The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Defeasible Reasoning
Open accessAbstract
What philosophers call defeasible reasoning is roughly the same as nonmonotonic reasoning in AI. Some brief remarks are made about the nature of reasoning and the relationship between work in epistemology, AI, and cognitive psychology. This is followed by a general description of human rational architecture. This description has the consequence that defeasible reasoning has a more complicated structure than has generally been recognized in AI. We define a proposition to be warranted if it would be believed by an ideal reasoner. A general theory of warrant, based on defeasible reasons, is developed. This theory is then used as a guide in the construction of a theory of defeasible reasoning, and a computer program implementing that theory. The theory constructed deals with only a subset of defeasible reasoning, but it is an important subset.
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Cites
Reiter, R. (1980) · Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.1016/0004-3702(80)90014-4 · Cited by 3,892
Circumscription—A form of non-monotonic reasoning
McCarthy, J. (1980) · Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.1016/0004-3702(80)90011-9 · Cited by 2,017
Doyle, J. (1979) · Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.1016/0004-3702(79)90008-0 · Cited by 1,132
McDermott, D., & Doyle, J. (1980) · Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.1016/0004-3702(80)90012-0 · Cited by 904
Contemporary Theories of Knowledge
Steo, W. (1962) · The Modern Schoolman · doi:10.5840/schoolman196239323 · Cited by 344
Nomic Probability and the Foundations of Induction.
Kyburg, H. E., & Pollock, J. L. (1993) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2185665 · Cited by 119
Self-citationSchurz, G. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198887546.003.0002 · Cited by 50
Cited by
Dung, P. M. (1995) · Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.1016/0004-3702(94)00041-x · Cited by 4,270
Argumentation in artificial intelligence
Bench-Capon, T. J. M., & Dunne, P. E. (2007) · Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.1016/j.artint.2007.05.001 · Cited by 803
An abstract, argumentation-theoretic approach to default reasoning
Bondarenko, A., Dung, P. M., Kowalski, R. A., & Toni, F. (1997) · Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.1016/s0004-3702(97)00015-5 · Cited by 665
Argument-based extended logic programming with defeasible priorities
Prakken, H., & Sartor, G. (1997) · Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics · doi:10.1080/11663081.1997.10510900 · Cited by 586
Logics for Defeasible Argumentation
Prakken, H., & Vreeswijk, G. (2001) · Handbook of Philosophical Logic · doi:10.1007/978-94-017-0456-4_3 · Cited by 418
Metadata
- Authors
- Pollock, J. L.
- Venue
- Cognitive Science
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1987-10
- Volume
- 11
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 481-518
- ISSN
- 0364-0213 (ISSN-L)
- 1551-6709
- OpenAlex
- W4256682192
- Cited by
- 522
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 1.87
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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