The DOI matches its Crossref record; 72 of the 72 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Intergroup Conflict and Intra-Group Punishment in an Experimental Contest Game
Abstract
We study how conflict in contest games is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to punish each other. Our motivation stems from the analysis of sociopolitical conflict. The theoretical prediction is that conflict expenditures are independent of group size and of whether punishment is available. We find, first, that conflict expenditures of groups are substantially larger than those of individuals, and both are above equilibrium. Second, allowing group members to punish each other leads to even larger conflict expenditures. These results contrast with those from public goods experiments where punishment enhances efficiency. (JEL C72, D74, H41)
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“The IADC is an all-pay contest with a single mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (Abbink et al., 2010; Dechenaux et al., 2015).”
From Oxytocin promotes coordinated out-group attack during intergroup conflict in humans (2019) · cites this paper as Abbink et al., 2010
Citations
Cites
Sufrin, S. C., & Olson, M. (1966) · Industrial and Labor Relations Review · doi:10.2307/2521228 · Cited by 11,583
Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. B
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Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War
FEARON, J. D., & LAITIN, D. D. (2003) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055403000534 · Cited by 7,366
Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects
Holt, C. A., & Laury, S. K. (2002) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282802762024700 · Cited by 5,893
Social categorization and intergroup behaviour
Tajfel, H., Billig, M. G., Bundy, R. P., & Flament, C. (1971) · European Journal of Social Psychology · doi:10.1002/ejsp.2420010202 · Cited by 5,562
Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.4.980 · Cited by 4,547 · cited 3×
“Note that these regularities are rather in line with the findings reported in Fehr and Gächter (2000) that subjects in public goods games were more heavily punished the more their contribution fell below the average contribution of other groups members and that contributions above the average were punished much less a…”
InfluentialThe economic costs of conflict: a case study of the Basque Country
Abadie, A., & Gardeazabal, J. (2003) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282803321455188 · Cited by 4,517
The welfare costs of tariffs, monopolies, and theft
TULLOCK, G. (1967) · Economic Inquiry · doi:10.1111/j.1465-7295.1967.tb01923.x · Cited by 2,963
Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict: An Instrumental Variables Approach
Miguel, E., Satyanath, S., & Sergenti, E. (2004) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/421174 · Cited by 2,460 · cited 1×
“Numerous studies have empirically investigated the impact of economic growth ( Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti, 2004 ), or ethnic polarisation and fragmentation (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005) on likelihood and intensity of civil conflict.”
Antisocial Punishment Across Societies
Herrmann, B., Thöni, C., & Gächter, S. (2008) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1153808 · Cited by 2,038
Self-citation
Research works printed but not linked: 5
- Herrmann Benedikt, 2008, University of Nottingham Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics Discussion Paper, 2008
- Konrad Kai A, 2007, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin Working Paper SP, 2007
- 10.1257/000282803321455359 · DOI
- Schmidt David, 2005, Indiana University Bloomington, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research Working Paper, 2006
- Tullock Gordon, 1980, Towards a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society, ed. James Buchanan, Robert Tollison, and Gordon Tullock, 97
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Group Identity and Social Preferences
Chen, Y., & Li, S. X. (2009) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.99.1.431 · Cited by 1,502
A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments
Dechenaux, E., Kovenock, D., & Sheremeta, R. M. (2015) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-014-9421-0 · Cited by 706
Collective action and the evolution of social norm internalization
Gavrilets, S., & Richerson, P. J. (2017) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1703857114 · Cited by 294
Resource scarcity and antisocial behavior
Prediger, S., Vollan, B., & Herrmann, B. (2014) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2014.07.007 · Cited by 234
Experimental Games and Social Decision Making
van Dijk, E., & Dreu, C. K. W. D. (2020) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-081420-110718 · Cited by 251
Metadata
- Authors
- Abbink, K., Brandts, J., Herrmann, B., & Orzen, H.
- Affiliations
- CBESS, University of East Anglia, Norwich, NR4 7TJ, United Kingdom.
- Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (ES)
- University of Nottingham (GB)
- University of Mannheim (DE)
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2010-03-01
- Volume
- 100
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 420-447
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2150340183
- Cited by
- 264
- References
- 72
- Citations by year
- 2026: 6 · 2025: 14 · 2024: 8 · 2023: 11 · 2022: 9 · 2021: 15 · 2020: 18 · 2019: 14 · 2018: 18 · 2017: 17 · 2016: 11 · 2015: 32 · 2014: 25 · 2013: 16 · 2012: 12
- FWCI
- 47.65
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- American Economic Review (publishedVersion)
- UvA-DARE (University of Amsterdam) (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- MADOC (University of Mannheim) (submittedVersion)
- UEA Digital Repository (University of East Anglia) (submittedVersion)
- Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
- Keywords
- intergroup conflict, group size, social dilemmas, public goods, socio-political conflict
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