Cited by 2,161Financial Markets and Investment StrategiesStock Market Forecasting MethodsEconomic theories and models

The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Its Critics

Malkiel, Burton G·2003·Journal of Economic Perspectives

Abstract

Revolutions often spawn counterrevolutions and the efficient market hypothesis in finance is no exception. The intellectual dominance of the efficient-market revolution has more been challenged by economists who stress psychological and behavorial elements of stock-price determination and by econometricians who argue that stock returns are, to a considerable extent, predictable. This survey examines the attacks on the efficient market hypothesis and the relationship between predictability and efficiency. I conclude that our stock markets are more efficient and less predictable than many recent academic papers would have us believe.

AI snapshot

Written from the paper’s full text.

TL;DR

Malkiel surveys challenges to the efficient market hypothesis from behavioral finance and predictability research and argues that stock markets remain far more efficient and far less predictable than critics claim. He concludes that documented anomalies are generally not robust or exploitable after transactions costs and that professional investors rarely beat broad index funds.

Key findings

  • Predictability claims exist but are weak or unreliable: Fama and French (1988) found 25–40% of the variation in long holding-period returns can be predicted from negative correlation with past returns, and dividend yields or P/E ratios can explain as much as 40% of future return variance. Yet Malkiel notes these predictors failed after the mid-1980s: with S&P 500 P/E in the low 20s and dividend yield below 3% in June 1987, the next 10-year annual total return was 16.7%; after June 1992, with yield at 3% and P/E in the mid-twenties, the subsequent return through June 2002 was 11.4%; from December 1996, despite Campbell and Shiller’s near-zero forecast, the S&P 500 returned almost 7% annually through mid-2002.
  • Anomalies are not dependable or profitable: small-company stocks returned over one percentage point more than large stocks since 1926, but there was no gain from holding smaller stocks from the mid-1980s through the 1990s; a Dimensional Fund Advisors value fund had an abnormal return of negative 0.2% per month over 1993–1998; momentum investors did worse than buy-and-hold investors because of transactions costs; and the January effect became undependable after publicity.
  • Professional managers generally underperform: about three-quarters of actively managed funds failed to beat the S&P 500 and Wilshire indexes over the past decade; the median large-cap equity fund underperformed the S&P 500 by almost two percentage points over 10-, 15-, and 20-year periods; of 355 original funds over 30 years, only five outperformed the market by two percentage points per year or more; top funds of 1998–1999 did three times the index then three times worse in 2000–2001.
  • Historical bubbles and crashes do not necessarily prove exploitable inefficiency: the October 1987 one-third drop coincided with long-term Treasury yields rising from about 9% to almost 10.5% and higher risk perceptions; a discount-rate rise from 11% to 13% would lower an index from $100 to $66.67. The Internet bubble offered no obvious arbitrage opportunity before it popped, and the Palm/3Com mispricing could not be shorted because too little Palm stock was outstanding. The historical equity risk premium—stocks about 10.5% versus high-grade bonds about 5.5% from 1926–2001—is partly attributed to survivorship bias and unexpected capital gains.

Methods

  • Design: a survey/essay synthesizing theoretical and empirical literature on the efficient market hypothesis, behavioral finance, predictability, anomalies, and historical episodes; it is not a new primary empirical study or formal meta-analysis.
  • Data/sample: cited studies and exhibits, including U.S. stock returns since 1926, S&P 500 dividend-yield and P/E deciles through 2000/2002, Fama–French size/value data for 1963–1990, mutual fund performance data through mid-2002, and examples such as the 1987 crash, the Internet bubble, and Palm/3Com.
  • Analysis: narrative evaluation of statistical versus economic significance, robustness across sample periods, transaction costs, risk proxies, and limits to arbitrage; includes a simple present-value/discount-rate example for the 1987 crash.

Limitations

  • The paper states it makes no attempt to present a complete survey; it acknowledges that markets can make egregious valuation errors (e.g., the Internet bubble), that psychological factors influence securities prices, and that behavioral influences cannot be ruled out.
  • The paper notes survivorship bias in mutual fund datasets and data-mining/publication bias in the anomaly literature; predictable patterns may be time-dependent and can disappear after publication.
  • Evident from the text: as an interpretive survey by an EMH proponent, it relies on selected cited findings and exhibits rather than new systematic tests, and its conclusions about non-exploitability depend on assumptions about transaction costs and risk adjustment.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1257/089533003321164958

Cites

78 of 78 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Claims the paper makes

0 of 51 cited sources checked · 0 supported · 0 flagged

  • Findingcitation
    § Predicting Future Returns from Initial Dividend Yields · p. 14

    The dividend yield phenomenon does not work consistently with individual stocks; investors who purchase a portfolio of individual stocks with the highest dividend yields will not earn a particularly high rate of return.

    “Finally, it is worth noting that this phenomenon does not work consistently with individual stocks, as has been shown by Fluck, Malkiel and Quandt (1997). Investors who simply purchase a portfolio of individual stocks with the highest dividend yields in the market will not earn a particularly high rate of return.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Fluck, Malkiel and Quandt (1997)

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  • Findingnone given
    § Predicting Future Returns from Initial Dividend Yields · p. 13

    For all 10-year periods from 1985 through 1992 that ended June 30, 2002, realized annual equity returns from the market index have averaged approximately 15 percent.

    “In fact, for all 10 year periods from 1985 through 1992 that ended June 30, 2002, realized annual equity returns from the market index have averaged approximately 15 percent.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Findingown data
    § Predicting Market Returns from Initial Price-earnings Multiples · p. 14

    Investors have tended to earn larger long-horizon returns when purchasing the market basket of stocks at relatively low price-earnings multiples.

    “Investors have tended to earn larger long-horizon returns when purchasing the market basket of stocks at relatively low price-earnings multiples.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Findingown data
    § 'Value' Stocks · p. 19

    Over a period running back to the 1930s, it does not appear that investors could actually have realized higher rates of return from mutual funds specializing in 'value' stocks.

    “Over a period running back to the 1930s, it does not appear that investors could actually have realized higher rates of return from mutual funds specializing in 'value' stocks.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Findingreasoning
    § Predicting Future Returns from Initial Dividend Yields · p. 13

    The use of dividend yields to predict future returns has been ineffective since the mid-1980s.

    “Moreover, the use of dividend yields to predict future returns has been ineffective since the mid-1980s.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims. 31
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 31
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    Findingcitation
    § Long-run Return Reversals · p. 11

    In the same simulation, returns in the next period were similar for both groups, so a contrarian approach would not yield higher-than-average returns.

    “However, they also found that returns in the next period were similar for both groups, so they could not confirm that a contrarian approach would yield higher-thanaverage returns.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Fluck, Malkiel and Quandt (1997)

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    Findingcitation
    § Long-run Return Reversals · p. 11

    There was a statistically strong pattern of return reversal, but not one that implied an inefficiency in the market that would enable investors to make excess returns.

    “There was a statistically strong pattern of return reversal, but not one that implied an inefficiency in the market that would enable investors to make excess returns.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Fluck, Malkiel and Quandt (1997)

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  • May combine two claims.

    Findingnone given
    § The Size Effect · p. 17

    From the mid-1980s through the 1990s, there has been no gain from holding smaller stocks; in most world markets, larger capitalization stocks produced larger rates of return.

    “From the mid1980s through the decade of the 1990s, there has been no gain from holding smaller stocks. Indeed, in most world markets, larger capitalization stocks produced larger rates of return.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data
    § Predicting Future Returns from Initial Dividend Yields · p. 13

    Investors have earned a higher rate of return from the stock market when they purchased a market basket of equities with an initial dividend yield that was relatively high, and relatively low future rates of return when stocks were purchased at low dividend yields.

    “In general, the exhibit shows that investors have earned a higher rate of return from the stock market when they purchased a market basket of equities with an initial dividend yield that was relatively high, and relatively low future rates of return when stocks were purchased at low dividend yields.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Findingnone given
    § The Internet Bubble of the Late 1990s · p. 28

    Professional pension-fund and mutual fund managers over-weighted their portfolios with high-tech stocks.

    “Professional pension-fund and mutual fund managers over-weighted their portfolios with high-tech stocks.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Findingnone given
    § The Internet Bubble of the Late 1990s · p. 28

    With hindsight, outlandish and unsupportable claims were being made regarding the growth of the Internet (and the related telecommunications structure needed to support it).

    “We know now, with the benefit of hindsight, that outlandish and unsupportable claims that being made regarding the growth of the Internet (and the related telecommunications structure needed to support it).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Findingnone given
    § The Internet Bubble of the Late 1990s · p. 27

    Even in the Internet bubble, there were no arbitrage opportunities available to rational investors before the bubble popped.

    “But even here, when we know after the fact that major errors were made, there were certainly no arbitrage opportunities available to rational investors before the bubble popped.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Findingreasoning
    § Other Illustrations of Irrational Pricing · p. 29

    As Palm Pilot began trading, the 95 percent of its shares still owned by 3-Com had a market value considerably more than the entire market capitalization of 3-Com, implying that all the rest of its business had a negative value.

    “As Palm Pilot began trading, enthusiasm for the shares was so great that the 95 percent of its shares still owed by 3-Com had a market value considerably more than the entire market capitalization of 3-Com, implying that all the rest of its business had a negative value.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Findingnone given
    § The Internet Bubble of the Late 1990s · p. 28

    Many of Wall Street's most respected security analysts, including those independent of investment banking firms, were recommending Internet stocks to clients as being fairly valued.

    “Many of Wall Street's most respected security analysts, including those independent of investment banking firms, were recommending Internet stocks to the firm's institutional and individual clients as being fairly valued.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Findingnone given
    § Other Illustrations of Irrational Pricing · p. 30

    The 'anomaly' disappeared once 3-Com spun off more of Palm stock.

    “The 'anomaly' disappeared once 3-Com spun off more of Palm stock.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Findingnone given
    § Other Illustrations of Irrational Pricing · p. 29

    In the Palm Pilot spin-off, initially only 5 percent of the Palm Pilot shares were distributed to the public; the other 95 percent remained on 3-Com's balance sheet.

    “Initially, only 5 percent of the Palm Pilot shares were distributed to the public; the other 95 percent remained on 3-Com's balance sheet.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Findingnone given
    § The Internet Bubble of the Late 1990s · p. 29

    Stock prices eventually did adjust to levels that more reasonably reflected the likely present value of their cash flows.

    “while stock prices eventually did adjust to levels that more reasonably reflected the likely present value of their cash flows”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Findingnone given
    § The Internet Bubble of the Late 1990s · p. 28

    With hindsight, projections for the rates and duration of growth of 'new economy' companies were unsustainable.

    “We know now that projections for the rates and duration of growth of these for 'new economy' companies were unsustainable.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).

    Findingnone given
    § The Internet Bubble of the Late 1990s · p. 28

    In retrospect, such professionals were egregiously wrong.

    “While it is now clear in retrospect that such professionals were egregiously wrong, there was certainly no obvious arbitrage opportunity available.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Findingnone given
    § The Internet Bubble of the Late 1990s · p. 28

    It was the sharp-pencilled professional investors who argued that the valuations of high-tech companies were proper.

    “But remember, it was the sharp-pencilled professional investors who argued that the valuations of high-tech companies were proper.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Findingnone given
    § Conclusion · p. 33

    Some market participants are demonstrably less than rational.

    “Undoubtedly, some market participants are demonstrably less then rational.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Long-run Return Reversals · p. 10

    The finding of mean reversion is not uniform across studies and is quite a bit weaker in some periods than in others.

    “However, the finding of mean reversion is not uniform across studies and is quite a bit weaker in some periods than it is for other periods.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § Short-term Momentum Including Underreaction to New Information · p. 7

    Momentum investors do not realize excess returns; a sample of such investors did far worse than buy-and-hold investors even during a period with clear statistical evidence of positive momentum.

    “Odean (1999) suggests that momentum investors do not realize excess returns. Quite the opposite - a sample of such investors suggests that such traders did far worse than buy-and-hold investors even during a period where there was clear statistical evidence of positive momentum.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Odean (1999)

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Short-term Momentum Including Underreaction to New Information · p. 7

    The statistical dependencies giving rise to momentum are extremely small and are not likely to permit investors to realize excess returns.

    “The statistical dependencies giving rise to momentum are extremely small and are not likely to permit investors to realize excess returns.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given
    § Burton G. Malkiel Abstract · p. 2

    Stock markets are more efficient and less predictable than many recent academic papers would have us believe.

    “I conclude that our stock markets are more efficient and less predictable than many recent academic papers would have us believe.”
    • Also stated in: § Burton G. Malkiel Abstract · p. 4 · boosted
      “I conclude that our stock markets are far more efficient and far less predictable than some recent academic papers would have us believe.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § Short-term Momentum Including Underreaction to New Information · p. 8

    Many return anomalies arise only in the context of some very particular model, and the results tend to disappear when exposed to different models for expected normal returns, different methods to adjust for risk, and different statistical approaches.

    “He also shows that many of the return 'anomalies' arise only in the context of some very particular model, and that the results tend to disappear when exposed to different models for expected 'normal' returns, different methods to adjust for risk, and when different statistical approaches are used to measure them.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Eugene Fama (1998)

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § Short-term Momentum Including Underreaction to New Information · p. 8

    Apparent underreaction to information is about as common as overreaction, and post-event continuation of abnormal returns is as frequent as post-event reversals.

    “Fama finds that apparent underreaction to information is about as common as overreaction, and post-event continuation of abnormal returns is as frequent as post-event reversals.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Eugene Fama (1998)

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    Premisecitation
    § Long-run Return Reversals · p. 11

    There appear to be a number of day-of-the-week effects; French (1980) documents significantly higher Monday returns.

    “There also appear to be a number of day-of-the-week effects. For example, French (1980) documents significantly higher Monday returns.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites French (1980)

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    Premisecitation
    § Long-run Return Reversals · p. 11

    January has been a very unusual month for stock market returns; returns from an equally weighted stock index have tended to be unusually high during the first two weeks of the year, particularly for stocks with relatively small total capitalizations.

    “A number of researchers have found that January has been a very unusual month for stock market returns. Returns from an equally weighted stock index have tended to be unusually high during the first two weeks of the year. The return premium has been particularly evident for stocks with relatively small total capitalizations (Keim, 1983).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Keim, 1983

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    Interpretationnone given
    § The Equity Risk Premium Puzzle · p. 21

    The U.S. stock market is almost unique in that it is one of the few world markets that remained in continuous operation during the entire period, and the measured risk premium results in part from survivorship bias.

    “Indeed, the U.S. stock market is almost unique in that it is one of the few world markets that remained in continuous operation during the entire period and the measured risk premium results, in part, from survivorship bias.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § Long-run Return Reversals · p. 11

    There appear to be some patterns in returns around the turn of the month and around holidays.

    “There also appear to be some patterns in returns around the turn of the month (Lakonishok and Smidt, 1988), as well as around holidays (Ariel, 1990).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Lakonishok and Smidt, 1988

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    • cites Ariel, 1990

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    Premisecitation
    § Predicting Market Returns from Initial Price-earnings Multiples · p. 14

    Campbell and Shiller (1998) report that initial P/E ratios explained as much as 40 percent of the variance of future returns, and conclude that equity returns have been predictable in the past to a considerable extent.

    “Campbell and Shiller (1998) report that initial P/E ratios explained as much as 40 percent of the variance of future returns. They conclude that equity returns have been predictable in the past to a considerable extent.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Campbell and Shiller (1998)

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  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation
    § The Equity Risk Premium Puzzle · p. 21

    Fama and French (2002) argue that the high average realized returns result in part from large unexpected capital gains.

    “Eugene Fama and Kenneth French (2002) argue that the high average realized returns result in part from large unexpected capital gains.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Fama and French (2002)

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  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § The Equity Risk Premium Puzzle · p. 20

    Using Ibbotson data from 1926 through 2001, common stocks have produced rates of return of approximately 101⁄2 percent while high grade bonds have returned only about 51⁄2 percent.

    “For example, using the Ibbotson data from 1926 through 2001, common stocks have produced rates of retain of approximately 10½ percent while high grade bonds have returned only about 5½ percent.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Ibbotson data

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  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisecitation
    § 'Value' Stocks · p. 19

    Fama and French (1993) suggest that the price-to-book value ratio may reflect another risk factor that is priced into the market and not captured by CAPM.

    “For example, Fama and French (1993) suggest that the price-to-book value ratio may reflect another risk factor that is priced into the market and not captured by CAPM.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Fama and French (1993)

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  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

    Premisereasoning
    § The Size Effect · p. 17

    Fama and French suggest that size may be a far better proxy for risk than beta, and therefore their findings should not be interpreted as indicating that markets are inefficient.

    “Fama and French suggest that size may be a far better proxy for risk than beta, and therefore that their findings should not be interpreted as indicating that markets are inefficient.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Fama and French

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § The Size Effect · p. 17

    If stocks are divided up by beta deciles, ten portfolios constructed by size display the same kind of positive relationship shown in Exhibit 2; within size deciles, the relationship between beta and return continues to be flat.

    “Moreover, if stocks are divided up by beta deciles, ten portfolios constructed by size display the same kind of positive relationship shown in Exhibit 2. On the other hand, within size deciles, the relationship between beta and return continues to be flat.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Fama and French

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  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation
    § 'Value' Stocks · p. 19

    These findings do not necessarily imply inefficiency; they may simply indicate failure of the CAPM to capture all the dimensions of risk.

    “But these findings do not necessarily imply inefficiency. They may simply indicate failure of the CAPM to capture all the dimensions of risk.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Predicting Market Returns from Initial Price-earnings Multiples · p. 15

    It is far from clear that any of these results can be used to generate profitable trading strategies.

    “And it is far from clear that any of these results can be used to generate profitable trading strategies.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Long-run Return Reversals · p. 12

    These non-random effects, even if dependable, are very small relative to the transactions costs involved in trying to exploit them, and do not appear to offer arbitrage opportunities that would enable investors to make excess risk-adjusted returns.

    “Moreover, these non-random effects (even if they were dependable) are very small relative to the transactions costs involved in trying to exploit them. They do not appear to offer arbitrage opportunities that would enable investors to make excess risk-adjusted returns.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisecitation
    § 'Value' Stocks · p. 19

    Fama and French (1993) argue that a three-factor asset-pricing model including price-to-book-value and size as measures of risk is the appropriate benchmark against which anomalies should be measured.

    “Fama and French (1993) argue that a three-factor asset-pricing model (including price-to-book-value and size as measures of risk) is the appropriate benchmark against which anomalies should be measured.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Fama and French (1993)

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    Premisecitation
    § 'Value' Stocks · p. 19

    Fama and French (1992) concluded that size and price-to-book-value together provide considerable explanatory power for future returns and once they are accounted for, little additional influence can be attributed to P/E multiples.

    “Fama and French (1992) concluded that size and price-to-book-value together provide considerable explanatory power for future returns and once they are accounted for, little additional influence can be attributed to P/E multiples.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Fama and French (1992)

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  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationown data
    § The Equity Risk Premium Puzzle · p. 20

    The large historical equity risk premium is simply the result of a combination of perceived equity risk being considerably higher during the early years of the period and of average equity returns being much higher than had been forecast by investors.

    “I believe that this finding is simply the result of a combination of perceived equity risk being considerably higher during the early years of the period and of average equity returns being much higher than had been forecast by investors.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation
    § Other Illustrations of Irrational Pricing · p. 30

    Researchers such as Ross (2001) have suggested that closed-end fund discounts can largely be explained by fund management fees.

    “researchers such as Ross (2001) have suggested that they can largely be explained by fund management fees.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Ross (2001)

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  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given
    § Summarizing the 'Anomalies' and Predictable Patterns · p. 23

    Datamining problems are unique to nonexperimental sciences, such as economics, which rely on statistical analysis for their insights and cannot test hypotheses by running repeated controlled experiments.

    “Datamining problems are unique to nonexperimental sciences, such as economics, which rely on statistical analysis for their insights and cannot test hypotheses by running repeated controlled experiments.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given
    § Summarizing the 'Anomalies' and Predictable Patterns · p. 21

    Some patterns based on fundamental valuation measures of individual stocks may simply reflect better proxies for measuring risk.

    “some of the patterns based on fundamental valuation measures of individual stocks may simply reflect better proxies for measuring risk.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Premisenone given
    § The Internet Bubble of the Late 1990s · p. 28

    Equity valuations rest on uncertain future forecasts.

    “Equity valuations rest on uncertain future forecasts.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given
    § The Performance of Professional Investors · p. 31

    If market prices were determined by irrational investors and systematically deviated from rational estimates of the present value of corporations, and if it was easy to spot predictable patterns in security returns or anomalous security prices, then professional fund managers should be able to beat the market.

    “Surely, if market prices were determined by irrational investors and systematically deviated from rational estimates of the present value of corporations, and if it was easy to spot predictable patterns in security returns or anomalous security prices, then professional fund managers should be able to beat the market.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given
    § The Internet Bubble of the Late 1990s · p. 27

    The remarkable market values assigned to internet and related high-tech companies seem inconsistent with rational valuation.

    “Surely, the remarkable market values assigned to internet and related high-tech companies seem inconsistent with rational valuation.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given
    § Other Illustrations of Irrational Pricing · p. 30

    The potential profits from name or ticker symbol confusion are extremely small relative to the transactions costs that would be required to exploit them.

    “Moreover, the potential profits from name or ticker symbol confusion are extremely small relative to the transactions costs that would be required to exploit them.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given
    § Summarizing the 'Anomalies' and Predictable Patterns · p. 23

    Significant effects are likely to be published in professional journals while negative results, or boring confirmations of previous findings, are relegated to the file drawer or discarded.

    “Significant effects are likely to be published in professional journals while negative results, or boring confirmations of previous findings, are relegated to the file drawer or discarded.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § The Internet Bubble of the Late 1990s · p. 28

    The extent of the bubble was only clear in retrospect.

    “Certainly, the extent of the bubble was only clear in retrospect.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given
    § The Internet Bubble of the Late 1990s · p. 29

    'Bubble' periods are the exception rather than the rule.

    “Fortunately, 'bubble' periods are the exception rather than the rule”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation
    § The Equity Risk Premium Puzzle · p. 21

    Economists such as Shiller have suggested that during the early 2000s, the ex ante equity risk premium was, if anything, irrationally too low.

    “Economists such as Shiller have suggested that during the early 2000s, the ex ante equity risk premium was, if anything, irrationally too low.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Shiller

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Premisenone given
    § Summarizing the 'Anomalies' and Predictable Patterns · p. 21

    Many 'anomalies' and statistically significant predictable patterns in stock returns have been uncovered in the literature.

    “many 'anomalies' and statistically significant predictable patterns in the stock returns have been uncovered in the literature.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given
    § Summarizing the 'Anomalies' and Predictable Patterns · p. 21

    These patterns are not robust and dependable in different sample periods.

    “these patterns are not robust and dependable in different sample periods”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given
    § Conclusion · p. 33

    With the passage of time and increasing sophistication of databases and empirical techniques, we will document further apparent departures from efficiency and further patterns in the development of stock returns.

    “Undoubtedly, with the passage of time and with the increasing sophistication of our databases and empirical techniques, we will document further apparent departures from efficiency and further patterns in the development of stock returns.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given
    § Conclusion · p. 34

    Whatever patterns or irrationalities in the pricing of individual stocks that have been discovered in a search of historical experience are unlikely to persist and will not provide investors with a method to obtain extraordinary returns.

    “Moreover, whatever patterns or irrationalities in the pricing of individual stocks that have been discovered in a search of historical experience are unlikely to persist and will not provide investors with a method to obtain extraordinary returns.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationown data
    § The Performance of Professional Investors · p. 33

    The record of professionals does not suggest that sufficient predictability exists in the stock market or that there are recognizable and exploitable irrationalities sufficient to produce excess returns.

    “The record of professionals does not suggest that sufficient predictability exists in the stock market or that there are recognizable and exploitable irrationalities sufficient to produce excess returns.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § Conclusion · p. 33

    The market cannot be perfectly efficient or there would be no incentive for professionals to uncover the information that gets so quickly reflected in market prices.

    “Moreover, the market cannot be perfectly efficient or there would be no incentive for professionals to uncover the information that gets so quickly reflected in market prices, a point stressed by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Grossman and Stiglitz (1980)

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Conclusion · p. 34

    The end result will not be an abandonment of the belief of many in the profession that the stock market is remarkably efficient in its utilization of information.

    “But I suspect that the end result will not be an abandonment of the belief of many in the profession that the stock market is remarkably efficient in its utilization of information.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Conclusion · p. 34

    If any $100 bills are lying around the stock exchanges of the world, they will not be there for long.

    “If any $100 bills are lying around the stock exchanges of the world, they will not be there for long.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § The Performance of Professional Investors · p. 31

    Jensen (1969) found that active mutual fund managers were unable to add value and tended to underperform the market by approximately the amount of their added expenses.

    “He found that active mutual fund managers were unable to add value and, in fact, tended to underperform the market by approximately the amount of their added expenses.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Jensen (1969)

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given
    § Conclusion · p. 34

    Periods such as 1999 where 'bubbles' seem to have existed, at least in certain sectors of the market, are the exception rather than the rule.

    “Periods such as 1999 where 'bubbles' seem to have existed, at least in certain sectors of the market, are fortunately the exception rather than the rule.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Conclusion · p. 33

    Pricing irregularities and predictable patterns in stock returns can appear over time and even persist for short periods.

    “As a result, pricing irregularities and predictable patterns in stock returns can appear over time and even persist for short periods.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
60 of 60
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Interest rates tend to be mean reverting.

    “the tendency of interest rates to be mean reverting”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Yields on long-term Treasury bonds increased from about 9 percent to almost 10 ½ percent in the two months prior to mid-October 1987.

    “yields on long-term Treasury bonds increased from about 9 percent to almost 10 ½ percent in the two months prior to mid-October.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Congress threatened to impose a 'merger tax' that would have made merger activity prohibitively expensive and could well have ended the merger boom.

    “Early in the month, Congress threatened to impose a 'merger tax' that would have made merger activity prohibitively expensive and could well have ended the merger boom.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    James Baker threatened to encourage a further fall in the exchange value of the dollar, increasing risks for foreign investors and frightening domestic investors.

    “Also, in early October 1987, then Secretary of the Treasury James Baker had threatened to encourage a further fall in the exchange value of the dollar, increasing risks for foreign investors and frightening domestic investors as well.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Stocks are priced as the present value of the expected future stream of dividends.

    “Suppose stocks are priced as the present value of the expected future stream of dividends.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Professional fund managers are compensated with strong incentives to outperform the market.

    “who often are compensated with strong incentives to outperform the market”
6 of 6

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.

  • Jensen study has conflicting publication years

    Minor

    The text dates Jensen's mutual-fund study to 1969, while the reference entry for that study dates it to 1968.

  • Exhibit 9 does not show the claimed 30-year distribution

    Minor

    The text says Exhibit 9 shows a 30-year distribution for 355 funds. The displayed Exhibit 9 instead lists the top 20 funds of the 1980s and their returns during the 1990s.

2 of 2

Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

Research works printed but not linked: 4

  1. Fama Eugene, 1993, Journal of Finance., 33, 3
  2. 1980, American Economic Review., 70, 393
  3. Malkiel Burton G, 2000, Wall Street Journal
  4. Samuelson Paul, 1965, Industrial Management Review, 6, 41

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Authors
Malkiel, B. G.
Affiliations
Princeton University (US)
Corresponding author
Malkiel, Burton G
Venue
Journal of Economic Perspectives
Published
2003-02-01
Volume
17
Issue
1
Pages
59-82
ISSN
0895-3309 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2138293190
Cited by
2,161
References
69
Citations by year
2026: 82 · 2025: 154 · 2024: 105 · 2023: 143 · 2022: 125 · 2021: 142 · 2020: 132 · 2019: 108 · 2018: 112 · 2017: 111 · 2016: 89 · 2015: 151 · 2014: 120 · 2013: 113 · 2012: 115
FWCI
40.69
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • The Journal of Economic Perspectives (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Financial Markets and Investment Strategies
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Stock Market Forecasting Methods
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic theories and models
Keywords
efficient market hypothesis, stock price predictability, behavioral finance, market efficiency, stock returns

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