The DOI matches its Crossref record; 67 of the 67 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Exploiting Naïvete about Self-Control in the Credit Market
Abstract
We analyze contract choices, loan-repayment behavior, and welfare in a model of a competitive credit market when borrowers have a taste for immediate gratification. Consistent with many credit cards and subprime mortgages, for most types of nonsophisticated borrowers the baseline repayment terms are cheap, but they are also inefficiently front loaded and delays require paying large penalties. Although credit is for future consumption, nonsophisticated consumers overborrow, pay the penalties, and back load repayment, suffering large welfare losses. Prohibiting large penalties for deferring small amounts of repayment—akin to recent regulations in the US credit-card and mortgage markets—can raise welfare. (JEL D14, D18, D49, D86)
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Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the Field
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The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model
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Cited by
Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the Field
DellaVigna, S. (2009) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.47.2.315 · Cited by 2,365
The Age of Reason: Financial Decisions over the Life Cycle and Implications for Regulation
Agarwal, S., Driscoll, J. C., Gabaix, X., & Laibson, D. (2009) · Brookings Papers on Economic Activity · doi:10.1353/eca.0.0067 · Cited by 832
Self-control, financial literacy and consumer over-indebtedness
Gathergood, J. (2012) · Journal of Economic Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.joep.2011.11.006 · Cited by 704
Present-Biased Preferences and Credit Card Borrowing
Meier, S., & Sprenger, C. (2009) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1412276 · Cited by 460
Regulating Consumer Financial Products: Evidence from Credit Cards *
Agarwal, S., Chomsisengphet, S., Mahoney, N., & Stroebel, J. (2015) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qju037 · Cited by 433
Metadata
- Authors
- Heidhues, P., & Kőszegi, B.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2010-12-01
- Volume
- 100
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 2279-2303
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1975296756
- Cited by
- 418
- References
- 67
- FWCI
- 57.40
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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