delay, relative to entirely intuitive or maximally counterintuitive cognitive templates. Using archival methods, Study 2 examined the cognitive structure of Grimm Brothers folktales. Compared to culturally unsuccessful folktales, those that were demonstrably successful were especially likely to fit an MCI template. These findings highlight the role of human memory processes in cultural evolution.
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Cites
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The evolution of costly displays, cooperation and religion
Henrich, J. (2009) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2009.03.005 · Cited by 693
Berger, J., & Heath, C. (2008) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.95.3.593 · Cited by 549
Analytic cognitive style predicts religious and paranormal belief
Pennycook, G., Cheyne, J. A., Seli, P., Koehler, D. J., & Fugelsang, J. A. (2012) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2012.03.003 · Cited by 544
Atran, S., & Henrich, J. (2010) · Biological Theory · doi:10.1162/biot_a_00018 · Cited by 459
Chua, R. Y. J., Roth, Y., & Lemoine, J.-F. (2015) · Administrative Science Quarterly · doi:10.1177/0001839214563595 · Cited by 433
Metadata
- Authors
- Norenzayan, A., Atran, S., Faulkner, J., & Schaller, M.
- Venue
- Cognitive Science
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2006-05
- Volume
- 30
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 531-553
- ISSN
- 0364-0213 (ISSN-L)
- 1551-6709
- OpenAlex
- W2105687216
- Cited by
- 383
- References
- 70
- FWCI
- 373.97
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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