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Cited by 788

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 34 of the 34 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Matching with Contracts

Hatfield, John William, Milgrom, Paul R·2005·American Economic Review

Abstract

We develop a model of matching with contracts which incorporates, as special cases, the college admissions problem, the Kelso-Crawford labor market matching model, and ascending package auctions. We introduce a new “law of aggregate demand” for the case of discrete heterogeneous workers and show that, when workers are substitutes, this law is satisfied by profit-maximizing firms. When workers are substitutes and the law is satisfied, truthful reporting is a dominant strategy for workers in a worker-offering auction/matching algorithm. We also parameterize a large class of preferences satisfying the two conditions.

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Metadata

Authors
Hatfield, J. W., & Milgrom, P. R.
Venue
American Economic Review
Published
2005-08-01
Volume
95
Issue
4
Pages
913-935
ISSN
0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2096375861
Cited by
788
References
34
FWCI
47.66
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Matching with Contracts. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1257/0002828054825466
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Hatfield, J. W., & Milgrom, P. R. (2005). Matching with Contracts. American Economic Review. https://doi.org/10.1257/0002828054825466

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.