The DOI matches its Crossref record; 22 of the 22 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A Political-Economy Theory of Trade Agreements
Open accessAbstract
We present a model where trade agreements are motivated by the desire of governments to commit vis-à-vis domestic lobbies, in addition to standard terms-of-trade externalities. The model predicts that trade liberalization is deeper when capital is more mobile across sectors, and when governments are more politically motivated (provided domestic-commitment motives are strong enough). The model also provides a new rationale for the use of tariff ceilings. In a fully dynamic specification of the model, tariffs are reduced in two stages: an immediate cut and a subsequent gradual reduction, with the speed of liberalization increasing in the degree of capital mobility. (JEL D72, F13)
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Grossman, G. M., & Helpman, E. (2008) · 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2 · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-79247-5_7 · Cited by 3,302
Bagwell, K., & Staiger, R. W. (1999) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.89.1.215 · Cited by 1,022
The Politics of Free Trade Agreements
Grossman, G., & Helpman, E. (1993) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w4597 · Cited by 936
Grossman, G. M., & Helpman, E. (1995) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261999 · Cited by 689
Optimum Tariffs and Retaliation
Johnson, H. G. (1953) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2296006 · Cited by 666
Regionalism and Multilateralism: A Political Economy Approach
Krishna, P. (1998) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/00335539851144162 · Cited by 542
The Value of Trade Agreements in the presence of Political pressures
Maggi, G., & Rodriguez‐Clare, A. (1998) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/250022 · Cited by 513
Self-citationOptimum Tariffs and Retaliation
Johnson, H. G. (1973) · Readings in Welfare Economics · doi:10.1007/978-1-349-15492-0_9 · Cited by 475
The Role of Multilateral Institutions in International Trade Cooperation
Maggi, G. (1999) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.89.1.190 · Cited by 412
Self-citationDiscretionary Trade Policy and Excessive Protection
Staiger, R. W., & Tabellini, G. (1987) · American Economic Review · Cited by 340
Cited by
The Design of International Trade Agreements: Introducing a New Dataset
Elsig, M., Dür, A., & Baccini, L. (2014) · doi:10.7892/boris.49460 · Cited by 745
Interdependent preferential trade agreement memberships: An empirical analysis
Egger, P., & Larch, M. (2008) · Journal of International Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jinteco.2008.08.003 · Cited by 505
The Empirical Turn in International Legal Scholarship
Shaffer, G., & Ginsburg, T. (2012) · American Journal of International Law · doi:10.5305/amerjintelaw.106.1.0001 · Cited by 346
Trade Agreements as Endogenously Incomplete Contracts
Horn, H., Maggi, G., & Staiger, R. W. (2010) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.100.1.394 · Cited by 301
Self-citationThe Environmental Bias of Trade Policy*
Shapiro, J. S. (2021) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjaa042 · Cited by 259
Metadata
- Authors
- Maggi, G., & Rodríguez-Clare, A.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2007-08-01
- Volume
- 97
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1374-1406
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2163049252
- Cited by
- 316
- References
- 22
- FWCI
- 15.50
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: A Political-Economy Theory of Trade Agreements. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1257/aer.97.4.1374
- The paper
- Maggi, G., & Rodríguez-Clare, A. (2007). A Political-Economy Theory of Trade Agreements. American Economic Review. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.97.4.1374
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
