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Can Mandated Political Representation Increase Policy Influence for Disadvantaged Minorities? Theory and Evidence from India
Open accessAbstract
A basic premise of representative democracy is that all those subject to policy should have a voice in its making. However, policies enacted by electorally accountable governments often fail to reflect the interests of disadvantaged minorities. This paper exploits the institutional features of political reservation, as practiced in Indian states, to examine the role of mandated political representation in providing disadvantaged groups influence over policy-making. I find that political reservation has increased transfers to groups which benefit from the mandate. This finding also suggests that complete policy commitment may be absent in democracies, as is found in this case.
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“We recruited respondents via a combination of reaching out directly and personal contacts, using purposeful sampling [151]-i.e., identifying and selecting experts with relevant experience-iterative until saturation.”
From Re-imagining Algorithmic Fairness in India and Beyond (2021) · cites this paper as [151]
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“But if politicians cannot commit to a particular political platform, and their group membership eventually determines the type of policies they will implement, then the lack of representation at the top means that the underrepresented groups in society will get worse outcomes (Besley and Coate, 1997; Pande, 2003).”
BackgroundA Female Style in Corporate Leadership? Evidence from Quotas
Matsa, D. A., & Miller, A. R. (2013) · American Economic Journal Applied Economics · doi:10.1257/app.5.3.136 · Cited by 927
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“This approach has provided the motivation for studies on the effect of political reservation (i.e. reserving political office for particular groups in the population) by Pande (2003) who studies caste reservation and Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) who study reservations for women.”
BackgroundHowe, L. D., Galobardes, B., Matijasevich, A., Gordon, D., Johnston, D., Onwujekwe, O. E., Patel, R., Webb, E. A., Lawlor, D. A., & Hargreaves, J. (2012) · International Journal of Epidemiology · doi:10.1093/ije/dys037 · Cited by 611
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Reshaping Institutions: Evidence on Aid Impacts Using a Preanalysis Plan*
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“Research in India suggests that political quotas for women and members of scheduled castes shift the composition of public spending toward goods preferred by these groups (Pande 2003; Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004) and reduces bias against female candidates (Beamen et al. 2009).”
BackgroundClots‐Figueras, I. (2010) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.11.017 · Cited by 438
Do Electoral Quotas Work after They Are Withdrawn? Evidence from a Natural Experiment in India
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Besley, T. J. (2005) · The Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/089533005774357761 · Cited by 390
The Power of Political Voice: Women's Political Representation and Crime in India
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“Similarly increased representation of disadvantaged castes in political office has been found to bring greater benefits for these castes (Pande, 2003; Besley et al, 2007).”
BackgroundVoting Technology, Political Responsiveness, and Infant Health: Evidence From Brazil
Fujiwara, T. (2015) · Econometrica · doi:10.3982/ecta11520 · Cited by 387
The Politics of Public Good Provision: Evidence from Indian Local Governments
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“…reservation suggests that political reservation for a group leads to a higher incidence of policies preferred by and/or targeted towards that group (see Pande (2003) for state-level evidence in the case of SC/ST, and Chattopadhyay and Du o (2003) for village-level evidence in the case of women).”
BackgroundResultSelf-citationBroockman, D. (2013) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12018 · Cited by 372
HAS DEMOCRATIZATION REDUCED INFANT MORTALITY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA? EVIDENCE FROM MICRO DATA
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Government Transfers and Political Support
Manacorda, M., Miguel, E. A., & Vigorito, A. (2009) · American Economic Journal Applied Economics · doi:10.1257/app.3.3.1 · Cited by 340
Determinants of Maternity Care Services Utilization among Married Adolescents in Rural India
Singh, P. K., Kumar, R., Alagarajan, M., & Singh, L. (2012) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0031666 · Cited by 350
The Effects of Participatory Budgeting on Municipal Expenditures and Infant Mortality in Brazil
Gonçalves, S. (2014) · World Development · doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2013.01.009 · Cited by 279
“…in order to ensure that their interests are reflected in policy-making (e.g., Besley, Pande, Rahman, & Rao, 2004; Chattopadhyay & Duflo, 2004; Pande, 2003); the introduction of service report cards (e.g., Bjorkman & Svensson, 2009); the direct involvement of community members in school and…”
BackgroundBó, E. D., Finan, F., Folke, O., Persson, T., & Rickne, J. K. (2017) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjx016 · Cited by 36
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Hessami, Z., & da Fonseca, M. L. (2020) · European Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2020.101896 · Cited by 329
“Just as mandated representatives from scheduled castes and tribes in India support policies targeted towards their own group (Pande, 2003), female representatives may address specific issues that by nature or due to traditional gender roles mainly affect women (Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004).”
BackgroundThe political economy of public goods: Some evidence from India
Banerjee, A., & Somanathan, R. (2007) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2006.04.005 · Cited by 517
“[28] Pande, Rohini (2003), “Can Mandated Political Representation Increase Policy Influence for Disadvantaged Minorities? Theory and Evidence from India”, American Economic Review.”
BackgroundRethinking the Comparative Perspective on Class and Representation: Evidence from Latin America
Carnes, N., & Lupu, N. (2014) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12112 · Cited by 320
The impact of political leaders' profession and education on reforms
Dreher, A., Lamla, M. J., Lein, S. M., & Somogyi, F. (2008) · Journal of Comparative Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jce.2008.08.005 · Cited by 314
Do Democracies Select More Educated Leaders?
Besley, T. J., & Reynal‐Querol, M. (2011) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055411000281 · Cited by 298
“3 See, for example, Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) and Pande (2003) for evidence from India, where reservation for lower caste groups and women has been used to change the makeup of the political class.”
BackgroundCan Informed Voters Enforce Better Governance? Experiments in Low-Income Democracies
Pande, R. (2011) · Annual Review of Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-economics-061109-080154 · Cited by 285
Self-citationIntersectionality, Quotas, and Minority Women's Political Representation Worldwide
Hughes, M. M. (2011) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055411000293 · Cited by 301
Estimating Local Fiscal Multipliers
Suárez Serrato, J. C., & Wingender, P. (2016) · doi:10.3386/w22425 · Cited by 270
“In a paper looking at political representation in India, Pande (2003) uses the di¤erence between annual changes in minorities population shares and their xed statutory shares as determined by the previous Census. population levels due to Census revisions and subsequent federal spending at the county level.”
Dunning, T., & Nilekani, J. (2013) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055412000573 · Cited by 259
“At the state level, Pande (2003) finds that SC legislators distribute more to their constituencies (though see Jensenius 2012, who finds weak effects of quotas at the state level).”
BackgroundCan Gender Parity Break the Glass Ceiling? Evidence from a Repeated Randomized Experiment
Bagues, M. F., & Esteve-Volart, B. (2010) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-937x.2009.00601.x · Cited by 250
Can gender quotas break down negative stereotypes? Evidence from changes in electoral rules
Paola, M. D., Scoppa, V., & Lombardo, R. (2010) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.02.004 · Cited by 250
“The rationale for increasing women representation is that women legislators tend to raise distinctive issues and priorities in the public agenda and give particular attention to women’s interests (Pande, 2003; Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004; Chen, 2009).”
BackgroundBó, E. D., Bó, P. D., & Snyder, J. A. (2008) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-937x.2008.00519.x · Cited by 258
Carnes, N., & Lupu, N. (2016) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055416000551 · Cited by 224
“…on issues related to gender and race (e.g., Berkman and O’Connor 1993; Bratton and Ray 2002; Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004; Franck and Rainer 2012; Pande 2003; Swers 2002; Thomas 1991), the shortage of workingclass politicians—who tend to be more leftist on economic issues in most…”
BackgroundRe-imagining Algorithmic Fairness in India and Beyond
Sambasivan, N., Arnesen, E., Hutchinson, B., Doshi, T., & Prabhakaran, V. (2021) · Proceedings of the 2021 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency · doi:10.1145/3442188.3445896 · Cited by 228
“studies have pointed to the successful redistribution of resources towards oppressed sub-groups, through reservations [43, 68, 152].”
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Krcmaric, D., Nelson, S. C., & Roberts, A. L. (2019) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-050718-032801 · Cited by 202
Cascio, E., & Washington, E. (2013) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjt028 · Cited by 199
“This information has been collected by the Census of Governments (COG) every five fiscal years for decades.”
MethodJust Rewards? Local Politics and Public Resource Allocation in South India
Besley, T. J., Pande, R., & Rao, V. (2011) · The World Bank Economic Review · doi:10.1093/wber/lhr039 · Cited by 192
“Pande (2003) analyzes the policy impact of state-wide reservation for Scheduled castes and Scheduled tribes.”
Self-citationPettersson‐Lidbom, P. (2011) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.07.004 · Cited by 188
Sen, G., & Mukherjee, A. (2014) · Journal of Human Development and Capabilities · doi:10.1080/19452829.2014.884057 · Cited by 186
Hnatkovska, V. V., Lahiri, A., & Paul, S. (2012) · American Economic Journal Applied Economics · doi:10.1257/app.4.2.274 · Cited by 184
Parochial Politics: Ethnic Preferences and Politician CorruptionPreprint
Banerjee, A., & Pande, R. (2007) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.976548 · Cited by 178
Self-citationMunshi, K. D. (2019) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.20171307 · Cited by 176
Breaking the Caste Barrier: Intergenerational Mobility in India
Hnatkovska, V. V., Lahiri, A., & Paul, S. (2013) · The Journal of Human Resources · doi:10.1353/jhr.2013.0012 · Cited by 170
“Thus, Pande (2003) examines the e¤ects of reservations on government policies, while Prakash (2009) studies the e¤ects of reservations on the labor market outcomes of SC/STs.”
BackgroundGender Discrimination and Evaluators’ Gender: Evidence from Italian Academia
Paola, M. D., & Scoppa, V. (2014) · Economica · doi:10.1111/ecca.12107 · Cited by 169
Gender Quotas and Female Leadership: A ReviewPreprint
Pande, R., & Ford, D. (2014) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 166
Self-citationWhen Do Legislators Pass on Pork? The Role of Political Parties in Determining Legislator Effort
Keefer, P. E., & Khemani, S. (2009) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055409090054 · Cited by 162
“23 Pande (2003) provides evidence that few, if any, candidates from scheduled castes and tribes win or compete in districts that are not reserved. public works to their own districts.”
BackgroundFemale Socialization: How Daughters Affect Their Legislator Fathers
Washington, E. (2008) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · doi:10.1257/aer.98.1.311 · Cited by 371
Besley, T. J. (2007) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02097.x · Cited by 157
“It is used by both Pande (2003) and Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) to motivate their work.”
BackgroundMethodHow Black Candidates Affect Voter Turnout*
Washington, E. (2006) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/qjec.121.3.973 · Cited by 153
Pathbreakers? Women's Electoral Success and Future Political Participation
Bhalotra, S. R., Clots‐Figueras, I., & Iyer, L. S. (2017) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/ecoj.12492 · Cited by 149
On Formalizing Fairness in Prediction with Machine LearningPreprint
Gajane, P., & Pechenizkiy, M. (2017) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1710.03184 · Cited by 152
Duflo, E. (2005) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1162/jeea.2005.3.2-3.668 · Cited by 151
Institutional Corruption and Election Fraud: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan
Callen, M. J., & Long, J. D. (2015) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20120427 · Cited by 149
“We study this problem in 1 There is substantial empirical documentation of the benefits of improving political accountability ( Besley and Burgess 2002; Besley, Pande, and Rao 2005; Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004; Ferraz and Finan 2008, 2011; Fujiwara 2013; Pande 2003; Martinez-Bravo et al. 2013 .”
BackgroundImpact of Political Reservations in West Bengal Local Governments on Anti-Poverty Targeting
Bardhan, P., Mookherjee, D., & Torrado, M. P. (2010) · Journal of Globalization and Development · doi:10.2202/1948-1837.1025 · Cited by 148
“Besley, Pande, Rahman and Rao (2004) used household and village survey data from local government in three South Indian states conducted between September and November 2002. They found that SC/ST Pradhan reservations increased the provision to SC/ST households of `private’ benefits such as housing and toilet construct…”
Electoral Rules and Minority Representation in U.S. Cities*
Trebbi, F., Aghion, P., & Alesina, A. (2008) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/qjec.2008.123.1.325 · Cited by 136
Progress and Perspectives in the Study of Political Selection
Bó, E. D., & Finan, F. (2018) · Annual Review of Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-economics-080217-053221 · Cited by 132
Can gender quotas in candidate lists empower women? Evidence from a regression discontinuity design
Bagues, M. F., & Campa, P. (2020) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2020.104315 · Cited by 178
Political reservations and women's entrepreneurship in India
Ghani, E., Kerr, W. R., & O'Connell, S. D. (2014) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2014.01.008 · Cited by 133
“Using state-level variation in India over four decades, Pande (2003) identifies how the mandated reservations of legislative positions for minority members of Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe (SC/ST) individuals increased the redistribution of resources towards these groups, demonstrating enhanced…”
Do judiciaries matter for development? Evidence from India
Chemin, M. (2009) · Journal of Comparative Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jce.2009.02.001 · Cited by 127
“Therefore, I have included into the analyses, a variable that represents the proportion of seats reserved for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, as well as the group’s population share according to government census (according to Pande, 2003).”
MethodThe redistributive effects of political reservation for minorities: Evidence from India
Chin, A. Y., & Prakash, N. (2010) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2010.10.004 · Cited by 126
The Majority‐Minority Divide in Attitudes toward Internal Migration: Evidence from Mumbai
Gaikwad, N., & Nellis, G. (2016) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12276 · Cited by 125
Cohen, L. H., & Malloy, C. J. (2014) · American Economic Journal Economic Policy · doi:10.1257/pol.6.3.63 · Cited by 127
Caste and Entrepreneurship in India
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Caste-based crimes and economic status: Evidence from India
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“…action extended to SCs and STs has made a discernible positive impact in some dimensions such as poverty, redistribution of state resources, and some public goods provisions (e.g., Pande, 2003; Besley et al., 2004; Chin and Prakash, 2011), gaps remain between the SCST and non-SCST groups.”
BackgroundCan Descriptive Representation Change Beliefs about a Stigmatized Group? Evidence from Rural India
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“Others highlighted the fact that members of these groups are more likely to receive private benefits when representation becomes more descriptive (Besley et al. 2004; 2005; Pande 2003).”
BackgroundLocal favoritism in at-large proportional representation systems
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“, gender (Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004), and ethnicity (Pande, 2003), matter for (32)Voters’ hometown bias might also have a less instrumental explanation.”
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Desai, R. M., & Joshi, S. (2013) · The World Bank Economic Review · doi:10.1093/wber/lht024 · Cited by 109
“communal inequities are endemic even in relatively (ethnically) homogenous communities, and these inequities are often reflected in public goods choices (Pande 2003; Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004; Hoff and Pandey 2006) We would expect, therefore, that any successful effort to promote cooperation by SHGs would ultimatel…”
BackgroundDoes Access to Formal Agricultural Credit Depend on Caste?
Kumar, S. M. (2012) · World Development · doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2012.11.001 · Cited by 108
“In the second case, government policy might also attempt to alleviate historical disadvantage through affirmative action such as political reservation (Pande 2003; Prakash & Chin 2011), or quotas in government educational institutions (Bertrand et al.”
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“Here, however, we add a provincial dummy as well to control for the more accurate fixed effect (a similar method is used in Pande 2003, and in Besley et al. 2005).”
MethodThe Impact of Political Leaders' Profession and Education on Reforms
Dreher, A., Lamla, M. J., Lein, S. M., & Somogyi, F. (2006) · Econstor (Econstor) · doi:10.3929/ethz-a-005277685 · Cited by 107
Institutions and Development: A View from Below
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Self-citationGender, religion and happiness
Mookerjee, R., & Beron, K. (2005) · The Journal of Socio-Economics · doi:10.1016/j.socec.2005.07.012 · Cited by 106
Does democracy help reduce environmental degradation?
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“Pande (2003) points out that “a basic premise of representative democracy is that all those subject to policy should have a voice in its making.””
BackgroundResultAffirmative action, education and gender: Evidence from India
Cassan, G. (2018) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2018.10.001 · Cited by 106
Country or leader? Political change and UN General Assembly voting
Dreher, A., & Jensen, N. M. (2012) · European Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2012.10.002 · Cited by 108
The Impact of Political Leaders' Profession and Education on ReformsPreprint
Dreher, A., Lamla, M. J., Lein, S. M., & Somogyi, F. (2006) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.946088 · Cited by 95
Cooperation in collective action*
Bandiera, O., Barankay, I., & Imran Rasul, A. (2005) · Economics of Transition · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0351.2005.00228.x · Cited by 93
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Chen, L. (2010) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 92
Urban geography and scaling of contemporary Indian cities
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“While these interventions have resulted in improvements on public goods provision [35] and redistribution of resources [36] to disadvantaged groups, social and political organization among Dalits has often resulted in feudal backlashes taking the form of “mass killings, gang rapes, looting in Dalit villages” [37].”
BackgroundClaiming the State: Active Citizenship and Social Welfare in Rural India
Kruks-Wisner, G. (2018) · Cited by 87
Local Representation and Strategic Voting: Evidence from Electoral Boundary ReformsPreprint
Saarimaa, T., & Tukiainen, J. (2013) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2340401 · Cited by 86
Representing the advantaged: how politicians reinforce inequality
(2015) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.187680 · Cited by 87
Welmond, M. J., Winters, L. A., Whiteside, K., Wong-Valle, J., Woollcombe, D., Yemtsov, R., Yurukoglu, T., Hay, P., Neal, C., Kanchas, G., et al. (2007) · Cited by 79
Why Do the Poor Receive Poor Services
Keefer, P. E., & Khemani, S. (2016) · Cited by 76
Do Black Politicians Matter? Evidence from Reconstruction
Logan, T. D. (2020) · The Journal of Economic History · doi:10.1017/s0022050719000755 · Cited by 75
High-end physician migration from India
Kaushik, M. (2008) · Bulletin of the World Health Organization · doi:10.2471/blt.07.041681 · Cited by 75
Cohen, L. H., Diether, K. B., & Malloy, C. J. (2013) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.08.012 · Cited by 70
Village Elections, Public Goods Investments and Pork Barrel Politics, Chinese-style
Luo, R., Zhang, L., Huang, J., & Rozelle, S. (2010) · The Journal of Development Studies · doi:10.1080/00220380903318061 · Cited by 75
“In this way, our results are somewhat like those of Rosenzweig and Foster (2003), Pande (2003) and Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) in that they find positive effects of changes in elections and political democracy (the effect is significant, albeit, the magnitude of the effect is not very large).”
BackgroundMethodResultInfluentialPublic Goods and Economic Development
Besley, T. J., & Ghatak, M. (2006) · doi:10.1093/0195305191.003.0019 · Cited by 73
Women as policy makers and donors: Female legislators and foreign aid
Hicks, D. L., Hicks, J. H., & Maldonado, B. (2015) · European Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2015.10.007 · Cited by 72
Gender and lawmaking in times of quotas
Lippmann, Q. (2022) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2022.104610 · Cited by 70
A gender-based theory of the origin of the caste system of India
Bidner, C., & Eswaran, M. (2015) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2014.12.006 · Cited by 71
“Economists have studied the experience of low caste groups in response to policies, especially in the political realm, that have been enacted to address the ill effects of caste (e.g. Pande (2003), Banerjee and Somanthan (2007), and Hnatkovska, Lahiri, and Paul (2012)).”
BackgroundUnderstanding Political Corruption in Low Income CountriesPreprint
Pande, R. (2007) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.976540 · Cited by 70
Self-citationArnesen, S., Duell, D., & Johannesson, M. P. (2018) · Electoral Studies · doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2018.10.005 · Cited by 67
“The large volume of studies on such cases such as the United States or India (Gay, 2002; Pantoja and Segura, 2003; Chauchard, 2014; Pande, 2003) speaks to this observation.”
BackgroundÅgren, H., Dahlberg, M., & Mörk, E. (2006) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/s11127-006-9077-1 · Cited by 67
“It combines data from surveys directed at 5 That increased representation may matter is shown by Pande (2003) and Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004).”
Does Female Reservation Affect Long-Term Political Outcomes? Evidence from Rural India
Deininger, K., Jin, S., Nagarajan, H. K., & Xia, F. (2014) · The Journal of Development Studies · doi:10.1080/00220388.2014.947279 · Cited by 66
“Although many studies explored the impacts of caste reservations (Krishnan, 2007; Pande, 2003), our focus is on”
The Local Economic Impacts of Resource Abundance: What Have We Learned?
Aragón, F. M., Chuhan-Pole, P., & Land, B. C. (2015) · World Bank, Washington, DC eBooks · doi:10.1596/1813-9450-7263 · Cited by 66
Metadata
- Authors
- Pande, R.
- Affiliations
- Yale University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Pande, Rohini
- ORCID
- Pande, Rohini
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2003-08-01
- Volume
- 93
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1132-1151
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2024464435
- Cited by
- 658
- References
- 33
- Citations by year
- 2026: 19 · 2025: 29 · 2024: 23 · 2023: 35 · 2022: 63 · 2021: 23 · 2020: 35 · 2019: 46 · 2018: 32 · 2017: 45 · 2016: 31 · 2015: 32 · 2014: 45 · 2013: 29 · 2012: 28
- FWCI
- 25.10
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- doi.org
- Locations
- American Economic Review (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Columbia Academic Commons (Columbia University)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Gender Studies › Gender Politics and Representation
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Keywords
- political reservation, policy influence, policy commitment, representative democracy, affirmative action, social transfers, Indian states
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