The DOI matches its Crossref record; 72 of the 72 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Intergroup Conflict and Intra-Group Punishment in an Experimental Contest Game
Abstract
We study how conflict in contest games is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to punish each other. Our motivation stems from the analysis of sociopolitical conflict. The theoretical prediction is that conflict expenditures are independent of group size and of whether punishment is available. We find, first, that conflict expenditures of groups are substantially larger than those of individuals, and both are above equilibrium. Second, allowing group members to punish each other leads to even larger conflict expenditures. These results contrast with those from public goods experiments where punishment enhances efficiency. (JEL C72, D74, H41)
Overview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“The IADC is an all-pay contest with a single mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (Abbink et al., 2010; Dechenaux et al., 2015).”
From Oxytocin promotes coordinated out-group attack during intergroup conflict in humans (2019) · cites this paper as Abbink et al., 2010
Citations
Cites
Sufrin, S. C., & Olson, M. (1966) · Industrial and Labor Relations Review · doi:10.2307/2521228 · Cited by 11,583
Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. B
Press, H. (1886) · Cited by 10,087
Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War
FEARON, J. D., & LAITIN, D. D. (2003) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055403000534 · Cited by 7,366
Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects
Holt, C. A., & Laury, S. K. (2002) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282802762024700 · Cited by 5,893
Social categorization and intergroup behaviour
Tajfel, H., Billig, M. G., Bundy, R. P., & Flament, C. (1971) · European Journal of Social Psychology · doi:10.1002/ejsp.2420010202 · Cited by 5,562
Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.4.980 · Cited by 4,547 · cited 3×
“Note that these regularities are rather in line with the findings reported in Fehr and Gächter (2000) that subjects in public goods games were more heavily punished the more their contribution fell below the average contribution of other groups members and that contributions above the average were punished much less a…”
InfluentialThe economic costs of conflict: a case study of the Basque Country
Abadie, A., & Gardeazabal, J. (2003) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282803321455188 · Cited by 4,517
The welfare costs of tariffs, monopolies, and theft
TULLOCK, G. (1967) · Economic Inquiry · doi:10.1111/j.1465-7295.1967.tb01923.x · Cited by 2,963
Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict: An Instrumental Variables Approach
Miguel, E., Satyanath, S., & Sergenti, E. (2004) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/421174 · Cited by 2,460 · cited 1×
“Numerous studies have empirically investigated the impact of economic growth ( Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti, 2004 ), or ethnic polarisation and fragmentation (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005) on likelihood and intensity of civil conflict.”
Antisocial Punishment Across Societies
Herrmann, B., Thöni, C., & Gächter, S. (2008) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1153808 · Cited by 2,038
Self-citationTullock, G. (2001) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-1-4757-5055-3_2 · Cited by 1,970
Giving According to GARP: An Experimental Test of the Consistency of Preferences for Altruism
James Andreoni, A., & Miller, J. H. (2002) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/1468-0262.00302 · Cited by 1,921
The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, by Mancur Olson
Latham, E. G. (1967) · Political Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2147334 · Cited by 1,568
Zeng, X., Liu, H., Chu, M. G., & Lavernia, E. J. (1992) · Metallurgical Transactions A · doi:10.1007/bf03024549 · Cited by 1,520
(1970) · Economic Inquiry · doi:10.1111/j.1465-7295.1970.tb01072.x · Cited by 1,506
Group Identity and Social Preferences
Chen, Y., & Li, S. X. (2009) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.99.1.431 · Cited by 1,502
Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing? An Experimental Investigation
Fehr, E., Kirchsteiger, G., & Riedl, A. M. (1993) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2118338 · Cited by 1,482
Ethnic Polarization, Potential Conflict, and Civil Wars
Montalvo, J. G., & Reynal-Querol, M. (2005) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828054201468 · Cited by 1,386 · cited 1×
“Numerous studies have empirically investigated the impact of economic growth (Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti, 2004), or ethnic polarisation and fragmentation (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005 ) on likelihood and intensity of civil conflict.”
Strategy and Dynamics in Contests
Konrad, K. A. (2009) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780199549597.001.0001 · Cited by 1,047
The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft
Tullock, G. (2008) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-79182-9_2 · Cited by 911
Monetary and Non-Monetary Punishment in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism
Théorie, G. D. E. D., David Masclet, B., NOUSSAIR, C. N., Tucker, S. J., & Villeval, M. C. (2001) · Cited by 812
Punishment and counter-punishment in public good games: Can we really govern ourselves?
Nikiforakis, N. (2008) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.04.008 · Cited by 711
Individual Behavior and Group Membership
Charness, G., Rigotti, L., & Rustichini, A. (2007) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.97.4.1340 · Cited by 672
THE EFFECT OF REWARDS AND SANCTIONS IN PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS
Sefton, M., Shupp, R., & Walker, J. M. (2007) · Economic Inquiry · doi:10.1111/j.1465-7295.2007.00051.x · Cited by 649
Reciprocity, culture and human cooperation: previous insights and a new cross-cultural experiment
Gächter, S., & Herrmann, B. (2008) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2008.0275 · Cited by 484
Driving forces behind informal sanctions
Falk, A., Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2005) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00644.x · Cited by 451
Chapter 22 Economics of Conflict: An Overview
Garfinkel, M. R., & Skaperdas, S. (2006) · Handbook of defense economics · doi:10.1016/s1574-0013(06)02022-9 · Cited by 422
Gift exchange and reciprocity in competitive experimental markets
Fehr, E., Kirchsteiger, G., & Riedl, A. M. (1998) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/s0014-2921(96)00051-7 · Cited by 421
Punishment, counterpunishment and sanction enforcement in a social dilemma experiment
Denant-Boèmont, L., David Masclet, B., & NOUSSAIR, C. N. (2007) · Economic Theory · doi:10.1007/s00199-007-0212-0 · Cited by 330
Cooperation in Intergroup and Single-Group Social Dilemmas
Bornstein, G., & Ben-Yossef, M. (1994) · Journal of Experimental Social Psychology · doi:10.1006/jesp.1994.1003 · Cited by 328
Expo‐Power Utility: A ‘Flexible’ Form for Absolute and Relative Risk Aversion
Saha, A. (1993) · American Journal of Agricultural Economics · doi:10.2307/1243978 · Cited by 302
Santoro, M. D. (2000) · The Journal of High Technology Management Research · doi:10.1016/s1047-8310(00)00032-8 · Cited by 233
Davis, D. D., & Reilly, R. J. (1998) · Public Choice · doi:10.1023/a:1004916624881 · Cited by 216
An experimental examination of rational rent-seeking
Potters, J., de Vries, C. G., & van Winden, F. (1998) · European Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1016/s0176-2680(98)00037-8 · Cited by 200
Communication and efficiency in competitive coordination games
Cason, T. N., Sheremeta, R. M., & Zhang, J. (2012) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2012.05.001 · Cited by 189
Rockenbach, B., Sadrieh, A., & Mathauschek, B. (2006) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2005.04.023 · Cited by 177
Introduction: Tastes, Castes and Culture: The Influence of Society on Preferences
Fehr, E., & Hoff, K. (2011) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0297.2011.02478.x · Cited by 176
An experimental investigation of efficient rent-seeking
Millner, E. L., & Pratt, M. D. (1989) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/bf00124330 · Cited by 158
Conflict, sticks and carrots: war increases prosocial punishments and rewards
Gneezy, A., & Fessler, D. M. T. (2011) · Proceedings of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2011.0805 · Cited by 158
Risk aversion and rent-seeking: An extension and some experimental evidence
Millner, E. L., & Pratt, M. D. (1991) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/bf00123856 · Cited by 153
Competition Between Organizational Groups: Its Impact on Altruistic and Anti-Social Motivations
Goette, L. F., Huffman, D., Meier, S., & Sutter, M. (2011) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1110.1466 · Cited by 149
Skaperdas, S., & Gan, L. (1995) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2235161 · Cited by 137
Risk Aversion in Rent‐Seeking and Rent‐Augmenting Games
Konrad, K. A., & Schlesinger, H. (1997) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0297.1997.tb00074.x · Cited by 128
Strategy in Contests - An IntroductionPreprint
Konrad, K. A. (2007) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.960458 · Cited by 127
Morgan, J., Orzen, H., & Sefton, M. (2010) · Economic Theory · doi:10.1007/s00199-010-0544-z · Cited by 125
Parochial altruism in inter-group conflicts
Abbink, K., Brandts, J., Herrmann, B., & Orzen, H. (2012) · Economics Letters · doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2012.04.083 · Cited by 117
Journal of Engineering Technology
(2016) · Journal of Engineering Technology · doi:10.21859/jet · Cited by 117
Punishment and Counter-Punishment in Public Good Games: Can We Still Govern Ourselves?Preprint
Nikiforakis, N. (2005) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.764185 · Cited by 102
Resource allocation contests: Experimental evidence
Shupp, R., Sheremeta, R. M., Schmidt, D., & Walker, J. M. (2013) · Journal of Economic Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.joep.2013.09.001 · Cited by 101
Two-stage contests with budget constraints: An experimental study
Parco, J. E., Rapoport, A., & Amaldoss, W. (2005) · Journal of Mathematical Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.jmp.2005.03.002 · Cited by 97
Risk Aversion, Heterogeneity and Contests
Cornes, R., & Hartley, R. (2003) · Public Choice · doi:10.1023/a:1026136008608 · Cited by 96
Costly punishment prevails in intergroup conflict
Sääksvuori, L., Mappes, T., & Puurtinen, M. (2011) · Proceedings of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2011.0252 · Cited by 88
Reexamining efficient rent-seeking in laboratory markets
Shogren, J. F., & Baik, K. H. (1991) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/bf00123855 · Cited by 87
The appearance of homo rivalis: Social preferences and the nature of rent seekingPreprint
Herrmann, B., & Orzen, H. (2008) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 84
Top guns may not fire: Best-shot group contests with group-specific public good prizes
Chowdhury, S. M., Lee, D.-R., & Sheremeta, R. M. (2013) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2013.04.012 · Cited by 79
Ethnic Polarization, Potential Con‡ict, and Civil Wars
Montalvo, J. G., & Reynal‐Querol, M. (2005) · Cited by 74
The Cost of Rent-Seeking: Evidence from Cellular Telephone License Lotteries
Hazlett, T. W., & Michaels, R. J. (1993) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/1060281 · Cited by 65
Trust and reciprocity behavior and behavioral forecasts: Individuals versus group-representatives
Song, F. (2007) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2007.06.002 · Cited by 65
Brothers in arms – An experiment on the alliance puzzle
Ke, C., Konrad, K. A., & Morath, F. (2012) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2012.08.011 · Cited by 60
Gregory, C. A. (2002) · doi:10.4324/9780203036327-41 · Cited by 56
Öncüler, A., & Croson, R. T. A. (2005) · Journal of Theoretical Politics · doi:10.1177/0951629805056895 · Cited by 52
Appropriability and Market Structure in a Stochastic Invention Model
Isaac, R. M., & Reynolds, S. S. (1988) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1886068 · Cited by 51
Two-Stage Contests with Budget Constraints: An Experimental StudyPreprint
Parco, J. E., Amaldoss, W., & Rapoport, A. (2004) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.605265 · Cited by 34
The Economic Effects of Violent Conflict: Evidence from Asset Market ReactionsPreprint
Guidolin, M., & Ferrara, E. L. (2005) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.825889 · Cited by 32
Trust on the brink of Armageddon: The first-strike game
Klaus Abbink, A., & de Haan, T. (2014) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2014.01.009 · Cited by 27
Gift Exchange and Reciprocity in Competitive Experimental Markets
Fehr, E., Kirchsteiger, G., & Riedl, A. M. (2003) · Institutional Repository (IHS Vienna) · Cited by 26
Punishment and Counter-punishment in Public Goods Games: Can we still govern ourselves?Preprint
Nikiforakis, N. (2004) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 22
Group and individual risk preferences: a lottery-choice experimentPreprint
David Masclet, B., Lohéac, Y., Denant-Boèmont, L., & Colombier, N. (2006) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 22
Strategy in contests: an introduction [Strategie in Turnieren – eine Einführung]Preprint
Konrad, K. A. (2007) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 11
Resource Allocation Contests: Experimental EvidencePreprint
Schmidt, D., Shupp, R., & Walker, J. M. (2005) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 10
Fuentes, J. A. (2005) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 7
Bernard, M. M., Dreber, A., Strimling, P., & Eriksson, K. (2011) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1788798 · Cited by 2
Research works printed but not linked: 5
- Herrmann Benedikt, 2008, University of Nottingham Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics Discussion Paper, 2008
- Konrad Kai A, 2007, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin Working Paper SP, 2007
- 10.1257/000282803321455359 · DOI
- Schmidt David, 2005, Indiana University Bloomington, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research Working Paper, 2006
- Tullock Gordon, 1980, Towards a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society, ed. James Buchanan, Robert Tollison, and Gordon Tullock, 97
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Group Identity and Social Preferences
Chen, Y., & Li, S. X. (2009) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.99.1.431 · Cited by 1,502
A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments
Dechenaux, E., Kovenock, D., & Sheremeta, R. M. (2015) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-014-9421-0 · Cited by 706
Collective action and the evolution of social norm internalization
Gavrilets, S., & Richerson, P. J. (2017) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1703857114 · Cited by 294
Resource scarcity and antisocial behavior
Prediger, S., Vollan, B., & Herrmann, B. (2014) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2014.07.007 · Cited by 234
Experimental Games and Social Decision Making
van Dijk, E., & Dreu, C. K. W. D. (2020) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-081420-110718 · Cited by 251
Metadata
- Authors
- Abbink, K., Brandts, J., Herrmann, B., & Orzen, H.
- Affiliations
- CBESS, University of East Anglia, Norwich, NR4 7TJ, United Kingdom.
- Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (ES)
- University of Nottingham (GB)
- University of Mannheim (DE)
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2010-03-01
- Volume
- 100
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 420-447
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2150340183
- Cited by
- 264
- References
- 72
- Citations by year
- 2026: 6 · 2025: 14 · 2024: 8 · 2023: 11 · 2022: 9 · 2021: 15 · 2020: 18 · 2019: 14 · 2018: 18 · 2017: 17 · 2016: 11 · 2015: 32 · 2014: 25 · 2013: 16 · 2012: 12
- FWCI
- 47.65
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- American Economic Review (publishedVersion)
- UvA-DARE (University of Amsterdam) (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- MADOC (University of Mannheim) (submittedVersion)
- UEA Digital Repository (University of East Anglia) (submittedVersion)
- Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
- Keywords
- intergroup conflict, group size, social dilemmas, public goods, socio-political conflict
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
