The DOI matches its Crossref record; 72 of the 72 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Intergroup Conflict and Intra-Group Punishment in an Experimental Contest Game
Abstract
We study how conflict in contest games is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to punish each other. Our motivation stems from the analysis of sociopolitical conflict. The theoretical prediction is that conflict expenditures are independent of group size and of whether punishment is available. We find, first, that conflict expenditures of groups are substantially larger than those of individuals, and both are above equilibrium. Second, allowing group members to punish each other leads to even larger conflict expenditures. These results contrast with those from public goods experiments where punishment enhances efficiency. (JEL C72, D74, H41)
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“The IADC is an all-pay contest with a single mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (Abbink et al., 2010; Dechenaux et al., 2015).”
From Oxytocin promotes coordinated out-group attack during intergroup conflict in humans (2019) · cites this paper as Abbink et al., 2010
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Metadata
- Authors
- Abbink, K., Brandts, J., Herrmann, B., & Orzen, H.
- Affiliations
- CBESS, University of East Anglia, Norwich, NR4 7TJ, United Kingdom.
- Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (ES)
- University of Nottingham (GB)
- University of Mannheim (DE)
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2010-03-01
- Volume
- 100
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 420-447
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2150340183
- Cited by
- 264
- References
- 72
- Citations by year
- 2026: 6 · 2025: 14 · 2024: 8 · 2023: 11 · 2022: 9 · 2021: 15 · 2020: 18 · 2019: 14 · 2018: 18 · 2017: 17 · 2016: 11 · 2015: 32 · 2014: 25 · 2013: 16 · 2012: 12
- FWCI
- 47.65
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- American Economic Review (publishedVersion)
- UvA-DARE (University of Amsterdam) (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- MADOC (University of Mannheim) (submittedVersion)
- UEA Digital Repository (University of East Anglia) (submittedVersion)
- Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
- Keywords
- intergroup conflict, group size, social dilemmas, public goods, socio-political conflict
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