CoChat
Sign Up
Cited by 658Gender Politics and RepresentationElectoral Systems and Political ParticipationGame Theory and Voting Systems

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 33 of the 33 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Can Mandated Political Representation Increase Policy Influence for Disadvantaged Minorities? Theory and Evidence from India

Open access
Pande, Rohini·2003·American Economic Review
DOI 10.1257/000282803769206232
Open this paper in CoChat — free account

Abstract

A basic premise of representative democracy is that all those subject to policy should have a voice in its making. However, policies enacted by electorally accountable governments often fail to reflect the interests of disadvantaged minorities. This paper exploits the institutional features of political reservation, as practiced in Indian states, to examine the role of mandated political representation in providing disadvantaged groups influence over policy-making. I find that political reservation has increased transfers to groups which benefit from the mandate. This finding also suggests that complete policy commitment may be absent in democracies, as is found in this case.

Overview

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1257/000282803769206232

Cites

33 of 33 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Recomputing p-values needs the paper’s full text.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

We couldn’t retrieve this paper’s full text, so its claims and self-check weren’t run. The registry and citation checks still apply.

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

Citations

Cites

Research works printed but not linked: 1

  1. Kalt Joseph, 1984, American Economic Review, 74, 279

Cited by

Sorted by citations

See all 658

Related

See all

Metadata

Authors
Pande, R.
Affiliations
Yale University (US)
Corresponding author
Pande, Rohini
ORCID
Pande, Rohini
Venue
American Economic Review
Publisher
American Economic Association
Published
2003-08-01
Volume
93
Issue
4
Pages
1132-1151
ISSN
0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1257/000282803769206232
OpenAlex
W2024464435
Cited by
658
References
33
Citations by year
2026: 19 · 2025: 29 · 2024: 23 · 2023: 35 · 2022: 63 · 2021: 23 · 2020: 35 · 2019: 46 · 2018: 32 · 2017: 45 · 2016: 31 · 2015: 32 · 2014: 45 · 2013: 29 · 2012: 28
FWCI
25.10
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • American Economic Review (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • Columbia Academic Commons (Columbia University)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Gender Studies › Gender Politics and Representation
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
Keywords
political reservation, policy influence, policy commitment, representative democracy, affirmative action, social transfers, Indian states

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review