The Political Economy of Corporate Governance
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 14 of the 14 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
We analyze the political determinants of investor and employment protection. Our model predicts that proportional electoral systems are conducive to weaker investor protection and stronger employment protection than majoritarian systems. This prediction is consistent with international panel data evidence. The proportionality of the voting system is significantly and negatively correlated with shareholder protection in a panel of 45 countries, and positively correlated with employment protection in a panel of 21 OECD countries. Other political variables also affect regulatory outcomes, especially for the labor market. The origin of the legal system has some additional explanatory power only for employment protection.
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Cites
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Cited by
The law and economics of self-dealing
Djankov, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2008) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.02.007 · Cited by 3,486
The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins
Porta, R. L., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2008) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.46.2.285 · Cited by 3,220
Botero, J. C., Djankov, S., Porta, R. L., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2004) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/0033553042476215 · Cited by 2,124
Corporate Governance, Economic Entrenchment, and Growth
Morck, R., Wolfenzon, D., & Yeung, B. (2005) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/002205105774431252 · Cited by 1,863
The Origins of State Capacity: Property Rights, Taxation, and Politics
Besley, T., & Persson, T. (2009) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.99.4.1218 · Cited by 1,637
Metadata
- Authors
- Pagano, M., & Volpin, P. F.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2005-08-01
- Volume
- 95
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1005-1030
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3121905422
- Cited by
- 827
- References
- 14
- FWCI
- 222.95
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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