The DOI matches its Crossref record; 19 of the 19 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Machiavellian Privatization
Open accessAbstract
We analyze politically motivated privatization in a bipartisan environment. When median-class voters a priori favor redistributive policies, a strategic privatization program allocating them enough shares can induce a voting shift away from left-wing parties whose policy would reduce the value of shareholdings. To induce median-class voters to buy enough shares to shift political preferences, strategic rationing and underpricing is often necessary. In the extreme, this may lead to free share distribution and voucher privatization. Shifting voting preferences becomes impossible when strong ex ante political constraints require large upfront transfers to insiders or when social inequality is extreme.
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The Effects of Privatization and Ownership in Transition Economies
Estrin, S., Hanousek, J., Kočenda, E., & Svejnar, J. (2009) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.47.3.699 · Cited by 926
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Becht, M., Bolton, P., & Röell, A. (2003) · Handbook of the Economics of Finance · doi:10.1016/s1574-0102(03)01005-7 · Cited by 795
State-owned Enterprises Around the WORLD as Hybrid Organizations
Bruton, G. D., Peng, M. W., Ahlstrom, D., Stan, C., & Xu, K. (2015) · Academy of Management Perspectives · doi:10.5465/amp.2013.0069 · Cited by 783
Bekaert, G., & Harvey, C. R. (2003) · Journal of Empirical Finance · doi:10.1016/s0927-5398(02)00054-3 · Cited by 754
Metadata
- Authors
- Biais, B., & Perotti, E.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2002-02-01
- Volume
- 92
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 240-258
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W4254832804
- Cited by
- 306
- References
- 19
- FWCI
- 45.47
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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