A Group Rule—Utilitarian Approach to Voter Turnout: Theory and Evidence
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 30 of the 30 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This paper explores a group rule–utilitarian approach to understanding voter turnout, inspired by the theoretical work of John C. Harsanyi (1980) and Timothy J. Feddersen and Alvaro Sandroni (2002). It develops a model based on this approach and studies its performance in explaining turnout in Texas liquor referenda. The results are encouraging: the comparative static predictions of the model are broadly consistent with the data, and a structurally estimated version of the model yields reasonable coefficient estimates and fits the data well. The structurally estimated model also outperforms a simple expressive voting model.
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“However, two recent attempts to endogenize the D term in a game theoretic model show that “ethical” preferences can help to explain turnout even when voters are well informed and fully strategic (Coate and Conlin 2004; Feddersen and Sandroni 2006a, 2006b).”
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Metadata
- Authors
- Coate, S., & Conlin, M.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2004-12-01
- Volume
- 94
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1476-1504
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2034352155
- Cited by
- 335
- References
- 30
- FWCI
- 32.40
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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