The DOI matches its Crossref record; 18 of the 18 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Boston Public School Match
Open accessAbstract
After the publication of “School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach” by Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez (2003), a Boston Globe reporter contacted us about the Boston Public Schools (BPS) system for assigning students to schools. The Globe article highlighted the difficulties that Boston’s system may give parents in strategizing about applying to schools. Briefly, Boston tries to give students their firstchoice school. But a student who fails to get her first choice may find her later choices filled by students who chose them first. So there is a risk in ranking a school first if there is a chance of not being admitted; other schools that would have been possible had they been listed first may also be filled. Valerie Edwards, then Strategic Planning Manager at BPS, and her colleague Carleton Jones invited us to a meeting in October 2003. BPS agreed to a study of their assignment system and provided us with micro-level data sets on choices and characteristics of students in the grades at which school choices are made (K, 1, 6, and 9), and school characteristics. Based on the pending results of this study, the Superintendent has asked for our advice on the design of a new assignment mechanism. This paper describes some of the difficulties with the current mechanism and some elements of the design and evaluation of possible replacement mechanisms. School choice in Boston has been partly shaped by desegregation. In 1974, Judge W. Arthur Garrity ordered busing for racial balance. In 1987, the U.S. Court of Appeals freed BPS to adopt a new, choice-based assignment plan. In 1999 BPS eliminated racial preferences in assignment and adopted the current mechanism.
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Citations
Cites
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College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach
Abdulkadiroğlu, A., & Sönmez, T. (2003) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282803322157061 · Cited by 1,568
Self-citationSdol, E. (2009) · Cited by 1,396
Shapley, L. S., & Scarf, H. E. (1974) · Journal of Mathematical Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-4068(74)90033-0 · Cited by 1,158
Roth, A. E. (2002) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/1468-0262.00335 · Cited by 1,004
Self-citationThe Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
Roth, A. E. (1982) · Mathematics of Operations Research · doi:10.1287/moor.7.4.617 · Cited by 895
Self-citationMyles, G. D. (1993) · European Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1016/0176-2680(93)90012-j · Cited by 875
The New York City High School Match
Abdulkadiroğlu, A., Pathak, P. A., & Roth, A. E. (2005) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282805774670167 · Cited by 654
Self-citation(1973) · RAND Corporation eBooks · doi:10.7249/r1056-1 · Cited by 584
School choice: an experimental study
Chen, Y., & Sönmez, T. (2006) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/j.jet.2004.10.006 · Cited by 376
Self-citationIncentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets
Kojima, F., & Pathak, P. A. (2009) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.99.3.608 · Cited by 362
Self-citationRoth, A. E. (1991) · PubMed · Cited by 343
Self-citationGames of school choice under the Boston mechanism
Ergin, H., & Sönmez, T. (2006) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2005.02.002 · Cited by 305
Self-citationIncentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
Roth, A. E. (1982) · Economics Letters · doi:10.1016/0165-1765(82)90003-9 · Cited by 279
Self-citationA Kidney Exchange Clearinghouse in New England
Roth, A. E., Sönmez, T., & Ünver, M. U. (2005) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282805774669989 · Cited by 279
Self-citationIncreasing the Opportunity of Live Kidney Donation by Matching for Two- and Three-Way Exchanges
Saidman, S. L., Roth, A. E., Sönmez, T., Ünver, M. U., & Delmonico, F. L. (2006) · Transplantation · doi:10.1097/01.tp.0000195775.77081.25 · Cited by 263
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The Combinatorial Assignment Problem: Approximate Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes
Budish, E. (2011) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/664613 · Cited by 766
Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets
Roth, A. E. (2007) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.21.3.37 · Cited by 560
Self-citationRoth, A. E., Sönmez, T., & Utku Ünver, M. (2005) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/j.jet.2005.04.004 · Cited by 536
Self-citationAbdulkadiroğlu, A., Pathak, P. A., & Roth, A. E. (2009) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.99.5.1954 · Cited by 500
Self-citationDeferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions
Roth, A. (2007) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w13225 · Cited by 392
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Abdulkadiroğlu, A., Pathak, P. A., Roth, A. E., & Sönmez, T.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2005-04-01
- Volume
- 95
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 368-371
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2128340555
- Cited by
- 530
- References
- 18
- FWCI
- 37.16
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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