Student or educator? Sign up with your school email and get 6 months of Pro free.
CoChat
Sign Up
Cited by 827

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

The Political Economy of Corporate Governance

Open access
Pagano, Marco, Volpin, Paolo F·2005·American Economic Review
DOI 10.1257/0002828054825646
Open this paper in CoChat — free account

Abstract

We analyze the political determinants of investor and employment protection. Our model predicts that proportional electoral systems are conducive to weaker investor protection and stronger employment protection than majoritarian systems. This prediction is consistent with international panel data evidence. The proportionality of the voting system is significantly and negatively correlated with shareholder protection in a panel of 45 countries, and positively correlated with employment protection in a panel of 21 OECD countries. Other political variables also affect regulatory outcomes, especially for the labor market. The origin of the legal system has some additional explanatory power only for employment protection.

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1257/0002828054825646

Cites

3 of 3 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Cites

Show all 3 references

Cited by

See all 827

Metadata

Authors
Pagano, M., & Volpin, P. F.
Venue
American Economic Review
Publisher
American Economic Association
Published
2005-08-01
Volume
95
Issue
4
Pages
1005-1030
ISSN
0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1257/0002828054825646
OpenAlex
W3121905422
Cited by
827
References
3
FWCI
222.95
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The Political Economy of Corporate Governance. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1257/0002828054825646
The paper
Pagano, M., & Volpin, P. F. (2005). The Political Economy of Corporate Governance. American Economic Review. https://doi.org/10.1257/0002828054825646

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.