The DOI matches its Crossref record; 34 of the 34 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Rational Choice Theory and the Paradox of Not Voting
Open accessAbstract
Given the extensive evidence of apparently strategic voter behavior, it is unsettling that there is not a canonical rational choice model of voting in elections with costs to vote. But while a canonical model does not yet exist, the literature appears to be converging toward a “group-based” model of turnout, in which group members participate in elections either because they are directly coordinated and rewarded by leaders as in “mobilization” models or because they believe themselves to be ethically obliged to act in a manner that is consistent with the group's interest as in “ethical agent” models. To appreciate the development of group-based models, it will be useful to begin with a discussion of the decision-theoretic literature on voting, with a focus on the paradox of not voting. Then we will move to the game-theoretic and group-based models of voting. A conclusion highlights some of the problems that group-based models of voting must address.
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Citations
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Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Feddersen, T. J.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Perspectives
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2004-02-01
- Volume
- 18
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 99-112
- ISSN
- 0895-3309 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2134294818
- Cited by
- 440
- References
- 34
- FWCI
- 33.98
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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